Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Luster, an employee of the United States Forest Service, appealed a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture on her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff, a full-time Visitor Information Specialist (VIS) with the Forest Service, claimed that: (1) she was not selected for a Forestry Technician position because of her gender; (2) she suffered disparate work conditions because of her gender and in retaliation for her Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaint; and (3) a Forest Service attorney inappropriately disclosed her EEO complaint information in violation of the Privacy Act. The Tenth Circuit "commend[ed] the district court for its thorough and well-reasoned order granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment" and affirmed, finding no error in the court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff Timothy J. Smith appealed a district court order that granted summary judgment for his employer, Defendant Morton International, Inc., (Morton), on his claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court held Smith’s claim failed at the prima facie case stage for two distinct reasons: he had not shown either that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA or that Morton had discriminated against him on the basis of his alleged disability. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of his alleged disability, and affirmed on that basis without reaching the discrimination issue.

Pro se prisoner Plaintiff-Appellant Aggie Joe Gallegos appealed the dismissal of his civil rights action brought against various Albuquerque police officers and other officials in connection with his 2007 arrest. Plaintiff was riding his bicycle in Albuquerque when he rode past a stop sign without stopping. Albuquerque police officer Defendant Byron Economidy was on patrol and, upon observing Plaintiff, he engaged his emergency lights in an attempt to stop Plaintiff. Plaintiff got off his bicycle and talked to Officer Economidy. But talks broke down and a chase ensued. Plaintiff abadoned the bicycle, and while running away from the officer, he threw things out of his pockets and ignored commands to stop running. Other police officers began arriving on the scene to assist. Officer Economidy and Plaintiff got into a physical altercation which ended with Plaintiff getting "tased" in the back. Plaintiff disputed the officer's account of the arrest, and brought this civil rights suit against the five officers involved in his arrest, in addition to the police chief, the mayor and the City of Albuquerque itself. Plaintiff argued that the officers used excessive force amounting to physical and psychological torture, and the City was vicariously liable for its officers' actions. The district court dismissed his case. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff argued that he was restrained in shackles in front of the jury, thereby causing him prejudice and rendering his trial fundamentally unfair. Finding no evidence that the trial court permitted Plaintiff to be in shackles in front of the jury, or that the trial court abused its discretion in the conduct of trial, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel Larson appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for failing to state a claim. Appellant is a Colorado Sherriff's Deputy. Tina Henson is his aunt. Ms. Henson had previously resided with Michael Suchan at Mr. Suchan’s residence, where she and Mr. Suchan had shared a volatile relationship. Their relationship apparently ended, and Ms. Henson had left some personal items at Mr. Suchan’s residence. After Ms. Henson tried to retrieve her personal items, she sought the help of Appellant, her nephew. The two went to Mr. Suchan's place unannounced, and finding the door unlocked (believing Mr. Suchan was not home), entered. Mr. Suchan was home, and began yelling at Ms. Henson. Appellant called 911 and Defendants Michael Agos and Hans Gross, both deputy sheriffs in a neighboring county were among those who responded to the call. Appellant argued that he could not be arrested for criminal trespass, inasmuch as he claimed Ms. Henson was a resident of Mr. Suchan’s house and that both she and Appellant had a right to be on the premises. The deputies then informed Appellant that he was being arrested for criminal trespass, and when he protested this, Appellant was told that he was being arrested "because of politics." Appellant ultimately filed suit in Colorado district court, claiming he was subject to an unreasonable search and seizure as well as malicious prosecution. Defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting Mr. Larson’s allegation that Deputies Agos and Gross violated the Fourth Amendment when they arrested him. The court concluded that the deputies had probable cause to believe that Appellant had committed criminal trespass. The court then determined that because Appellant "had not demonstrated that Defendants Agos and Gross committed a Fourth Amendment violation, Arapahoe County cannot be held liable for the lawful conduct of its officers." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court for substantially the same reasons stated in its order.

Two former employees of the Kansas Unified School District #501 filed administrative charges against the District following claims of wage discrimination. Dwight Almond, III and Kevin Weems were both offered and accepted new positions with lesser pay within the District rather than be fired from a District-wide downsizing effort. Both filed their claims in 2006, several years after the alleged pay discrimination took place. The district court held that the men had waited too long to seek administrative review, and that delay had the effect of barring their lawsuits altogether. In the pendency of the employees' appeal of the district court's dismissal, Congress enacted the "Ledbetter Act" specifically aimed at addressing "discrimination in compensation" claims in which members of a protected class receive less pay than similarly situated colleagues. The employees raised multiple claims on appeal, including a violation of the Ledbetter Act. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that because the employees in this case didn't raise an unequal pay for equal work claim, they did not benefit from the Act’s comparatively generous deadlines, so preexisting accrual rules applied. Under those rules, the employees' claims were untimely and accordingly dismissed.

Plaintiff Katherine Winters filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of an asserted right to the care and custody of her biological grandchildren. She named the State of Kansas, the state Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, social workers and their supervisors and the state court judge who ruled on the "Child in Need of Care" (CINC) matter relating to all three children and the adoption proceeding of her grandson "C.W.," as well as a prosecutor, guardian ad litem and court-appointed special advocates. Plaintiff requested remedies including declaratory and injunctive relief voiding state-court placement and adoption orders, plus compensatory damages of $67 million and punitive damages. The district court dismissed the action, and Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in its determinations on subject-matter jurisdiction, defendants’ immunity, and the sufficiency of her complaint. Her fundamental argument was that the district court failed to give proper consideration to her claim of a constitutional right to the custody and care of C.W. Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal and the appellate briefs in the light of the governing law, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis of Plaintiff's claims. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff-Appellant Cherie Lopez-Fisher claimed Defendant-Appellee Abbott Laboratories fired her because of her gender, race, color and national origin. After receiving extensive briefing and hearing oral argument in this Title VII case, a magistrate judge entered an order granting summary judgment to Abbott Labs. In her appellate brief, Plaintiff insisted that because she successfully passed a "Performance Improvement Plan" conducted by Abbott Labs, her termination a week later raised an inference of discrimination. The magistrate judge found no evidence in the record that Plaintiff passed the Plan. Furthermore, the magistrate concluded that Plaintiff did not overcome her burden of proof that Abbott Labs' proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff (poor performance) was pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit adopted the magistrate judge's ruling in affirming dismissal of Plaintiff's case.

Petitioner Chuwuma Azubuko appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint for lack of venue. Petitioner filed a complaint in the Western District of Oklahoma alleging Latoya Irish and an unknown Boston police detective violated his constitutional rights. He complained that Irish denied his subsidized housing application and that the detective warned him not to contact Irish. Plaintiff sought $21.4 million in damages. According to the complaint, Plaintiff, Irish and the unknown detective all resided in Massachusetts. Further, the apartment at issue is located in Massachusetts. Plaintiff did not allege any facts connecting the dispute to the Western District of Oklahoma. The district court noted that Plaintiff had been placed under filing restrictions in the District of Massachusetts, and that Plaintiff had "a history of attempting to circumvent the Orders enjoining him by filing his lawsuits in other Districts, only to have them transferred to the District of Massachusetts." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that "[Plaintiff] spen[t] the bulk of his appellate brief arguing that the district court possessed jurisdiction over his action. 'Venue, however, is distinct from jurisdiction.'" The Court agreed that venue was improper, and that Plaintiff's action should have been dismissed.

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.

Plaintiff-Appellant Denice Twigg appealed a district courtâs order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) on Plaintiff's claims for (1) retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and (3) interference under the FMLA. Upon its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that HBC terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about race discrimination or her taking FMLA leave. Therefore, her retaliation claims under Sec.1981 and the FMLA failed as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to HBC on Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim because HBC met its burden of demonstrating that it terminated Plaintiff for a reason unrelated to her FMLA leave, namely, her failure to comply with the companyâs notice-of-absence policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.