Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center ran a residential treatment facility in St. George, Utah for young people with mental and emotional disorders. It wanted to expand its operations with a "step-down" program hereby participants would live in a separate facility with more responsibility and autonomy that other students in preparation for reentry to society. Cinnamon Hills applied to the City for a zoning variance to use the top floor of a hotel it owned for the program, the City denied its request. Cinnamon Hills subsequently sued the City for discrimination against the disabled. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Cinnamon Hills appealed. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found that Cinnamon Hills could not prove by the evidence on record, instances of discrimination as it alleged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision in dismissing Cinnamon Hills' claims.

Plaintiff-Appellant Teresa Hernandez sued Defendant-Appellee Valley View Hospital Association for race and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e17. The district court granted summary judgment for Valley View on Plaintiff's claims for hostile work environment and constructive discharge, and dismissed her retaliation claim as time-barred. The court characterized Plaintiff's evidence as only "a handful of racially insensitive jokes and comments over a period of more than three years, which, while not laudable, would not support a racial or national origin hostile work environment claim." Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment to the hospital. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that Plaintiff did "marshal" sufficient hostile work environment evidence to withstand summary judgment. The Court also reversed the grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. Ann Elaine Campbell put horses out to pasture on land she owns in two Oklahoma municipalities, Defendants-Appellees the City of Spencer (the City) and the Town of Forest Park (the Town). After an animal-welfare investigation, City and Town authorities executed search warrants and seized 44 horses from her properties. The two municipalities successfully petitioned a state court to order forfeiture of the horses unless the owner posted a security bond to pay for their maintenance from the date of seizure. After unsuccessfully appealing the forfeiture and bond determinations in state court, Plaintiff filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court against the City and the Town, alleging that they violated the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully searching her property and seizing her horses; the Fifth Amendment by depriving her of her horses without due process or just compensation; and the Eighth Amendment by obtaining an excessive fine through an unreasonable forfeiture bond. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine. On appeal Plaintiff contended that the district court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings: "[The Court] agree[d] that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims, which [were] barred by Rooker-Feldman because they challenged the state court judgment; but it erred in dismissing the Fourth Amendment claims to the extent that they concern[ed] preforfeiture events."

Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Jaramillo appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Adams County School District 14 on her 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim for race discrimination. Plaintiff was employed as principal of Hanson PreK-8 school. More than 70% of the students attending Hanson are Hispanic, and Plaintiff was the only Hispanic principal in the District. In 2008, the District contemplated policy changes, including implementing an English Language Learners policy, which stresses English immersion (rather than teaching subjects in Spanish as well as English), and operating Hanson on the same academic year as other schools in the District. These proposals were controversial in the Hispanic community and apparently with some of the teachers at Hanson. Dr. Sue Chandler, interim superintendent of the District, received a copy of an e-mail about a planned teachers’ meeting before the public study session which contained false and inaccurate information. Dr. Chandler met with Plaintiff to ask for the name of the person who had misinformed her as to the specifics of the policy. Plaintiff refused to give the name. They met again later in the afternoon and Dr. Chandler questioned Plaintiff about her lack of support for the administration’s policy, and requested that Plaintiff provide Dr. Chandler with the name of the person who informed Plaintiff about the Board’s upcoming study session. Dr. Chandler informed Plaintiff that failing to provide the name would result in disciplinary action. Plaintiff refused to provide the name. Dr. Chandler placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave; Plaintiff was subsequently notified by letter that Dr. Chandler recommended Plaintiff's termination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment: "What the record does reveal in this case is disagreement about administrative policy choices --hardly infrequent in the education setting. But that does not constitute pretext [of discrimination]."

Plaintiff-Appellant David R. Ribeau, Jr., appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Dean Katt and Richard Smith. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim alleging that Defendants violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Smith was Plaintiff's immediate supervisor at the Unified School District 290 (USD 290) in Ottawa, Kansas. Plaintiff worked as a maintenance mechanic. In 2008, Plaintiff was fired after 24 years on the job for alleged poor work performance. Mr. Katt, USD 290's superintendent, told Plaintiff that the USD 290 Board of Education had given its approval for his termination. Due to the Defendants' representations, Plaintiff believed he could not file a grievance because the Board had already approved his termination. The Board, however, had not yet given its approval: the Board did not approve Plaintiff's termination until approximately one month later. The district court found Plaintiff was an at-will employee and had no protected property interest in his continued employment. Plaintiff timely appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Court found that any entitlement Plaintiff had to a pre-termination Board hearing derived from his express employment contract. The language of that contract was unambiguous and did not provide for a pre-termination hearing before the Board. Plaintiff therefore had no legitimate claim of entitlement to a pre-termination hearing under state law, and the district court was correct to dismiss his 1983 claim.

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Robert Newton alleged Major John R. Teter and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne E. Lee of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. It denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim was not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the "Feres" doctrine. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants challenged the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Plaintiff's ATCS certificate claim. Plaintiff cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's ATCS certificate was not barred by the "Feres" doctrine, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cross-appeal.

Plaintiffs William B. Elliott, Tommy J. Evaro, and Andria J. Hernandez were all targets of investigations by a Dona Ana County grand jury. Under New Mexico law they were entitled to target notices that advised them of the right to testify before the grand jury. But the notices they received may not have complied with state law. They filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal district court alleging that District Attorney Susana Martinez violated their due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court granted the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the New Mexico statute did not establish a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs appealed. Upon review the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the statutory right to particular procedures was not a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Sabourin sued the University of Utah in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming, among other things, that it had violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by deciding to eliminate his position and then fire him for cause while he was on leave for childcare in 2006. The district court granted the University summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his FMLA claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: all of Plaintiff’s claims failed because the undisputed facts showed that the University’s adverse decisions were not based on Plaintiff’s taking FMLA leave. The decision to eliminate his position was made before he sought FMLA leave; and he was fired for engaging in a course of insubordination.

A New Mexico jury convicted former prison guard Defendant-Appellant John Gould of two counts of depriving an inmate of his rights under color of law, and two counts of filing a false report. The convictions arose out of Defendant's use of excessive force against two inmates in two different detention centers and his filing of false reports to cover the incidents up. On appeal, Defendant sought reversal of all the charges against him, arguing that the delay between his conviction and the entry of the final judgment violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the district court erred in excluding certain evidence. Finding no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights, and finding that if there was an error in excluding the evidence, it was harmless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) appealed a judgment of the district court that declined to enforce an administrative subpoena against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF). On appeal, the EEOC argued the district court abused its discretion because it "applied erroneous legal principles and ignored record evidence." This case arose from an ADA discrimination claim filed by Gregory Graves and Thomas Palizzi. Each alleged they were not hired as conductors or conductor trainees based on a perceived disability. The EEOC launched an investigation and issued a subpoena to BNSF. During the course of its investigation, the EEOC expanded the parameters of its investigation without notice or explanation. BNSF did not comply with the administrative subpoena, and the EEOC applied to the district court for enforcement. Finding no abuse of discretion or a misapplication of the law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "Nothing prevent[ed] the EEOC from investigating the charges filed by Mr. Graves and Mr. Palizzi, and then . . . expanding its search. Alternatively, nothing prevent[ed] the EEOC from aggregating the information it possesses in the form of a Commissioner's Charge. . . . But nationwide recordkeeping data is not 'relevant to' charges of individual disability discrimination filed by two men who applied for the same type of job in the same state, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion."