Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the forty-six-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection with his shipping an assault rifle and pistol from Florida to Puerto Rico. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, where (1) the district court's application of an upward departure was reasonable; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing how far to enhance the sentence; and (3) the district court did not fail to balance the relevant mitigating factors.

Plaintiff appealed from entry of summary judgment against his claims of race-based disparate treatment and of hostile work environment against Employer. Plaintiff's complaint alleged Employer punished him more harshly for a rules violation, on the basis of his Hispanic heritage, than it did a similarly situated white co-worker and permitted other employees to harass him in violation of Title VII. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate on both of Plaintiff's claims, as (1) Employer's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, on the record, did not allow inferences or pretext or discrimination, and there was no differential treatment; and (2) Employer took reasonable steps to address the alleged co-worker harassment.

Based on challenges of planting evidence and conducting illegal searches and seizures, officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department were convicted (in different combinations) of conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate persons in the town of Mayagüez in the free exercise or enjoyment of their constitutional rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846. The First Circuit affirmed all convictions against challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.

In 1996, Cordero began working as an agent in the Internal Revenue Division of the Puerto Rico Treasury Department. Her supervisor, Rodríguez, was brother of the mayor of Mayagüez, who was head of the Popular Democratic Party's city office. Politically, Cordero affiliates with the New Progressive Party. Cordero says that on many occasions Rodríguez made disparaging comments about the NPP within her earshot. She also claims that Rodríguez took many subtle steps to inconvenience her, such as repeatedly changing her schedule and falsely claiming that she left early so he could deduct ten minutes of pay from her check. She also claims that Rodríguez "physically and verbally assaulted" her and that there were several other incidents, including incidents after she received a transfer. The district court rejected her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the allegations “troubling” but untimely. Although the continuing violation doctrine can render otherwise time-barred conduct actionable, the doctrine still requires some anchoring violation within the limitations period, and none of Rodríguez's post-transfer conduct meets that test. Cordero's transfer occurred more than a year before she filed suit, and none of Rodríguez's conduct within that one-year limitations period was actionable.

In 1998, Holmes pled guilty to second-degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison, the mandatory sentence. Mass. G.L. ch. 265, 2. Holmes claims that he pled guilty because his attorney, Graham, told him that the prosecutor had proposed that if Holmes entered the plea and if the prosecutor wanted information from Holmes, Holmes would be able to reduce his sentence by filing a Motion to Revise or Revoke. Holmes filed the Rule 29 motion, but did not identify any grounds. The motion was futile; the trial judge had no discretion in sentencing. In 2000, Holmes filed pro se a motion to withdraw the plea, alleging that Graham was constitutionally ineffective. Graham stated that he had advised Holmes to accept the plea because there was significant risk of a first degree murder conviction. In 2004, Holmes filed an amended motion, claiming that he would not have pled guilty had he known that the Rule 29 Motion would have been futile. After successive denials Holmes filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.

Plaintiff, a former trust employee of the Metropolitan Bus Authority of Puerto Rico, sued public officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a decision not to install him in a career attorney position in the MBA was politically motivated and was effected without due process of law, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the due process claim as to all defendants, finding that plaintiff was afforded adequate process, and affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment claim as to all defendants, save for defendant Delgado. Plaintiff's allegations of participation in the decision were speculative and inadequate with respect to all of the defendants except Delgado.

Plaintiff worked for the Puerto Rico Ports Authority. In 2006, Bonilla, PRPA's executive director, named the plaintiff to a trust position within the PRPA. At the time, the Popular Democratic Party held power in Puerto Rico. In 2008, plaintiff voluntarily resigned this post in order to accept a career position at the Marín International Airport in Carolina. Within months, he transferred to another career position as a security supervisor at Aguadilla airport. The PDP lost the general election in 2008, and its rival, the New Progressive Party, assumed office. In early 2009, plaintiff began experiencing workplace harassment, including banishment from the Aguadilla airport, transfer to the Mercedita airport in Ponce (far from his home), removal of his sidearm, a series of negative performance evaluations, and threats of suspension and termination. No legitimate reason supported any of these actions. The district court dismissed his claim of political discrimination. The First Circuit reversed.

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales.

FBI agents executed a search warrant at an apartment; the search was one of six that day involving an alleged domestic terrorism plot by "Los Macheteros," an organization dedicated Puerto Rican independence that has been involved in numerous prior violent acts. When reporters entered the apartment complex during the search, there was a confrontation, and agents used pepper spray and struck or pushed plaintiffs, who brought Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. After the First Circuit vacated summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the district court again granted summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court's discovery limitations were consistent with resolving qualified immunity questions at the earliest possible stage and it acted within its discretion to consider depositions and video clips. The court concluded that it was not clearly established that a "non-arrest" could be considered a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, so that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Even if viewed as a seizure, the court found the force employed by defendants was reasonable in at the time of the events.

Training, simulating an arrest, took place at a police facility in San Juan without certified trainers. A requirement that weapons be emptied was not enforced and the highest-ranked officer gave the order that bulletproof jackets not be worn during the exercise. Loaded guns were present and the officer playing the suspect was shot and died. His family filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The trial court dismissed. The First Circuit reversed in part, first affirming dismissal of Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims. With respect to Fourteenth Amendment claims, plaintiffs adequately claimed that actions and inactions of the police and the use of a loaded firearm under the circumstances shock the conscience, and that defendants with supervisory responsibility were callously and recklessly deficient in the lack of any care for the safety of the officer. The mayor is not amenable to suit merely because he is mayor, nor may the municipality be sued, as pled, on a respondeat superior theory. Although the complaint alleges that there were insufficient regulations in place to govern the training exercise, it also describes several safety procedures that were intended to prevent exactly this type of accident.