Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Pro se prisoner Petitioner Steve Standifer challenged a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation that denied him eligibility to participate in its Residential Drug Abuse Program by filing for the writ of habeas corpus. He was deemed ineligible because his last-reported date of drug use was more than three years before his arrest on federal charges. Petitioner contended the BOP's policy requiring that it consider only his substance-abuse history for the 12 months preceding his arrest was based on an unreasonable interpretation of the authorizing statutes. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Court concluded that the BOP's eligibility requirement is based on reasonable interpretation of the applicable governing provisions. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Petitioner's assertion that the BOP was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs was "unavailing". The Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition and dismissed his appeal.

Plaintiff Edward Simmons sued the Postmaster General of the United States claiming that the USPS discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment as a result of his disability. Plaintiff worked as a customer services supervisor at a Colorado facility. In this action, Plaintiff alleged that he was disabled by reason of a brain tumor and post-traumatic stress disorder. The USPS moved for summary judgment. Among its many reasons, the USPS argued that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC 791, 794). The district court granted the USPS' motion, and Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that none of the arguments Plaintiff raised on appeal involved the district court's determination of his meeting the elements of his prima facie case. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgement.

This case arose from "an unfortunate situation" of child-on-child abuse within the foster care system. Plaintiffs J.W. and M.R.W. are a foster couple, and their now-adopted foster children were injured after an abusive foster child was placed in their home in 2002. Plaintiffs raised several state and federal claims against Utah and the state employees involved in placing the abusive child in their home. The district court dismissed several of Plaintiffs' negligence claims based on Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. As for Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court held that the caseworker and her supervisor were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs had not shown a failure to exercise professional judgment on the part of the caseworker, nor had they shown any basis for holding the supervisor liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs challenged these decisions on appeal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the undisputed evidence in the record reflected that there was an impermissible deviation from professional judgment on the part of the state employees. Furthermore, the Court found Plaintiffs did not set forth a valid basis for holding the employees liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Plaintiff Billy Merrifield brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against his former employer Defendant Board of Commissioners for Santa Fe. In his suit, he alleged he had been denied procedural due process with respect to the County's pre termination hearing process when he was fired from his position as a Youth Services Administrator. His complaint also alleged that he was fired in retaliation for retaining an attorney. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, and set aside a state administrative decision to award him back pay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to show that the County's pre termination process was constitutionally inadequate and that his association with an attorney lead to his termination.

Pro se Appellant Janos Toevs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil-rights suit. Appellant's lawsuit pertained to the Colorado prison system's "Quality of Life Level Program" (QLLP). The QLLP program was described as a "stratified quality of life program based on increased levels of privileges for demonstrated appropriate offender behavior." Level 1 is the most restrictive, and each successive level offers an inmate more privileges. Appellant was placed in the QLLP in 2002 after attempting to escape. By September 2005, he had reached the least restrictive Level 6, but due to poor health was regressed back to Level 1. By 2009, Appellant had achieved Level 6 again and rejoined the general prison population. Appellant complained that during his placement in the QLLP from 2005 to 2009, his case managers' periodic reviews were "perfunctory, meaningless, and all said the same thing." He sued his case workers and the warden in their individual capacities. In affirming the district court's dismissal of Appellant's case, the Tenth Circuit found that the standards for meaningful periodic review for inmates in the QLLP were not previously clearly established in the Circuit. As such, the Court found that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Appellant's suit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Simmons appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Sykes Enterprises, Incorporated. Ms. Simmons claimed Sykes terminated her on the basis of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court concluded that Ms. Simmons failed to establish that Sykes' reason for terminating her was pretextual, and dismissed her case. In early 2007, Ms. Simmons claimed that the workplace environment got decidedly hostile towards her. Later that year, an aggrieved employee complained to Sykes management that someone within the company had improperly disclosed the employee's confidential medical information. Ms. Simmons was implicated as the source of the confidential information. After her termination, Ms. Simmons filed a complaint with the EEOC, which in turn, resulted in a formal complaint before the district court. The Tenth Circuit found that the undisputed facts in this case permitted only one inference: "absent the alleged discriminatory bias, Sykes would still have fired Ms. Simmons because from Sykes' perspective, she violated company policy and could not be trusted with confidential information." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Sykes Enterprises.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Whittington filed a civil rights lawsuit, alleging that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to choose between spending funds in his inmate bank account on court costs, or on dental hygiene items. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was unable to pay for basic hygiene supplies because all of his inmate salary and the funds in his account were levied for mandatory deductions imposed by the Department of Corrections, or for the necessary costs of protected litigation. Refusing to give him the hygiene supplies for free, Plaintiff argued, was "cruel and unusual punishment." Ultimately the district court dismissed all Plaintiffs' claims based on various grounds. Plaintiff only challenged the dismissals based on "qualified immunity." The Tenth Circuit found that the deprivation of hygiene items for extended periods can implicate the Eighth Amendment, but the law was not established on this point at the time Plaintiff brought his complaint. The Court noted that the facts of Plaintiff's complaint do not allege that the Department of Corrections denied him the items per se. Rather, Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the Department forced him to choose between two constitutionally protected activities. The Court held that the district court properly granted qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims against the Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Matthews appealed the district courtâs decision that granted summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP. Plaintiff worked for the Agency under a collective bargaining agreement as a unit supervisor. A female employee under Plaintiffâs supervision told the union steward that Plaintiff allegedly made inappropriate comments to her. The union investigated and recommended that Plaintiff be demoted from his supervisory position. Coincidentally, Plaintiff left work under a doctorâs certification that he could not return to work for medical reasons. Though âcertain statutory employment discrimination claimsâ had previously been arbitrated between the parties, Plaintiff filed suit against the Agency in the district court, alleging his demotion was discriminatory and retaliatory. The Agency pointed to those previously arbitrated claims, and moved to have Plaintiffâs case dismissed. Believing the U.S. Supreme Court had already decided a case similar to Plaintiffâs, the district court used that Supreme Court case as the basis for its decision to dismiss Plaintiffâs case. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court relied on the wrong precedent. The Court held that the prior arbitration should not have precluded the entire case. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff could not establish his case of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In the early 1990s, Colorado state prisoners initiated a class action lawsuit alleging that state officials were committing ongoing violations of disabled prisonersâ rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In 2003, the parties entered into a consent decree setting forth the actions the government officials would take to bring the prison system into compliance with these laws. Claimant Larry Gordon filed an individual claim for damages under the plan devised by the inmates and officials. Mr. Gordonâs claim was denied, and he filed an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Because the class action suit covered the issue Mr. Gordon raised in his appeal, his case was remanded to a panel that was working on the logistics of enforcing the plan. The parties could not resolve their disagreements concerning enforcement of the plan, and took their disagreement to the district court. The court ruled that its orders on appeal from the panelâs decisions would be final and not appealable to the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages would eventually be denied by the district court, and he appealed despite the courtâs earlier ruling. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether it could actually review appeals from denied claims of damages that stemmed from the consent decree and plan. The officials wanted the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, Court held that even if the language of the agreement provided that the lower courtâs review would be final, an appeal could be made to the Tenth Circuit since the Courtâs jurisdiction is invoked by statute. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decision to dismiss the officialsâ motion, and Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn McDonald-Cuba sued her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc.(SFPS), and sought damages for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17, and New Mexico state law. SFPS counter-sued Plaintiff on breach of contract, interference with their economic advantage and breach of loyalty. SFPS would eventually drop all its claims against Plaintiff. The district court granted SFPS summary judgment on the discrimination claims. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on her claims premised on post-employment retaliation and discrimination. The Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not seek all administrative remedies available to her through before taking her case to court. The Court held that âneither the filing of her EEOC charge nor [Plaintiffâs] filing of this suit can serve as protected activity for purposes of her retaliation . . . because neither of those activities occurred before she filed the EEOC charge mentioned in her complaint.â The Court vacated the district courtâs judgment on Plaintiffâs post-employment retaliation claim, and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for review.