Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

During his trial for the 1986 shooting death of an acquaintance, defendant unsuccessfully urged the jury to find that someone else could have shot the victim, that the killing was accidental, or that he had been too impaired by alcohol or drugs to form specific intent to kill. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life without parole. Almost five years later, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, based on trial counsel's failure to present a mental impairment or illness defense. Following an evidentiary hearing, defendant was denied a new trial. The state's highest court determined that defendant was competent to stand trial and that counsel's decision was not unreasonable, in light of defendant's opposition to the mental impairment defense. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed.

Defendant,convicted of 21 counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault against his two stepchildren, four counts of endangering the welfare of a child and one count of indecent exposure and lewdness, exhausted direct appeals in New Hampshire state courts. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, rejecting claims that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by prohibiting him from cross-examining his stepchildren regarding their accusations that he had also abused younger siblings. The First Circuit affirmed. Exclusion of cross-examination did not deprive defendant of a defense; he was able to introduce other evidence that the children "invented" the allegations. Trial courts may place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.

Petitioner is serving a life sentence in a Massachusetts state prison for first-degree murder. The state's highest court affirmed the conviction. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present a defense that petitioner's Tourette's Syndrome exacerbated the effects of alcohol and Artane, and that he was legally insane at the time of the killing on account of the Tourette's Syndrome and other mental illness.

Plaintiffs' father was killed in an auto accident when the driver of a vehicle in which he was a passenger, attempted to flee police officers. Asserting federal constitutional and state tort claims, plaintiffs filed suit in Rhode Island state court against the officers, the city, the police department, and the police chief in his official capacity. The district court dismissed constitutional claims and declined to remand to state court. Following a trial, the court entered judgment for defendants as a matter of law. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction and exclusion of deposition testimony of the driver. That he was in prison did not render him automatically "unavailable." The court was within its discretion in denying a continuance to secure his presence.

After being extradited from Columbia, petitioner was convicted in federal court for his part in a drug conspiracy. He twice sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, without success. He then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 for alleged violations of the extradition treaty. The district court denied relief, deeming the petition an attempt to circumvent the limits on section 2255. The First Circuit affirmed. Relief under section 2255 does cover violations of treaties and petitioner cannot circumvent the limits on multiple section 2255 petitions by resorting to section 2241 to assert a treaty claim that could as easily have been advanced in his original section 2255 petition.

Plaintiff was arrested for obstructing a police officer. Charges were dropped; he brought an action against the officers involved, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury ruled in favor of one of the officers. Plaintiff moved for a new trial based on exclusion of evidence concerning statements allegedly made to plaintiff before the arrest. The First Circuit affirmed. There was no probative value to the proffered evidence and the officer's alleged statement would have been unduly prejudicial

A federal jury awarded Fortin $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting Fortin in 2007. In a post-judgment ruling, the district court reduced the award to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act for the personal liability of government employees, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, 8104-D. On appeal, Fortin argued that the MTCA cap is inapplicable here because the officer was covered by an insurance policy that triggered a higher limit under the Act. The First Circuit determined that the issues were unresolved under state law and certified two questions to the Maine Supreme Court. Whether Fortin is limited to recovery of $10,000 depends on the unexplored relationship among several provisions of the MTCA governing damage awards against government employees. Analysis may also require determining what interpretive rule should be applied to ambiguous insurance policies providing MTCA liability coverage.

Petitioner, serving two life terms for first degree murder, exhausted state appeals and was denied habeas corpus. His trial counsel had conceded that petitioner committed the shootings, but attempted to establish insanity. The First Circuit affirmed. Any errors committed under state law with respect to establishing competence or intoxication did not create federal constitutional issues.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 860, and conspiring to unlawfully possess, use, or brandish a firearm in furtherance of or during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(o) and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and 8 years supervised release. After the conviction was affirmed, defendant challenged the district court's denial of a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice.

Plaintiff, a homosexual man, was employed by the city. He claims that he was taunted by unidentified coworkers and that, after he had a romantic relationship with a coworker, he was afraid for his safety and requested that they not work together. Plaintiff claims that his work assignments deteriorated after that request. He was transferred and claims that his work caused him to become nervous and depressed and require hospitalization. The district court rejected claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and alleging violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff appealed only with respect to an equal protection claim. The First Circuit affirmed. The transfer was not an adverse employment action and plaintiff did not establish that similarly situated heterosexuals were treated differently. The court rejected a "continuing violation" claim alleging hostile work environment.