Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a municipal employee since 1989, was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 2005. She claimed of disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000. The district court entered summary judgment for her employer. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's refusal to consider evidence for which no corresponding English translation was provided to or properly filed, admission of summary charts prepared by a paralegal employed by the defendant's law firm, and dismissal of an alleged equal protection claim sua sponte. Plaintiff, who was absent more than 50 percent of the time starting in 2006, failed to establish that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA; physical presence was an essential function. Her request for assigned parking was reasonable, but did not cause any of the claimed adverse employment actions.

Plaintiff, a 49-year-old Cape Verdean female who self-identifies as black, began working for defendant as a Budget Administrator in 2001. Between 2004 and 2008, she applied for, and was denied, promotion to four different positions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer in her case, alleging discrimination based on gender, race, and national origin in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B and Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not make a prima facie case; she failed to show that she was qualified for the positions at issue or that she was "similarly situated" to other candidates.

Plaintiff, a dental hygienist at defendant's dental health center for more than 10 years, claimed that supervisors subjected her to unpaid work hours because she is black and then to selective discipline and other malfeasance in retaliation for questioning her unpaid hours. The district court entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff established only "a litany of petty insults, vindictive behavior, and angry recriminations" that are not actionable.

In 1995 Puerto Rico enacted a law mandating minimum liability insurance for drivers and created the Asociación de Suscripción Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio to provide compulsory liability insurance to those otherwise unable or unwilling to obtain insurance; the Association insures about 80 percent of vehicles in Puerto Rico. In 2008 the Association challenged regulations that limit its distribution of profits to members (insurance companies) and require that other revenue be kept in a reserve. The district court dismissed a "taking claim" under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Facial claims were time-barred; other claims were not properly raised.

After an election, in which the political party that had been in power in the municipality for eight years lost power, the new mayor hired a consultant to evaluate the budget. In response to the report, which indicated severe financial problems, several employees were terminated and sue, claiming deprivation of due process and political discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The reorganization was bona fide, not pretextual, and would have been implemented regardless of the employees' political affiliations. There was no evidence that the mayor knew the political affiliations of the employees.

After discovery of previously-undisclosed evidence, plaintiff's murder conviction was vacated and he was released after more than 30 years in prison. His suit for damages, against the city and detectives, was dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. Holding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on one count, the court noted that in 1972 it was not clearly established that Brady's no-fault disclosure obligation applied to police officers as opposed to prosecutors. They were not entitled to immunity on a claim of deliberate deception in concealing evidence and allowing false testimony. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for municipal liability.

Plaintiff, a small, family-owned firm, with Puerto Rican owners, does construction and related work on electrical utility lines, and had contracts with defendant. Plaintiff's employee was severely electrocuted and burned in accident that occurred while working on an project for defendant and defendant's manager ordered a work stoppage pending investigation, during which the contract expired. OSHA fined plaintiff. When defendant next put contracts out to bid, another company got the primary contract and plaintiff got the secondary contract, which it declined. When re-bidding became necessary, plaintiff did not participate, but filed suit, alleging discrimination in the early termination of the earlier contract and in the award and hostile work environment as well as unfair practices under state law (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9, 11). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of evidence of racial animus.

The district court declined to enter judgment on on the pleadings, in favor of defendants, in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The complaint alleged that defendants failed to provide medical services to an inmate, who had threatened suicide and engaged in self-destructive behavior, while in custody following a single-car accident.The inmate committed suicide 14 hours after release. The First Circuit reversed. The allegations went beyond the requirements of due process; there was no claim of state-created or augmented risk, and 14 hours at liberty is not reasonably compatible with any claim that normal sources of support were effectively blocked.

Petitioner was prosecuted and convicted 13 years after the murder of his wife. The evidence suggested that the motive was to obtain control of a small inheritance for drugs and prostitutes. The highest court of Massachusetts denied his petition in accordance with the special procedure for dealing with post-conviction petitions in Section 33E cases (the provision deals with a narrow class of capital cases): a single judge acts as gatekeeper to bar access to the full court on any issue that could have been raised at the time of direct appeal, unless (as a general rule) the relief is sought on a basis that is both new (in the sense of having been unavailable at the time of direct appeal) and substantial. The federal district court denied habeas corpus on the ground that the denial of relief on collateral review by the state court rested on a procedural basis in state law (the gatekeeperâs finding of failure to raise the claim on direct appeal) that was independent of the federal right and adequate to bar further relief: the gatekeeper had acted in accordance with a state rule or practice that was "firmly established and regularly followed." The First Circuit affirmed.

Petitioner, convicted of a 1984 Massachusetts murder, exhausted state appeals. After hearing new evidence that, according to a witness, another man had made self-incriminating about the murder, the district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner did not establish prejudice.