Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed. View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Shannon Cavanaugh suffered a serious head injury after she was tasered by a Woods Cross City police officer. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found for the City and the officer who tasered her. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude certain testimony from the officer concerning his beliefs prior to using the taser; (2) in refusing to grant Plaintiff a new trial due to insufficient evidence she was an immediate threat; (2) in refusing to instruct the jury on what constitutes "resisting arrest;" and (4) refusing to submit Plaintiff's excessive force question to the jury. Rejecting all of Plaintiff's ground for appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court. View "Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, et al" on Justia Law

Glenn Coyne, a Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) officer, answered Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider 's 911 call about an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night, raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days later committed suicide. Plaintiff sued the GJPD under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne, inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped. In district court, the defendants did not contest Plaintiff's allegations about Officer Coyne's conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Plaintiff could not prove that they caused the rape or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that it would happen. The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Plaintiff could not prove essential facts to establish 1983 liability. Plaintiff appealed that ruling; defendants cross-appealed the color of state law ruling. "The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne's alleged conduct was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead, and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. . . . to hold [defendants] liable for Officer Coyne's actions, she faces stringent proof requirements under 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court dismissed defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Schneider v. City of Grand Junction" on Justia Law

Lockheed Martin Corp. sought to set aside a decision of the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (the "ARB" or the "Board") that concluded Lockheed violated Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who concluded Lockheed violated the Act by constructively discharging employee Andrea Brown after she had engaged in protected activity. Brown worked as Communications Director for Lockheed from June 2000 to February 2008. In 2003, she became the Director of Communications in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In May 2006, Brown began having difficulty getting responses from one of her supervisors on work-related matters. She discussed the problem with Tina Colditz, a coworker and personal friend. Colditz ran a pen pals program for the company, through which Lockheed employees could correspond with members of the U.S. military deployed in Iraq. Colditz told Brown that the supervisor had developed sexual relationships with several of the soldiers in the program, had purchased a laptop computer for one soldier, sent inappropriate emails and sex toys to soldiers stationed in Iraq, and traveled to welcome-home ceremonies for soldiers on the pretext of business while actually taking soldiers to expensive hotels in limousines for intimate relations. Colditz told Brown she was concerned the supervisor was using company funds for these activities. Brown thus became concerned Owen’s actions were fraudulent and illegal and that there could be media exposure which could lead to government audits and affect the company’s future contracts and stock price. Brown brought her concerns to Jan Moncallo, Lockheed’s Vice President of Human Resources. Moncallo told Brown she would submit an anonymous ethics complaint on Brown’s behalf, and that she would be protected from retaliation because no one would know her identity. Moncallo sent an Prior to 2006, Brown received a "high contributor" or "exceptional contributor" rating in her performance evaluations. In late 2006, and thereafter, however, Brown received a lower rating of "successful contributor." In 2007, Lockheed announced to all employees it was undergoing a corporate-structure reorganization. Brown began reporting to a new supervisor, who according to Brown, had a negative attitude toward her from the beginning of their professional relationship. Shortly thereafter, Brown received a phone call from the former supervisor telling her that Brown’s job had been posted on the internet and that she should get her resume together. Brown would suffer from an emotional breakdown, fall into a deep depression, and take medical leave over the changes. Brown brought a complaint alleging violations of Sarbanes-Oxley. In his Recommended Decision and Order, the ALJ found that Brown had engaged in protected activity; she suffered materially adverse employment actions, including constructive discharge; and her engagement in protected activity was a contributing factor in the constructive discharge. The ALJ awarded reinstatement, back pay, medical expenses, and non-economic compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000. Lockheed timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor, which affirmed. Finding no error in the Board's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Lockheed Martin v. DOL" on Justia Law

Officer Shane Prickett of the Florence City Police Department used a Taser on Petitioner Lara Roosevelt-Hennix while Petitioner's hands were cuffed behind her back and she was seated in the back seat of a police car. She brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Prickett subjected her to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Prickett argued he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity in an brief oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing on Prickett's summary judgment motion. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether Prickett clearly established by the evidence in the record, on his assertion that Petitioner actively resisted the officers' proper attempts to place her in leg restraints. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Petitioner informed the officers she was physically unable to comply with their request to move her feet outside the patrol vehicle. Furthermore, the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude the officers never attempted to aid Petitioner in moving her feet before applying the taser. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Prickett's motion for summary judgment. View "Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Koessel was terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff in Sublette County, Wyoming, due to concerns about the lingering effects of a stroke he suffered. In response, petitioner brought suit in district court against the Sheriff and the County alleging they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), breached his employment contract, and violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact for a jury. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, claiming fact disputes existed on all of his claims. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court that the Defendants' were entitled to summary judgment on all of petitioner's claims. View "Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Appellants sought reversal of a district court order that denied their motion to dismiss claims asserted against them by Plaintiff-Appellee Michael Wilson, Sr. under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wilson alleged he was unlawfully detained and deprived of his constitutional right to a prompt and probable cause determination. Appellants, all of whom worked as wardens, deputy sherifs, police officers, police chiefs and a booking officer, claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that Wilson's complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim against each appellant for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss against Appellant Deputy Fred Torres; and that the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss as to appellants Deputy Lawrence Montanto, former sheriff Rene Rivera, and Warden Joe Chavez. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilson v. Montano, et al" on Justia Law

Paul and Melinda Muskrat brought a civil rights action on behalf of their disabled son against the school district where he attended school for several years and against certain school district employees. The Muskrats alleged that the defendants unconstitutionally subjected their son to timeouts and physical abuse. The school district moved to dismiss, arguing that the Muskrats had not exhausted their claims through administrative procedures established by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The district court denied this motion, ruling that the Muskrats had no obligation to exhaust their claims. The case then proceeded to discovery and the defendants eventually moved for summary judgment, arguing that no constitutional violation occurred. The district court agreed and granted defendants' motions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in all respects. "First, plaintiffs' claims [did] not fail for lack of exhaustion. Second, reaching the merits, the district court did not err in concluding the defendants' conduct did not shock the conscience, nor did it have an obligation to evaluate the claims under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment." View "Muskrat v. Deer Creek Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were high school students from Roswell, New Mexico who belonged to a religious group called "Relentless." They sued the Roswell Independent school district and its superintendent seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for allegedly violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by preventing them from distributing 2500 rubber fetus dolls to other students. They also challenged the District's policies requiring preapproval before distributing any non-school-sponsored materials on school grounds. Teachers complained that students' preoccupation with the dolls disrupted classroom instruction: "[w]hile teachers were trying to instruct, students threw dolls and doll heads across classrooms, at one another, and into wastebaskets. Some teachers said the disruptions took eight to 10 minutes each class period, and others said their teaching plans were derailed entirely. An honors freshman English class canceled a scheduled test because students had become engaged in name calling and insults over the topic of abortion. A Roswell security officer described the day as 'a disaster' because of the dolls." A magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the District on all claims and Plaintiffs appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise and equal protection claims. The Court also affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' facial challenge to the District's preapproval policies. View "Taylor v. Roswell Independent School Dist. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant David Becker was pulled over by Defendant-Appellee Officer Jason Bateman in a parking lot in Heber City, Utah. A confrontation ensued which ended in Plaintiff being thrown to the ground and suffering a severe traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff brought suit against Officer Bateman, the Heber City Chief of Police in his official capacity, and Heber City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Officer Bateman used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding Officer Bateman did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because the violation of constitutional rights Plaintiff asserted was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Bateman. However, the district court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore reversed. On remand, the district court must determine whether Plaintiff can withstand summary judgment as to the second element of his municipal liability claim. Similarly, the district court must determine whether Mrs. Becker could maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium against the City in light of the Court's ruling that a reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. View "Becker v. Bateman" on Justia Law