Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Darryl Tavares and Eddie Jones were both convicted of conspiracy to knowingly transport an individual in interstate commerce with the intent that such individual engage in prostitution. Tavares was also convicted of knowingly transporting a minor across state lines to engage in prostitution and of sex trafficking of a child. Jones was also convicted of aiding and abetting the transportation of a minor across state lines to engage in prostitution and of knowingly transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in prostitution. The district court sentenced Defendants to 300 months' imprisonment and to three years' supervised release. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its rulings during trial; (2) substantial evidence supported the convictions; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendants. View "US v. Tavares" on Justia Law

At the turn of this century, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that created fixed and floating buffer zones around abortion clinics. The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected several challenges to the law's constitutionality. In 2007, the legislature amended the statute to create a fixed thirty-five-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The First Circuit upheld the law against a facial challenge. Plaintiffs pursued an as-applied challenge in district court, where it was rejected. Plaintiffs again appealed, principally raising First Amendment arguments. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute is a content-neutral, narrowly tailored time-place-manner regulation that protects the rights of prospective patients and clinic employees without offending the First Amendment rights of others. View "McCullen v. Coakley" on Justia Law

In 1984, following the denial of his motion to suppress, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of conspiracy to possess marijuana, and the sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to four years incarceration. After various appeals, Petitioner reached an agreement with the government wherein he abandoned his suppression challenge and the government recommended that his sentence be reduced to eighteen months' imprisonment. In 2007, Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of error coram nobis, attacking the denial of the suppression motion in the 1984 case based on newly available evidence. Although Petitioner had been released from imprisonment for the 1984 crime, that conviction operated to increase the sentence he received as the result of his next criminal conviction, for which Petitioner was still serving time. The district court denied Petitioner's petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that issuance of the writ would not be warranted under the facts and circumstances of this case. View "Murray v. United States" on Justia Law

Upon an investigation by the Maine Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) and the Maine Attorney General's Office (AG's Office) into the questionable business practices of Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Company), Appellant, the Company's employee, accepted responsibility for his own unlawful conduct. In exchange, several state officials (Appellees) representing the Bureau and the AG's Office agreed to take no further action against Appellant. Appellees, however, subsequently agreed to Appellant's termination in a separate agreement with the Company. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellees were entitled to absolute immunity on the section 1983 claim, and (2) Appellant failed to plead a plausible section 1985(2) claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden in establishing they were entitled to absolute immunity for entering into the consent agreements with Appellant and the Company, and the district court did not err by refusing to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel on Appellees' immunity defense; and (2) because the complaint failed to allege any racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus underlying Appellees' actions, the district court properly dismissed Appellant's section 1985(2) claim. View "Knowlton v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Powers and John Mahan, who ran an employment agency supplying temporary workers, were convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the functions of the IRS and mail fraud. Powers was also convicted of subscribing false tax returns and Mahan of procuring false tax returns. The tax fraud amounted to $7.5 million. Powers was sentenced to eighty-four months' imprisonment and Mahan to a term of seventy-six months. Defendants' appealed, alleging that the trial court committed errors requiring a new trial. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendants' convictions and sentences, holding (1) there was no prejudice to Defendants in the trial court's failure to give an defense instruction on advice of counsel; (2) various witnesses were not allowed to testify as to the ultimate issues, and thus the role of the jury was not invaded; (3) defense counsel was afforded a reasonable opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses; and (4) the district court did not plainly err in excluding testimony by Defendants' witnesses. View "United States v. Mahan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and (2) the district court erred in giving a "willful blindness" instruction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding (1) the record did not establish that Defendant was willfully blind to drug-related activity; and (2) the Government, therefore, did not meet its burden of poof with respect to the second element of the charged conspiracy - that Defendant "had knowledge of the conspiracy." Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Burgos" on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute arising from charges of sexual harassment brought by a former employee (Employee) against the one-time president (President) of Jasmine Company, Inc. After President filed an action against Jasmine's liability insurance provider (Insurer), seeking defense and indemnification for the harassment charges, Insurer filed a third-party complaint against Jasmine itself, requesting a declaratory judgment that it had not duty to defend or indemnify Jasmine for the harassment claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the third-party claims for Jasmine, holding that Insurer had to defend and indemnify Jasmine. At issue on appeal was whether a finder of fact must conclude that the conduct underlying the sexual harassment charges did or did not begin before Jasmine's insurance policy took effect. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of when the harassing conduct that gave rise to Employee's claims began was a quintessential question for a factfinder. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with five criminal offenses based on the discovery of marijuana plants and pipe bombs in his home. Appellant filed motions to suppress the evidence seized from his home and his statements to law enforcement. The district court denied both motions. Appellant thereafter pled guilty to four counts of the indictment conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's suppression motions, as (1) the evidence seized from Appellant's home was discovered pursuant to a warrantless search justified pursuant to the emergency exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant's statements to investigators were correctly admitted into evidence, as Appellant was not in custody during the interviews, obviating the need for Miranda warnings and for heeding Appellant's invocation of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present. View "United States v. Infante" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possessing five or more grams of cocaine base. After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion as well as the use of certain prior convictions in calculating his sentence guideline range. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the district court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, as (i) the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which Defendant was riding, (ii) the stop did not escalate into a de facto arrest, and (iii) the district court's finding that the drugs on Defendant's person were in plain sight was not clearly erroneous; and (2) the district court properly considered Defendant's 1997 conviction for assault and battery of a police officer and 1997 felony drug conviction in calculating Defendant's sentence guideline range. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law