Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was arrested for using his cell phone camera to film police officers arresting a man on the Boston Common. Charges included violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute and two other state-law offenses, were subsequently dismissed. Plaintiff's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff was exercising clearly-established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in a public place and his clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest without probable cause.

In April 1999, a Massachusetts jury convicted petitioner of rape, kidnapping, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and carjacking. After unsuccessful attempts at post-trial relief in state court, he filed an unsuccessful petition for habeas corpus. The district court also denied a motion by which petitioner sought to subject evidence to DNA testing. The First Circuit affirmed. The court properly denied the discovery motion, given petitioner's speculative theories and baseless allegations. The court also rejected an argument that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254, pursuant to which the district court evaluated the petition, unconstitutionally restricts review to existing Supreme Court precedent.

In 2005, federal agents executed a search warrant on the residence of a fugitive felon, thought to be dangerous. That house was near the property of plaintiff's parents. The complaint alleges that unnamed agents assaulted plaintiff, pushed him to the ground, handcuffed him, and detained him for about four hours without explanation. Although defendant was in charge of the operation, he was not present during the operation and had no personal contact with plaintiff. The district court dismissed official capacity claims against defendant and unnamed agents, but it denied the motion as to personal capacity claims. The First Circuit reversed and directed entry of judgment for defendant, holding that the pleadings were insufficient under the Supreme Court's Iqbal decision. There were no facts to support that defendant participated in or directed plaintiff's detention

Plaintiff worked for the authority for 22 years while receiving treatment for schizophrenia, a condition diagnosed more than 30 years earlier. He received excellent evaluations. He claims that, beginning in 2005, his supervisors made plaintiff's life difficult in retaliation for his union activities. In 2006, plaintiff was barred from working until evaluated by a psychiatrist and was not allowed to work, even after a satisfactory report was received. The district court dismissed all claims. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The complaint did not articulate due process violations to support claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court vacated dismissal of an Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 claim. Although the complaint did not allege that schizophrenia substantially limited any aspect of plaintiff's life, the allegations did support a claim that the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Cases against the supervisors were properly dismissed; the Act reaches only the conduct of employers and does not impose liability on co-workers.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Rhode Island election laws as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees, contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates, and reporting of independent expenditures. The organization claimed that it would refrain from certain political activities if required to register as a PAC, but would comply with independent expenditures under protest. After receiving assurances that the organization could engage in its planned speech without registering as a PAC, the district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting the minimal burden imposed by the law and the valuable governmental interest underlying it. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the organization had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits.

During a raid of a motel room in which he was a guest, defendant was place on the floor and handcuffed in the wake of his host's arrest on drug charges. Defendant consented to a search of his pants pocket to locate identification; the search turned up seven small bags of crack cocaine. A dozen rounds of .38-caliber ammunition were later discovered in the pocket of his jacket. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress this evidence, he entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of simple possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The First Circuit affirmed. Given consent to retrieve an object from a cramped space, like a pocket, it is objectively reasonable to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other items in the pocket. The consent was voluntary. The circumstances justified use of handcuffs and drawn guns. Defendant was experienced in dealing with law enforcement and showed no signs of intimidation.

An inmate of the Maine corrections system, sought a civil rights remedy (42 U.S.C. 1983) for alleged denial of adequate medical care for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) by healthcare professionals at a jail and the state prison. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed with respect to the contractor that provides care, stating that the evidence could not establish Eighth Amendment violations, but reversed with respect to a physicians' assistant. Although the contractor acknowledged that its care "fell short of the mark," carelessness or inadvertence falls short of the Eighth Amendment standard of deliberate indifference. There was a material dispute about deliberate indifference by the physicians' assistant, who had a financial interest in limiting care and a disciplinary history.

A medical social worker at the Health Department of San Juan sued the municipality and officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they fired her in retaliation for statements she made on matters of public concern in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied the individual defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The First Circuit reversed. Defendants could have reasonably concluded that they did not have the necessary confidence and trust in plaintiff to continue her employment and that firing her would not violate her First Amendment rights: the city investigated plaintiff's much publicized allegations of serious improprieties by the executive director of her department, she refused to provide testimony or evidence to corroborate her claims, the investigation determined that the claims were false and baseless, and her actions were found to violate state and local regulations.

A jury awarded plaintiff $300,000 in damages in a Title VII suit alleging intentional discrimination by her former employer. Plaintiff had testified that during her employment as a construction worker, she was forced to perform oral sex on a supervisor multiple times, was subjected to extreme, continuing sexual abuse by coworkers and supervisors, that the job was her only means of supporting her family, and that the company ignored her complaints. The district court reduced the jury award to $50,000 under 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3)(A), using the year of the award to measure the number of employees and determine the size of the applicable statutory cap. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an award of $200,000,stating that the relevant year for determining the cap was the year in which the discrimination occurred and that the employer had the burden of proof with respect to the cap.