Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged Florida's "Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992" (the Florida Act), Fla. Stat. 456.053, which prohibited Florida physicians from referring their patients for services to business entities in which the referring physicians have a financial interest. The court concluded that the conflict preemption doctrine did not apply, and the exemptions in federal law allowing physicians serving end-stage renal disease patients to engage in self-referral did not preempt Florida's more restrict law prohibiting such conduct. The court also concluded that the Florida Act did not discriminate against interstate commerce, nor did it impose a burden on interstate commerce that was clearly excessive when compared with the law's putative local benefits. Therefore, the Florida Act did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Further, plaintiffs' substantive due process claim failed to survive rational basis scrutiny, and an equal protection claim would fail as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fresenius Medical Care Holding, et al v.Tucker, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., after she was terminated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer because plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the termination - that plaintiff violated (or appeared to violate) the company's conduct policies - was pretextual. In this case, the corporate executive who terminated plaintiff later said that she was an exceptional employee who had done nothing wrong, had done everything right, and should not have been fired. The court held that such evidence, when combined with a prima facie case, created a jury question as to discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Kragor v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America" on Justia Law

The Board challenged the district court's determination affirming the validity of a Department of Education regulation that required state and local agencies to reimburse parents and guardians for an independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their children with disabilities. The court held that the Secretary of Education did not exceed its authority in promulgating 34 C.F.R. 300.502, providing parents the right to a publicly financed IEE and therefore, the district court did not err in requiring the Board to reimburse plaintiffs for the IEE that they obtained for their child. View "Phillip C., et al v. Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that her termination was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it was based on her candidacy. The court held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, did not require defendant to retain her political opponent after becoming superior court clerk for the county. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Underwood v. Harkins, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brought these actions against defendants for injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that the FDOT promulgated a policy of "detaining" motorists in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that the complaint allegations did not state a constitutional violation; defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; and summary judgment of the district court denying qualified immunity to defendants was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Chandler v. Secretary, FL DOT, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed summary judgment in favor of her former employer and against her complaint of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. At issue was whether the employer was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court held that the employer was a state agency immune from plaintiff's complaint of disability discrimination and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's complaint of racial discrimination where plaintiff unequivocally answered "no" when she was asked if her termination had anything to do with her race. View "Ross v. Jefferson Co Dept of Health" on Justia Law

Objectors appealed the district court's approval of a class action settlement. The underlying case involved allegations that Disney violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12182 et seq., by implementing a policy that banned the use of two-wheeled vehicles, including Segways, by customers within its park and hotels, without exception. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class and in approving the settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the settlement orders.

This appeal involved challenges to ten provisions of Alabama's House Bill 56, the "Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act" (H.B. 56). The stated purpose of the legislation was to discourage illegal immigration within the state and maximize enforcement of federal immigration laws through cooperation with federal authorities. The court found that the United States was likely to succeed on the merits of its challenges to sections 10, 11(a), 13(a), 16, 17, and 27 of H.B. 56. The court agreed with the United States that it was not likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to section 12(a) or section 18 at this time. The court also found that the United States had not shown at this stage that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to section 30. Finally, the court dismissed the United States' appeal as to section 28 as moot, as the court's opinion in the private plaintiffs' companion case fully disposed of that issue.

Defendants appealed the district court's order granting plaintiffs' motion and preliminarily enjoined enforcement of sections 7 and 8 of House Bill 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.B. 87), on the ground that each was preempted by federal law. H.B. 87 was enacted to address the problem of illegal immigration within the state. The court held that section 7 could not be reconciled with the federal immigration scheme or the individual provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's order preliminarily enjoining enforcement of section 7. The court reversed in part the portion of that order enjoining section 8.

Plaintiffs challenged various provisions of Alabama's House Bill 56, the "Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act" (H.B. 56). Because the court found that the United States was likely to succeed on its claims that sections 10 and 27 of H.B. 56 were preempted, the court dismissed the HICA plaintiffs' appeal as to those sections as moot. The court vacated as moot the district court's injunction of section 8 and remanded for the dismissal of the challenge to that section, as the statutory amendment had removed the challenged language. In light of the court's decision on the substantive provisions of sections 10, 11, and 13, the court vacated as moot the district court's order insofar as it preliminarily enjoined the last sentence of sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). The court found that at least one of the HICA plaintiffs had standing to challenge section 28 and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for the entry of a preliminary injunction. Finally, the court concluded, for reasons stated in the United State's companion cases, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14674, that the HICA plaintiffs could not succeed on the merits of their facial challenges to sections 12, 18, and 30 at this time.