Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and imposed a sentence of death. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Petitioner filed a motion asking the trial court to limit any cross-examination of Petitioner, asserting his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The post-conviction trial court denied the request, and Petitioner did not testify. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner's right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context, but a petitioner who elects to testify is bound to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether and in what manner the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context and instead resolved the appeal on non-constitutional grounds. The Court vacated the trial court and court of criminal appeals, holding (1) the scope of cross-examination of a post-conviction petitioner is governed by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, 8(C)(1)(d); and (2) the lower courts deprived Petitioner of the limited scope cross-examination provided in Rule 28. Remanded for a new post-conviction hearing.

Defendant was indicted for a murder that occurred nearly ten years prior to his arrest. Defendant's theory of the case implicated two other men, who had previously been tried and acquitted of the murder, as the individuals responsible for the murder. Over the objection of Defendant, the State introduced evidence of the prior acquittals of the other men. A jury convicted Defendant of facilitation of first degree murder. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that the evidence of the acquittals of the other parties was irrelevant and that the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the facts of this case, the evidence of a prior acquittal of an individual for the crime for which the defendant is on trial is not relevant as context evidence, relevant to the credibility of the witness, or relevant to rebut a defense theory that the other individual committed the crime; and (2) the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Defendant Joshua Parker was convicted of second degree murder and attempted rape. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempt to commit rape but reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction of second degree murder, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction, (2) State v. Mellons did not control the outcome of this case, (3) sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense, and (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof was sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, remanded for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide and sentencing on reckless homicide.

Defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six years of enhanced probation. During the proceedings, the trial court did not warn Defendant that, upon the expiration of his sentence, he would be subjected to lifetime community supervision, which is mandated by statute for Defendant's conviction. Before Defendant's sentence expired, the State filed a petition to amend the judgment to include lifetime community supervision. The trial court corrected the judgment, and Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant had been adequately informed of the lifetime community supervision requirement by his trial counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the trial court failed to warn Defendant of the mandatory nature of lifetime community supervision, as was required by the Court's recent ruling in Ward v. State, and because the State was unable to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, four counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty years on each of the aggravated rape convictions and structured service of the sentences to result in an effective term of eighty years. The judgment orders designated Defendant a "Multiple 35% Range 2" offender but did not designate Defendant as a "Multiple Rapist." The court of criminal appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence. Defendant then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the trial court did not have authority to sentence him as a "Multiple 35% Range 2" offender. The habeas corpus court denied relief. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief, holding that Defendant's four sentences for his four aggravated rape convictions were illegal because each of the judgment orders indicated that Defendant was eligible for early release on parole (by the designation "Multiple 35% Range 2" offender) instead of indicating that he must serve his entire sentence (by the designation "Multiple Rapist") in direct contravention of Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-523. Remanded for the entry of amended judgment orders reflecting Defendant's status as a "Multiple Rapist."

Plaintiffs Timmy Sykes and Curtis Greene were employed as criminal investigators by the Chattanooga Housing Authority (CHA) when they expressed their concerns regarding illegal searches and seizures and racial profiling by the CHA chief and assistant chief. Subsequently, CHA terminated the employment of both Sykes and Greene, alleging sexual harassment on the part of Sykes and violations of the CHA cell phone policy on the part of Greene. Sykes and Greene sued the CHA and the CHA chief, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the state Whistleblower Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals vacated summary judgment on the THRA claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the Whistleblower Act claims, finding the undisputed facts established the plaintiffs could not prove an exclusive causal relationship between the plaintiffs' whistleblowing activity and their discharge; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's ruling vacating summary judgment in defendants' favor on the THRA claims, finding there were genuine issues of disputed fact.

Defendant Gary Wade was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court classified Wade as a career offender. On appeal, the court of criminal appeals found (1) that the conviction for theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 violated the prohibition against double jeopardy and was therefore dismissed; (2) that, if properly convicted of the remaining offenses, the defendant qualified as a persistent rather than a career offender; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The State appealed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the appellate court with regard to two of the convictions, holding that the evidence presented at trial warrants reinstatement of the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property with a value of $10,000 or more but less tan $60,000; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's determination that Wade qualifies as a persistent rather than career offender. Remanded.