Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

A school district (District) obtained an in rem delinquent property tax judgment against an oil and gas lease that Respondent owned and operated. Respondent did not appeal, and the District foreclosed its judgment lien on the leasehold, taking ownership. The Railroad Commission ordered Respondent to plug a well on the lease. Respondent did not comply, and the Commission plugged the well and brought an enforcement action in court to recover the costs of the operation and the penalty. Respondent and the Commission settled. Respondent then sued the District, alleging in part that the District's actions had resulted in a taking of his property requiring compensation. The trial court dismissed Respondent's action for want of jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded with respect to the takings claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Respondent's case, as Respondent did not assert on appeal that the District took his property without compensation. View "W. Hardin County Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Poole" on Justia Law

Since first imposing a franchise tax in 1893, the Legislature restructured it several times, drawing various distinctions among taxpayers with adjustments, deductions, and exemptions that became elaborate. Petitioner in this original proceeding contended that the franchise tax bore no reasonable relationship to its object, the value of the privilege of doing business in Texas, and therefore it violated the Texas Constitution's mandate that "taxation shall be equal and uniform," the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process guarantees, and the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) Petitioner failed to establish that the franchise tax violates the Equal and Uniform Clause; (2) the failure of Petitioner's challenge based on the Equal and Uniform Clause foreclosed its equal protection challenge; (3) the franchise tax does not violate due process; and (4) the manufacturing rate does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to the services provided by Texas. View "In re Nestle USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Intervenor appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff sued as surviving spouse of a same-sex couple that was married in Canada in 2007 and was resident in New York at the time of her spouse's death in 2009. Plaintiff was denied the benefit of the spousal deduction for federal estate taxes under 26 U.S.C. 2056(A) solely because Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. 7, defined the words "marriage" and "spouse" in federal law in a way that barred the IRS from recognizing plaintiff as a spouse or the couple as married. The court held that plaintiff had standing in this action; plaintiff's suit was not foreclosed by Baker v. Nelson; Section 3 of DOMA was subject to intermediate scrutiny under the factors enumerated in City of Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Center, and other cases; and the statute did not withstand that review because it violated equal protection and was therefore unconstitutional. View "Windsor v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants, three individuals who participated in businesses that helped customers evade federal and state income taxes, were convicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States, mail fraud, false representation of a Social Security number, passport fraud, and failure to file income tax returns. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences for all Appellants with the exception of one Appellant (Giordano)'s restitution order, which was vacated and remanded for recalculation, holding (1) Appellants' convictions did not violate the First Amendment, as Appellants did far more than advocate tax evasion and instead developed a vast enterprise that helped clients hide their income from federal and state tax authorities; (2) the indictment did not erroneously include misdemeanor crimes among the eighty-one objects of the felony conspiracy count; (3) the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the crime of failure to file income taxes; but (4) the district court failed to consider evidence that Giordano presented at sentencing.

The West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals rejected the challenge of ConAgra Brands, Inc. to assessments for unpaid corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The assessments were imposed on apportioned royalties ConAgra received from the licensing of its intangible trademarks and trade names for use through the United States, including West Virginia. In setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals, the circuit court held that ConAgra's licensing transactions did not constitute doing business in West Virginia and that the assessments failed to meet the requirements of the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The State Tax Commissioner sought reinstatement of the assessments for corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the order setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals and invalidating the assessments should not be disturbed.

Petitioners were nonresidents who neither lived nor worked in Maryland but had a source of income in the State. In 2005, the Comptroller of the Treasury issued a notice of assessment against Petitioners' 2004 joint Maryland nonresident income tax returns for failure to pay the Special Nonresident Tax (SNRT). The assessment included the amount owed for the SNRT and interest. Petitioners challenged, on federal and state constitutional grounds, the State's authority to impose the SNRT. The tax court (1) declared the SNRT to be constitutional, and (2) denied Petitioners' request to abate the accrued interest, reasoning that the court lacked the authority to do so. The circuit court affirmed as to the constitutionality of the tax but determined that the tax court could abate the interest assessment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the SNRT does not violate the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Privileged and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) the SNRT does not violate Maryland's equal protection doctrine; and (3) the tax court's power of review extends to the abatement of interest assessments. Remanded to consider whether Petitioners were entitled to the abatement of interest.

Property owners appealed a special tax assessment the Board of County Commissioners levied against real property for cleanup costs the County claimed it incurred while removing dangerous structures and unsightly conditions on that property. The district court found subject matter jurisdiction lacking and granted the County's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property owners' claims could be brought on direct review under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-907(a), which provides injunctive relief against an illegal levy or enforcement of any tax, charge, or assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed and in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under section 60-907(a) on two of its three issues; and (2) because the district court went beyond the jurisdiction question and found for the County on the merits and the court of appeals stopped short of considering the merits of any claims when it found the entire case was jurisdictionally barred, the court of appeals erred in part in its jurisdictional ruling. Remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the remaining claims.

Real party in interest, as personal representative of his son's estate, filed a complaint in 2006 seeking a refund of state personal income taxes for the years 2000 and 2001, alleging that the estate had paid over $15 million as part of a tax amnesty program, reserving the right to seek a refund, and demanding a jury trial. At issue was whether a taxpayer had the right to a jury trial in an action for a refund of state income taxes. The court held that article I, section 16 of the California Constitution did not require a jury trial in a statutory action for a state income tax refund where the statutory cause of action for a tax refund was a purely legislative creation with no foundation in contract and where such statutory right of action occupied a different class from the common law form of action in which a jury trial was available.

Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. 2201, alleging that the so-called "parsonage exemption" violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sued the Executive Office of the California Franchise Tax Board in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that California's parsonage exemption violated the Establishment Clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. Six days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, a minister of the gospel in the Sacramento area, who regularly claimed both the federal and state parsonage exemptions, moved to intervene as a defendant. At issue was whether an individual who claimed certain federal and state tax exemptions could intervene in an unrelated action challenging the constitutionality of those exemptions. The court held that the minister was not entitled to intervene as of right where the federal defendants adequately represented the minister's interest. The court also clarified that the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement did not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor was not raising new claims. Therefore, the court also held that the minister was not required to make any further showing that his intervention was supported by independent jurisdictional grounds where the district court's denial of permissive intervention was not an appropriate exercise in discretion because the district court did not apply the correct legal rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded that portion of the district court's order so that the district court could reassess the request for permissive intervention.