Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2000 the planning board approved a development and the developer began purchasing land. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the land could be sold without legislative action, although it was gained from the sea. Construction began; the developer invested $200 million. Because of protests, the legislature investigated and concluded that the developer lacked valid title. A 2007 Department of Justice opinion stated that the land belonged to the public domain. The governor suspended permits and froze construction. Pending a hearing, the developer filed a quiet title action. The Regulations and Permits Administration upheld suspension of construction. The Puerto Rico appeals court ordered the administration to hold an evidentiary hearing (which did not occur), but did not lift the stay on construction. The developer succeeded in its quiet title action; in 2008 construction resumed. The supreme court held that the developer's due process rights had been violated. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff did state a procedural due process claim, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants were not on clear notice they they were required to hold a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.

The inmate, convicted in 1978 of murder, gained a reputation as a "jail house lawyer" while serving his life sentence and acquired a number of "separations," a term used to indicate a conflict counseling against assignment of one inmate to the same institution as another inmate or staff member. Because of the separations, Pennsylvania began billeting him in other states' institutions pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. In 2001 he was transferred to Maryland. A letter, written in connection with the transfer, noted that the inmate is not a discipline problem, but is a "nuisance" as a jailhouse lawyer. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the inmate's protected First Amendment activities and the transfer. The timing of the transfer and the use of the term "nuisance" did not establish retaliatory motive.

Police obtained warrants, believing that the suspect had beaten a victim with a nightstick, went to the apartment before dawn, broke down the door, and promptly removed the suspect. The suspect's 15-year-old sister claims she was pushed down, injured her knee, and was handcuffed. The parents claim to have had guns held to their heads; the mother was wearing only underpants. The suspect's girlfriend claims that officers threatened to take her baby. They were detained for 40-60 minutes. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the court denied officers' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The First Circuit reversed with respect to claims based on detention of the plaintiffs. Officers had an interest in protecting their own safety and in an unimpeded search; plaintiffs were cuffed only for the duration of the search. There was no clear constitutional violation. The court affirmed with respect to other claims. The sister's injuries were sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim; no reasonable officer would think it clearly necessary to point an assault weapon at a handcuffed 15-year-old girl with no history of violence. Similarly, it was not clearly reasonably necessary to point a gun at the head of a woman, not a suspect, and nearly naked. The court also declined claims of state-law official immunity.

After a drug search, plaintiff, a 12-year veteran of the police force, notified his supervisor that he had $600 that had been found in the house. He followed instructions and returned the money to its owner. He was suspended without pay. The officer was acquitted of criminal charges before the suspension hearing, which occurred six months after his request. After the hearing, he was terminated from the department. The Investigation, Processing and Appeals Commission and Puerto Rico Court of Appeals affirmed. The federal district court ultimately dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied collateral estoppel; plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the issues at the administrative and state court levels and a "public policy" exception does not apply. Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the 14-day delay between his acquittal and the administrative hearing.

In 1994 the federal government filed suit to remedy conditions in Puerto Rican juvenile detention facilities. The court approved a settlement in 1997. A 2007 order terminated some conditions and modified and retained others. The parties continued sparring over failure to achieve specified staff levels; a 2009 order required hiring of 50 staff members per month until the goal was reached. Six months later, the federal government moved for a finding of civil contempt. The district court took no action on either the contempt motion or Puerto Rico's request to modify or terminate the 2009 order before 180 days had passed, and the prospective relief provisions were stayed (18 U.S.C. 3626(a)). The court subsequently denied the motion for contempt. The Third Circuit dismissed, reasoning that there is nothing to enforce because the 2009 order was stayed as a result of the motion to modify or terminate. The two motions involve the same argument: whether Puerto Rico is financially able to comply with the 2009 order. The court urged the district court to decide Puerto Rico's motion promptly.

The plaintiff, a U.S. Marine, claims that he was injured by police who were ejecting a fan during a baseball game. Criminal charges brought against the plaintiff for his involvement in the incident were dismissed and he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court awarded damages against the municipality ($35,000) and against each of four officers ($10,000 each). The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting defendants' motions based on untimely service of process; in entering default judgments for defendants' repeated failures to comply with discovery orders; in admitting evidence about the plaintiff's psychological treatment; and in refusing to give the municipality's proposed jury instruction on causation..

Pursuant to a permit issued by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the developer built 26 of 79 planned homes and installed infrastructure between 1992 and 2007. The Rhode Island Historic Preservation and Heritage Commission (HPHC) became interested in the site and recommended withdrawal of the permit or requiring a complete archaeological data recovery project. In 2009, after informal negotiations, the developer notified the HPHC that it would resume construction absent some response from the agencies. The developer resumed construction and a stop-work order issued. CRMC hearings are ongoing. The district court dismissed the developer's takings claims as unripe, rejecting an argument that the state litigation requirement was excused; that argument was foreclosed by a binding First Circuit holding that Rhode Island's procedures were available and adequate. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the developer did not prove that state remedies were unavailable or inadequate.

The doctor administered a standard withdrawal protocol for the plaintiff, a heroin addict, while he was in pre-trial detention. The district court rejected plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on his suffering during withdrawal. The First Circuit affirmed. The doctor's misjudgment, even neglect, during the course of treatment, did not amount to "deliberate indifference." The plaintiff's allegations concerning about "pervasive filth" in his cell because of his vomiting and diarrhea during withdrawal did not establish deliberate indifference by the doctor.

The contractor first obtained a certificate required to bid on public construction projects in 1994. In 2008, after the company was declared the lowest bidder on a school project, the state agency received information that the company had included false information on its 2007 renewal application. The agency decertified the company and it lost the bid. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit vacated for lack of jurisdiction. The company had failed to amend its complaint to name individual defendants and the state agency, the only defendant in the case, is shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court noted the complexity of the Fourteenth Amendment property interest issue.

The inmate, convicted of second-degree murder in 1993 and violation of a domestic relations restraining order in 2010, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on a decision that he was ineligible for a pre-parole community diversion program. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were barred as res judicata. While the federal case was pending, the Puerto Rican Court of Appeals affirmed that the inmate was not entitled to participate in the program. The court took judicial notice of the decision, despite failure to provide a timely English translation and the government's failure to argue res judicata below.