Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2007, there were two shooting deaths, one of a civilian, Liko Kenney, and one of a police officer, Bruce McKay, in Franconia, New Hampshire. Following a traffic stop, Kenney shot Officer McKay four times and ran over him twice with his car. Thereafter, a witness to the shooting, Gregory Floyd, approached Kenney and asked him to drop his weapon. When Kenney refused, Floyd shot and killed Kenney, fearing that Kenney might shoot Floyd or his son, who had gone to McKay's assistance. In this civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, David Kenney, the civilian victim's father and the executor of his son's estate, sued McKay, the town of Franconia and its police officials, and Floyd. The district court granted the town and police defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all federal claims, concluding that Plaintiff lacked sufficient evidence to prove any violation of Kenney's Fourth Amendment rights had occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of a constitutional violation regarding McKay's actions toward Kenney; and (2) therefore, the claims against the town and McKay's supervisors also failed. View "Kenney v. Floyd" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the governor of Maine violated the First Amendment by removing a large state-owned mural, commissioned by the former administration, from its location on the walls of a small waiting room for visitors to the Maine Department of Labor (MDOL). The mural consisted of panels depicting selected episodes in the history of Maine labor. Plaintiffs, six Maine residents who had viewed the mural and planned to view it again at the MDOL office, filed a complaint against the governor and the commissioner of MDOL claiming that the mural's removal was impermissibly content- and viewpoint-based. The U.S. district court entered judgment for Defendants. After noting that the MDOL waiting room was not a public forum, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the government may, in this setting, choose to disassociate itself from an endorsement implicit from the setting for the mural, which it understood as interfering with the message of neutrality the administration wished to portray. View "Newton v. LePage" on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm and knowingly possessing a firearm with an altered serial number. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the district court erroneously precluded his proposed entrapment defense and improperly admitted certain evidence at trial, and (2) because the Commerce Clause does not endow Congress with the requisite authority to regulate the conduct covered by the underlying statutes of conviction, those statutes were invalid and unenforceable. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court's denial of Defendant's pretrial motions to unveil and subpoena an alleged confidential informant did not deprive Defendant of his constitutional right to present a complete defense; (2) the district court's admission of the disputed evidence was not error; and (3) the underlying statutes of conviction were valid and constitutional. View "United States v. Roszkowski" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant on nine counts growing out of a conspiracy to commit armed robbery and the unlawful killing of a guard during a robbery. In an earlier multi-defendant appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's convictions and sentences on eight of the nine counts. As to the remaining count, however, the First Circuit affirmed Appellant's conviction but vacated his sentence in order to afford him an opportunity to allocute. At resentencing on that count, the district court heard Appellant's allocution and proceeded to reinstate the original sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court's failure to fully explain its reason for imposing its sentence on count eight was not plain error, and Appellant's sentence on count eight was substantively reasonable; and (2) Appellant's conviction and sentence on count nine did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Medina-Villegas" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from charges of sexual harassment brought by a one-time employee against Appellant, the former president of Jasmine Company, Inc. Appellant sought a defense to and indemnity for the harassment claims from Appellee, Jasmine's liability insurance provider. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to coverage from Appellee because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration between Appellant and the purchaser of his business conclusively established that Appellant's conduct fell within an exclusion to Appellee's insurance policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration presented Appellant with the full and fair opportunity for adjudication on the issue at hand; and (2) therefore, the district court was correct to bar Appellant from disputing the applicability of the exclusion based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant served several prison terms for sex-related crimes. Before Appellant was released from custody in the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the federal government commenced the effort to have him certified as a sexually dangerous person and to commit him civilly under the Adam Walsh Act. The federal district court determined that Appellant met the conditions for certification as a sexually dangerous person and ordered him civilly committed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was legitimately in BOP custody when the commitment proceeding began, as required by statute; and (2) the district court correctly found that Appellant suffered from the requisite mental disorder and that he satisfied the statutory dangerousness test. View "United States v. Wetmore" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed a judgment of the U.S. district court sentencing him to thirty-three months' imprisonment for failing to register as a sex offender. In calculating a range for his sentence under the sentencing guidelines, the district court included two additional criminal history points because Appellant was under a criminal justice sentence when he failed to register. Appellant contended that he was not under a criminal justice sentence at that time. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was under a criminal justice sentence when he failed to register, and therefore, the district court's sentencing calculation was sound. View "United States v. Peters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment to her former employer in this suit for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, arguing that the district judge slipped by premising dismissal on disputed facts. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff's appeal with prejudice after discussing the circumstances under which appeals will be dismissed for failure to adhere to appellate rules, holding that Plaintiff's substantial noncompliance with important appellate rules were major violations in that they crippled any attempt to review the issues intelligently and constituted sufficient cause to dismiss the appeal. View "Rodriguez-Machado v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to 216 months in prison. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings, holding that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to suppress Defendant's statement regarding a bag containing firearms, as Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statement; (2) admitting an audio recording of a telephone call to a police chief where the court properly authenticated the evidence; and (3) determining Defendant was convicted of two predicate offenses in Virginia and Florida and sentencing Defendant under the ACCA. View "United States v. Murdock" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and ordered to be detained on criminal charges. An initial indictment and several superseding indictments followed charging Defendant with several drug offenses. The last indictment was filed in October 2011. Defendant filed motions seeking dismissal of the fourth superseding indictment and release from custody under the section 3164 of the Speedy Trial Act. The district court ordered Defendant's discharge. Fifteen minutes later, Defendant was re-arrested on a new criminal complaint for drug possession. Defendant was re-indicted on four counts virtually identical to the counts charged in the October 2011 indictment and again pled not guilty. Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Tirasso, the district court found that re-indictment on the same offense does not restart section 3164's ninety-day clock and granted Defendant's motion for release. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when an indictment is dismissed upon the motion of a defendant, the dismissal is without prejudice and that defendant is again detained awaiting trial, section 3164's ninety-day clock restarts at the moment that Defendant is re-arrested, regardless of the nature of the charges in the new complaint. View "United States v. Worthy" on Justia Law