Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district, claiming that he was retaliated against by the school district because he made public statements to the press regarding the accreditation investigation of the school district. Because plaintiff was not speaking pursuant to any official duties for the school district, bur rather was speaking in his capacity as president of the Georgia Association of Educators, the district court erred when it held that plaintiff's speech fell under the rule announced in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the school district and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hubbard v. Clayton Co. Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to three years probation for threatening to shoot President Obama on defendant's Facebook page. Afterwards, defendant spoke to a reporter for his college newspaper, saying that his ordeal was "pretty funny," that he could not be imprisoned in his "own house," and that a lot of good had come out of his case, including his rock band because a "lot of people showed up [to one of his shows] to see the kid who threatened to kill the [P]resident." The district court, upon learning of these comments, modified the conditions of probation to include 45 days in a halfway house and one year of home confinement with electronic monitoring. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that defendant's appeal was moot to the extent that it challenged the district court's modification of the conditions of probation to include a 45-day term in a halfway house; the appeal was not moot with respect to the district court's modification of the conditions of probation to include an additional eight months in home confinement with electronic monitoring; where 18 U.S.C. 3563(c) permits modification when a defendant's post-sentencing conduct shows that the original conditions were not sufficient to accomplish the purposes of probation, the home confinement modification did not violate defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause; the home confinement modification did not violate the Due Process Clause where, assuming there was any error, it did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings; and the home confinement modification did not violate the First Amendment where defendant's post-sentencing comments were relevant to the conditions of probation because they indicated that defendant did not grasp the seriousness of his conduct and did not think much of the probationary sentence he had received, and defendant was not punished for any abstract beliefs. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "United States v. Serrapio, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging that the employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, by terminating him based on his diagnoses of alcoholism. The court agreed with the employer that plaintiff was not qualified under DOT regulations to drive a commercial truck because he had a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. Because the court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to drive a commercial truck under the DOT regulations, the court need not address whether the employer's company policy also supported that determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the ADA claim. In regards to the FMLA claims, the court agreed with the district court's determination that plaintiff's interference claim failed because the employer would have discharged plaintiff regardless of his FMLA leave, and plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because he could not show that the employer's decision to terminate him was causally related to his FMLA leave. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the FMLA claims. View "Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant reduced and ultimately terminated plaintiff's consulting work as a forensic psychologist for the Broward County Public Defender's office in retaliation for plaintiff's constitutionally protected testimony about a Florida state court judge. The court vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendant where a reasonable fact-finder could find that defendant was subjectively motivated to reduce and did reduce plaintiff's work because of his testimony and plaintiff's testimony was also a motivating factor behind defendant removing him from the wheel rotation system; affirmed the judgment of the district court granting qualified immunity to defendant in his individual capacity where there was evidence of both lawful and unlawful motivations for defendant's actions and preexisting law did not dictate that the merits of the case must be decided in plaintiff's favor; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brannon, et al. v. Finklestein" on Justia Law

Hillcrest filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging a Right-of-Way Preservation Ordinance. The court concluded that Hillcrest's facial substantive due process claim accrued when the Ordinance was enacted on November 22, 2005, and was time-barred when Hillcrest filed this action more than five years later. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order to the extent that it granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of Hillcrest on its facial substantive due process claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County" on Justia Law

This appeal involved complaints of a racially hostile work environment at a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, owned by Austal. At issue on appeal was whether an employee may rely on evidence of racial harassment of which he is not personally aware to prove that his work environment was objectively hostile. The court held that an employee alleging a hostile work environment cannot complain about conduct of which he was oblivious for the purpose of proving that his work environment was objectively hostile. In this instance, the court concluded that seven of the employees presented sufficient evidence that their work environments were objectively hostile, and vacated the summary judgment against them. The court affirmed the summary judgment against the remaining six employees and affirmed the two jury verdicts. View "Adams, et al. v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of Southern Nuclear's motion for summary judgment as to his claim of discrimination based on the misuse of information obtained during a required medical evaluation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(3)(C). The court joined the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in holding that an individual seeking relief under section 12112(d)(3)(C) must demonstrate that he is a qualified individual with a disability. Here, plaintiff admitted at oral argument that he could not demonstrate that he is an individual with a disability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wetherbee v. Southern Nuclear Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, G4S, on his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Count I of the complaint alleged that G4S discriminated against plaintiff based on his national origin and Count III alleged that G4S discriminated against him because of his race. Counts II and IV alleged that G4S terminated plaintiff's employment because he filed a complaint of discrimination with its Human Resources department. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on Counts II and IV but vacated its judgment on Counts I and III. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether Counts I and III presented claims sufficient to withstand summary judgment where the district court should bear in mind that those counts asserted the "status-based" category of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Barthelus v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that police officers' conduct in entering his house without a warrant and then arresting him for punching an officer infringed his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the district court properly denied the officers qualified immunity for entering plaintiff's residence without a warrant or anything remotely approaching reasonable suspicion. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in denying the officers' motions to dismiss the owner's claim for unlawful arrest where the officers' arrest of plaintiff after he punched the officer could not be considered a violation of his Fourth Amendment right not to be seized without probable cause. View "Morris v. Bower" on Justia Law

Godfrey Cook, a pretrial detainee, was murdered in the county jail by another pretrial detainee. Plaintiffs, the administrator of Cook's estate and Cook's two adult children, filed suit for money damages under federal and statutory law against defendants. The federal claims against all defendants except the Sheriff have been dismissed. This appeal concerned the district court's denial of the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. The court concluded that it was difficult to conclude that the Sheriff was on notice of a substantial risk of serious harm caused by deficient policies in the Jail and, even if he was on notice, a Jail policy permitting detention officers to move a mental health inmate to a different cell, when trained medical personnel have determined that the inmate does not pose a threat to others, did not violate clearly established law. Assuming that plaintiff adequately established that the Sheriff committed a constitutional violation by failing to train the detention officers at the Jail, plaintiff failed to establish that the Sheriff violated clearly established law. Because it was not clearly established that failing to segregate mental health inmates violated Cook's constitutional rights, the Sheriff's failure to train detention officers did not amount to a constitutional violation. Therefore, the Sheriff was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Keith, et al. v. Brown" on Justia Law