Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, an attorney and her client, filed suit against defendants in their individual capacities, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment based on the warrantless recording of their privileged conversations and the seizure of the written statement, and under 18 U.S.C. 2520(a) for violations of the Federal Wiretap Act based on the warrantless recording. The court concluded that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy for their privileged attorney-client conversations in the interview room of the St. Johns County Sheriff's Office. The surreptitious recording and monitoring of those attorney-client conversations, without notice to plaintiffs, and without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. Under the circumstances, it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless recording of attorney-client conversations between a non-incarcerated suspect and his attorney. The district court correctly held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the warrantless seizure of the client's written statement from the attorney violated their Fourth Amendment rights and that the exigent circumstances exception was inapplicable in this instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gennusa, et al. v. Canova, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the district court's order dismissing as moot his lawsuit alleging that two Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the protection he required after he assisted the BOP in the investigation of its own officer in another city. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong standard for rebutting the government actor's presumption. Applying the correct legal standard to the facts of plaintiff's case, the court concluded that his request for injunctive relief was not moot. The BOP has not met its "formidable" or "heavy" burden of establishing "that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur" or that the challenged conduct has been unambiguously terminated. The BOP has not met its burden to show that plaintiff would not be returned to a high-security BOP facility. Considering all the circumstances of plaintiff's case and applying the proper standard for evaluating voluntary cessation by a government actor, the court concluded that the BOP failed to carry its burden to demonstrate unambiguous termination of the challenged conduct. Accordingly, plaintiff's suit was not moot. The court reversed and remanded. View "Doe v. Stover, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against prison officials after he was assaulted and stabbed by his cellmate. Plaintiff alleged that the officials were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm that the cellmate posed to plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could infer from the facts that defendants actually knew that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm from the cellmate where defendants knew that the cellmate had a violent past, was very disruptive, and needed greater management. The cellmate had started a dangerous fire that endangered his life and plaintiff's life, had expressed no regret for doing so, and used plaintiff's personal photographs and papers to start the fire. Defendants also knew that plaintiff feared for his life. Because the record contained sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the subjective element of plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, the district court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on that basis. The law clearly established that defendants' failure to investigate the substantial risk of harm constituted unconstitutional deliberate indifference to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Caldwell, et al. v. FCI Talladega Warden, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the W.C. Holman Correctional Facility, was assaulted in the "back hallway" with a knife by another inmate who cut plaintiff's throat and nearly killed him. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prison officials, seeking damages for the injuries he received. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's requests for leave to conduct additional discovery where the only evidence plaintiff was unable to obtain related to the purchasing of craft materials and the policies for disposing of used hobby craft blades. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm plaintiff faced at the time of the assault. Although the evidence demonstrated that the warden was on notice that inmate-on-inmate assaults occurred in the back hallway, the evidence of inmate-on-inmate assault involving weapons did not indicate that inmates were exposed to something even approaching the constant threat of violence and Holman's policies for monitoring the back hallway did not create a substantial risk of serious harm. The record failed to demonstrate that any lapse in oversight of cutting instruments created a substantial risk of excessive inmate-on-inmate violence. Even if the conditions at Holman created an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence, defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the risk. View "Harrison v. Culliver, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Secretary of State, arguing that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The 90 Day Provision requires states to "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters." Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections, the Secretary engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. Determining that the issue was not moot even if the 2012 elections have passed, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that the Secretary's actions fall under the category of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters." Further, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA supported the court's conclusion that the plain meaning of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" was intended by Congress to include programs like the Secretary's. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arcia, et al. v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CRI, claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.10. Congress made significant changes to the ADA by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The court concluded that, in light of these recent amendments to the ADA, plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence on his ADA and FCRA disability claims to make out a prima facie case; the district court erroneously applied the prima facie standard created for reduction-in-force cases to plaintiff's age discrimination claims; and, therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CRI, remanding for further proceedings. View "Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FedEx on his disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq. When plaintiff failed his Department of Transportation (DOT) medical examination due to his diabetes, FedEx withdrew plaintiff's job offer since he did not qualify for a Technician position. FedEx claimed that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) required it to do so. Plaintiff argued that by imposing a requirement that he must obtain a DOT medical card even though he would be a mechanic and not a commercial truck driver, FedEx violated the ADA and the FCRA, which prohibited an employer from using qualification standards that screen out people with disabilities. The court concluded that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether test-driving FedEx trucks was an essential function of the Technician position. The court also concluded that, the occasional test-driving of empty FedEx trucks in the Fort Myers area did not constitute transporting property or passengers in interstate commerce. Therefore, the FMCRs did not oblige FedEx to require plaintiff to obtain DOT medical certification to be "qualified" for the Technician position. The FMCRs did not afford FedEx a defense to plaintiff's disability discrimination claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Samson v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's Ordinance No. 2886-12, which generally prohibits targeted picketing within 50 feet of a residential dwelling. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss. At issue are sections 62-79 and 62-77. The court concluded that the Ordinance's ban on targeted picketing, section 62-79, was content-neutral, furthered a significant government interest, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternate channels for speech. Therefore, section 62-79 was facially constitutional and the district court dismissed plaintiff's challenge as to section 62-79. The court concluded however, that section 62-77 granted private citizens unbridled discretion to invoke the City's power to regulate speech in public fora abutting private residences. Accordingly, the court concluded that the loitering provision was facially unconstitutional and invalid. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bell, et al. v. City of Winter Park, FL, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that he could experience unnecessary pain when the State of Florida executed him by lethal injection. The court concluded that plaintiff had not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim that the use of midazolam hydrochloride in Florida's current lethal injection protocol amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. In light of the district court's thorough and detailed credibility determinations and the extensive factual findings that flowed from them, the court concluded that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the use of midazolam in the 2013 Protocol created a substantial risk of serious harm. The court affirmed the district court's order denying a preliminary injunction and denied the motion for stay of execution. View "Chavez v. Florida SP Warden, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that her teenage daughter - who suffers from severe emotional, mental, and physical disabilities - was sexually assaulted by another student while in defendant's care. The district court concluded that plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief and dismissed with prejudice. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motions for partial reconsideration and for leave to amend. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" warranting the reopening of the final judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for partial reconsideration. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "M. G. v. St. Lucie Cty. Sch. Bd., et al." on Justia Law