Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Property owners appealed a special tax assessment the Board of County Commissioners levied against real property for cleanup costs the County claimed it incurred while removing dangerous structures and unsightly conditions on that property. The district court found subject matter jurisdiction lacking and granted the County's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property owners' claims could be brought on direct review under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-907(a), which provides injunctive relief against an illegal levy or enforcement of any tax, charge, or assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed and in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under section 60-907(a) on two of its three issues; and (2) because the district court went beyond the jurisdiction question and found for the County on the merits and the court of appeals stopped short of considering the merits of any claims when it found the entire case was jurisdictionally barred, the court of appeals erred in part in its jurisdictional ruling. Remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the remaining claims.

Real party in interest, as personal representative of his son's estate, filed a complaint in 2006 seeking a refund of state personal income taxes for the years 2000 and 2001, alleging that the estate had paid over $15 million as part of a tax amnesty program, reserving the right to seek a refund, and demanding a jury trial. At issue was whether a taxpayer had the right to a jury trial in an action for a refund of state income taxes. The court held that article I, section 16 of the California Constitution did not require a jury trial in a statutory action for a state income tax refund where the statutory cause of action for a tax refund was a purely legislative creation with no foundation in contract and where such statutory right of action occupied a different class from the common law form of action in which a jury trial was available.

Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. 2201, alleging that the so-called "parsonage exemption" violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sued the Executive Office of the California Franchise Tax Board in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that California's parsonage exemption violated the Establishment Clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. Six days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, a minister of the gospel in the Sacramento area, who regularly claimed both the federal and state parsonage exemptions, moved to intervene as a defendant. At issue was whether an individual who claimed certain federal and state tax exemptions could intervene in an unrelated action challenging the constitutionality of those exemptions. The court held that the minister was not entitled to intervene as of right where the federal defendants adequately represented the minister's interest. The court also clarified that the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement did not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor was not raising new claims. Therefore, the court also held that the minister was not required to make any further showing that his intervention was supported by independent jurisdictional grounds where the district court's denial of permissive intervention was not an appropriate exercise in discretion because the district court did not apply the correct legal rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded that portion of the district court's order so that the district court could reassess the request for permissive intervention.