Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a district court order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action against the Attorney General of Florida and the State Attorney for Florida's Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff claimed that the State prevented him from gaining access to physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing, in violation of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and compulsory process, and his Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all the claims for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the Supreme Court had recently made it clear that there was no freestanding constitutional right to access evidence for DNA testing, and that the federal courts could only upset a state's postconviction DNA access procedures if they were fundamentally inadequate to vindicate substantive rights.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of Troup's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' sexual harassment claim brought pursuant to Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681. The facts of this case stemmed from circumstances surrounding the sexual molestation of a 12-year-old boy by his 45-year-old seventh grade homeroom teacher. The court held that the district court combined Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., workplace discrimination standards with Title IX teacher-on-student harassment standards when it articulated plaintiff's burden. However, the district court's reliance on the wrong standard did not necessarily mandate that the court must now reverse its decision and remand the case. After considering the factual record and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the court found that the information of which the school principal had knowledge was not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had actual notice sufficient to alert him to the possibility of sexual harassment of the 12-year-old by his teacher. Accordingly, although for different reasons than the district court, the court granted summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed suit against Sheriff Gee, in his official capacity, after she was transferred from her data processing telecommunications technician position to the Help Desk when she informed the sheriff's office, her employer, that she was pregnant. Plaintiff asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), and under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded her $80,000 in back pay and $10,000 for emotional distress. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict; in view of the sheriff's concession that he did not plead or argue the affirmative defense under the doctrine of after-acquired evidence and that there was no evidence that plaintiff engaged in wrongdoing, the district court erred in applying the doctrine to vacate the award of back pay; and the district court did not err in its response to a question from the jury.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's order dismissing his complaint against Target and Virginia Winn. Plaintiff, a Hispanic male, alleged that Winn, a white Target cashier, refused to serve him based on his race and publicly humiliated him when she turned him away from her register. Plaintiff brought suit against Winn for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); against Target for vicarious liability and for negligent training, supervision, and retention; and against both defendants for violating his right to make contracts under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the case, explaining that plaintiff could not maintain a section 1981 claim because he was ultimately able to complete his purchase, and that Winn's alleged actions did not rise to the level of outrageousness required to state an IIED claim under controlling Florida law. After thorough review and having had the benefit of oral argument, the court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendants, all state social workers, placed a teenaged minor in an adoptive home and the teenager later sexually assaulted the young grandchild of the adoptive parents. The victim sued the state workers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his federal substantive due process rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the preexisting law at the pertinent time did not clearly establish that the victim's federal rights would be violated by the state workers' acts, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the federal claims against defendants in their individual capacities.

Plaintiffs brought suit individually and on behalf of James Christopher Allen's estate against defendants, including officers Cooks and Harkleroad, for excessive force, denial of medical care, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., assault, battery, negligence, and wrongful death. Allen died shortly after the officers repeatedly used their Tasers in an attempt to subdue and arrest defendant, who died shortly thereafter while being transported to jail. Cooks and Harkleroad subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal after the district court's judgment. The court held that, given all the factors, the officers' conduct did not arise to the level of "obvious clarity" which would require all reasonable officers to inevitably conclude that the force used was unlawful. Accordingly, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court also held that no reasonable jury could find that the officers used their Tasers with the deliberate intent to do wrong. The court agreed, and plaintiffs concurred, with Harkleroad's claim that he could not be held liable under Georgia law for any negligence-based claim resulting from the performance of discretionary acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendants, alleging that all defendants violated her free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that CSC violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims. The court held that plaintiff had not provided evidence that Dr. Chosewood, CDC's Director of Health and Safety, and Ms. Zerbe, the CDC project officer responsible for managing the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) contract, requested her removal from the EAP in retaliation of her free exercise rights. Because plaintiff failed to show that her constitutional right was violated, Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that no reasonable juror could conclude that Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe's decision was based on plaintiff's religious objections to counseling clients in same-sex relationships, rather than the manner in which plaintiff handled a certain client's referral and their understanding that plaintiff would not alter her behavior in connection with future referrals. Because Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe did not violate plaintiff's statutory right under RFRA, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court further held that plaintiff could not assert a Bivens action against CSC; because CSC did not burden plaintiff's religious rights by removing her from the EAP contract or by ultimately terminating her employment, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of CSC on her RFRA claim; and the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claim against CSC. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued the Secretary and several elected officials, alleging that the officials' application of a Georgia statute that governed absentee voting, Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-381(a)(1)(D), denied him the right to have a ballot mailed to him at the jail and prevented him from voting while he was incarcerated in the fall of 2008. The court vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's alleged injury was not fairly traceable to any actions of the officials where plaintiff would not have received a ballot at the jail regardless of the officials' application of the statute when he provided only his home address on his application for an absentee ballot.

Appellants, members of the U.S. House of Representatives, along with the Florida House of Representatives, appealed from a district court order granting final summary judgment to appellees, the Florida Secretary of State and various intervening parties. At issue was whether a state constitutional provision, Amendment Six, establishing standards for congressional redistricting that was approved by the people by initiative was contrary to the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that Florida voters' act of lawmaking according to the state's expressly enumerated lawmaking process was fully consistent with the commands of the Elections Clause, and consonant with the understanding given to the Elections Clause by the Supreme Court in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant and Smiley v. Holm. The court also held that the factors enumerated in Amendment Six have been for many years commonly considered by legislative bodies in congressional redistricting and long accepted by the courts as being lawful and consistent with the powers delegated to the state legislatures by the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellants are the parents of G.J., a child with autism and brain injuries. At issue was whether the ALJ and the district court properly evaluated appellants' claims that the MCSD did not comply with certain provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., with respect to services it was to provide to G.J. The court held that the district court did not err in setting forth reasonable conditions for G.J.'s reevaluation and in determining that appellants were not entitled to either a private or publicly funded independent educational evaluation. The court also held that there was no basis for making a determination that any procedural failures with regard to the August 2008 and 2009 IEP meetings impacted the education received by G.J. to any substantive degree. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.