Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The district court held that ICP had proven that defendants' allocation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in Dallas resulted in disparate impact on African-American residents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) and 3605(a). At issue was the correct legal standard to be applied to disparate impact claims under the FHA. The court adopted the HUD burden-shifting approach found in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 for claims of disparate impact under the FHA and remanded to the district court for application of this standard in the first instance. View "Inclusive Communities Project v. TX Dept. of Housing, et al." on Justia Law

The taxpayers in this case were out-of-state natural gas marketing companies, out-of-state local distribution companies that were certified as public utilities in their states, and out-of-state municipalities. Each taxpayer bought natural gas from producers or other marketers then delivered it to pipelines under contracts allowing the taxpayers to withdraw equivalent amounts of gas at a later time from out-of-state distribution points. The taxpayers filed requests for ad valorem tax exemption, claiming the natural gas was exempt under Kan. Const. art. 11, 1, which exempts merchants' inventory from ad valorem taxation but does not exempt tangible personal property owned by a public utility. The Kansas Court of Tax Appeals determined the natural gas was not exempt because the taxpayers were public utilities pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-5a01. The Supreme Court held (1) the taxation at issue did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) section 79-5a01 was constitutional as applied to the out-of-state local distribution companies; but (3) section 79-5a01 was unconstitutional as applied to the out-of-state natural gas marketing companies and those taxpayers that were out-of-state municipalities because those entities were not public utilities under the meaning of the statute. View "In re Property Valuation Appeals of Various Applicants" on Justia Law

In 2009, a political blog and a Chicago television station began reporting that Illinois State Rep. Froehlich offered his constituents reductions in county property taxes in exchange for political favors. The reports highlighted Satkar Hospitality, reporting that it and its owners donated hotel rooms worth thousands of dollars to Froehlich’s campaign. Satkar Hospitality and Capra appealed their tax assessments for 2007 and 2008 and won reductions, but after the publicity about Rep. Froehlich, both were called back before the Board of Review for new hearings. They claim that in these second hearings, the Board inquired not into the value of their properties but into their relationships with Rep. Froehlich. The Board rescinded the reductions. Satkar and Capra sued the Board and individual members under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district courts concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute quasi‐judicial immunity and the Board itself is not. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but also held that the damages claims against the Board cannot proceed. They are not cognizable in federal courts, which must abstain in suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging state and local tax collection, at least if an adequate state remedy is available. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-211 requires the Department of Revenue (Department) to reappraise all residential property in the state every six years. The Department assessed the value of Plaintiff's property in 2008 and used the 2008 appraisal to establish Plaintiff's tax liability for the six-year tax cycle ending in 2014. Plaintiff argued that section 15-7-111, as applied, violated its right to equal protection. The State Tax Appeal Board rejected the claim. The district court, however, concluded that section 15-7-111 violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection because the six-year tax cycle caused some taxpayers to pay a disproportionate share of taxes due to their over-assessed property value and other taxpayers to pay less than their fair share of taxes due to their under-assessed property value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that similarly situated taxpayers, for a short time, may pay divergent taxes, and such a divergence in taxes does not violate equal protection privileges. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellee sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of provisions of the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act), 15 U.S.C. 375, that required him to pay state and local taxes and banned him from sending his products through the U.S. mail. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the tax provision on due process grounds, but otherwise dismissed appellee's claims. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction where appellee was likely to succeed on the merits on his due process challenge; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining where the public interest lies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that appellee was likely to suffer irreparable harm and that the balance of the equities tipped in his favor. Further, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellee's remaining claims. View "Gordon v. Holder, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

The Empire Zones Program Act offered state tax incentives designed to enhance business development in the state. In 2009, the program was amended to introduce two new criteria businesses must meet to retain their certificates for the program. Plaintiffs were five businesses which were certified under the program prior to 2008. In 2009, Plaintiffs were decertified from the program for failing to meet the new criteria. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the James Square plaintiffs, concluding that the state defendants acted without legal authority when they applied the new criteria for the program retroactively. The legislature subsequently clarified its intention, stating that the 2009 amendments to the program were to be applied retroactively to January 1, 2008. Supreme Court adhered to its prior determination, declaring that the legislature's clarification as applied was unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. Regarding the additional plaintiffs, the Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's holding to the extent of granting Plaintiff's petitions seeking a declaration that the 2009 amendments could not be applied retroactively to January 1, 2008. The State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's determinations in all five cases that the 2009 amendments should not be applied retroactively. View "James Square Assocs. LP v. Mullen" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Iowa Department of Revenue assessed the value of Qwest Corporation's Iowa operating property. Qwest protested the assessment by challenging the general assembly's previous decision to tax the personal property of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) but not competitive long distance telephone companies (CLDTCs) or wireless providers operating in Iowa. Specifically, Qwest argued that the tax scheme which taxed ILECs for the value of their personal property but not CLDTCs and wireless providers violated Qwest's equal protection rights. The State Board of Tax Review (Board) concluded that Qwest's constitutional rights were not violated. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and upheld the Board's assessment on Qwest, holding that imposing a tax on Iowa-based personal property of ILECs but not on that of CLDTCs or wireless service providers did not violate the Iowa Constitution, as the differential tax treatment of these enterprises is rationally related to legitimate state interests in encouraging the development of new competitive telecommunications infrastructure while raising revenue from those providers that historically had a regulated monopoly and continue to enjoy some advantages of that monopoly. View "Qwest Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Review" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Amazon.com and Overstock.com. Both companies were formed in states other than New York, were located in states other than New York, and sold their merchandise solely through the Internet. At issue was N.Y. Tax Law 1101(b)(8)(vi) (the Internet tax), which was amended in 2008 to provide that vendors who paid New York residents to actively solicit business in the State would be required to pay New York taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the Internet tax, alleging that it was unconstitutional on its face as a violation the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Internet tax did not subject online retailers without a physical presence in the State to New York sales and compensating use taxes; and (2) the tax did not create an irrational, irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the State. View "Overstock.com, Inc. v State Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska foreclosed on Jeffrey and Jeanne Stoops' property after the Stoops failed to pay municipal taxes. The Town then conveyed the property to Richard and Betty Nelson by municipal quitclaim deed. The Stoopses subsequently filed a complaint against Richard Nelson seeking to quiet title to the property and asking the court to declare the respective rights of the parties to the property. The superior court granted the Nelsons' motion for summary judgment. The Stoopses appealed, arguing (1) the Town failed to give the Stoopses proper notice of the pending foreclosure in violation of their due process rights, and (2) the Town failed to adhere strictly to the requirements of the statutorily outlined steps a municipality must take to foreclose on a municipal tax lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Town complied with the requirements of the statutory scheme and gave the Stoopses sufficient notice, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Nelsons. View "Stoops v. Nelson" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance creating an offstreet parking district adjoining a Cabela's store. Plaintiff, a resident of the City, filed a complaint against the City and its mayor and city council members, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The district court found the action was barred by the general four-year statute of limitations because it was commenced more than four years after the ordinance was adopted. At issue on appeal was when the statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court reversed without reaching the constitutionality of the ordinance because the Court could not tell from the face of Plaintiff's complaint when Plaintiff's cause of action accrued for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Remanded. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law