Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant filed a pleading in the court of appeals entitled “Eighth Admendment [sic] Violation” seeking an order compelling a county jail to send medical records pertaining to treatment he received while he was there to the correctional institution where he is currently incarcerated. The court of appeals construed Appellant’s pleading as a petition for a writ of mandamus and then dismissed his case for failing to follow procedural requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err by dismissing Appellant’s mandamus petition because he failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25. View "State v. Henton" on Justia Law

Relator requested records for public golf courses operated by Cleveland Metroparks. Metroparks declined to provide the records, asserting that they were exempt from disclosure because they were trade secrets or protected by the attorney client privilege. Relator then filed this mandamus action. The court of appeals granted in part and denied in part the request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Metroparks failed to establish that some documents were exempt from disclosure but that the remaining documents were either trade secrets or protected by the attorney client privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to strike certain affidavits; (2) the court of appeals properly denied Relator’s request for a writ of mandamus with regard to the names and e-mail addresses of Metroparks customers; and (3) the court of appeals did not err by not conducting an in camera review of the documents Relator requested. View "Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks" on Justia Law

Appellant’s father (Decedent) died after receiving surgery at Aultman Hospital. Appellant requested a copy of Decedent’s complete medical record. The Hospital produced the medical record that existed in the medical-records department. Dissatisfied with the Hospital’s response, Appellant filed this action to compel the production of Decedent’s complete medical record. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, concluding that the Hospital had produced the requested medical record, as defined by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74(A)(8). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the term “medical record” as that term is used in Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74 does not include all patient data but consists only of information maintained by the medical-records department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) data that was generated in the process of the patient’s healthcare treatment and that pertains to the patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition qualifies as a “medical record”; but (2) “medical record” means any patient data “generated and maintained by a health care provider” without limitation as to the physical location or department where it is kept. Remanded. View "Griffith v. Aultman Hosp." on Justia Law

Appellee was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI). Because he had been convicted of OVI five times in the previous twenty years, Appellee was charged with two fourth-degree felonies under Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and the repeat-OVI specification described in Ohio Rev. Code 2941.1413 for each offense. Appellee moved to dismiss the repeat-OVI specification attached to each count, arguing that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection because it allows the State to seek greater punishment without providing proof beyond that required to trigger section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Appellee pled no contest to both counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and section 2941.1413 are part of a logical, graduated system of penalties for recidivist OVI offenses and do not violate equal protection. View "State v. Klembus" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with two felony-murder specifications. Appellant was sentenced to death. After Appellant exhausted his postconviction and federal remedies, the Supreme Court ordered the execution to proceed on September 15, 2009. During the scheduled execution, attempts to insert an IV catheter were unsuccessful. Appellant was injected eighteen times during the botched attempt. Appellant pursued multiple avenues challenging any further attempt by the State to execute him. This appeal arose from Appellant’s successive petition for postconviction relief, in which he asserted that any future attempt to execute him would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. The trial court denied Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State was not constitutionally barred from carrying out Appellant’s execution. View "State v. Broom" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Appellant, a juvenile, delinquent on sex offenses. At disposition, the juvenile court did not record a finding regarding Appellant’s age at the time the offenses were committed. Upon Appellant’s release from the Ohio Department of Youth Services, the court scheduled a sex-offender-classification hearing. Appellant opposed his classification as a juvenile-sex-offender registrant, arguing that he was ineligible for classification because he was under the age of fourteen when the offenses were committed and because classification would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. After a hearing, the juvenile court found (1) Appellant had committed at least one offense when he was fourteen years of age, and (2) Appellant should be designated a juvenile offender registrant and classified as a Tier II offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a determination of a juvenile sex offender’s age at the time of the offense can be made at any time prior to or during the classification hearing; and (2) the imposition of classification upon release from a secure facility and for a time period beyond the juvenile offender’s attainment of age eighteen or twenty-one does not violate the offender’s due process rights or the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

In 2012, a principal of Lipson O’Shea Legal Group made a request for records from Cuyahoga County Board of Health (Cuyahoga County BOH) seeking documentation of homes in the County where a minor child was found to have elevated blood lead levels. Cuyahoga County BOH sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the records sought by Lipson O’Shea. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cuyahoga County BOH, concluding that the release of the records was prohibited by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.01, which exempts from disclosure certain health information if the information could be used to reveal the individual’s identity. The court of appeals reversed, declaring that, rather than withholding all records, Cuyahoga County BOH must examine each document, redact any protected health information, and release any remaining unprotected information not otherwise excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some of the information in the requested records prepared by the Cuyahoga County BOH is not protected health information, and therefore, it cannot be said that all of the information responsive to the request is protected. View "Cuyahoga County Bd. of Health v. Lipson O'Shea Legal Group" on Justia Law

This appeal involved Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a gun that was found in a search of a car legally parked on a public street that Defendant was sitting in just before his arrest on a warrant for domestic violence. After Defendant was arrested, an officer conducted an inventory search of the car, during which he found a handgun. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant based on the domestic-violence warrant and that, pursuant to that arrest, the inventory search of the car prior to towing was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless inventory search of the lawfully parked vehicle in this case was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 14. View "State v. Leak" on Justia Law

The Ohio Republican Party (ORP) sent a public-records request to Cuyahoga County seeking the County’s key card swipe data for five individuals, including Edward FitzGerald, the County’s former county executive. At the time of the ORP’s request, the key-card-swipe data were security records exempted from release because FitzGerald had received threats and release of that data would have diminished the County’s ability to protect him and maintain the security of the office of the county executive. Subsequent to receipt of the public-records request, the County moved its administrative offices to a new building, FitzGerald’s term of office expired, and the County released the records to members of the media. The ORP filed this mandamus action alleging that the County had failed to respond to its public-record requests. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus and ordered the release of the records, holding that FitzGerald’s key-card-swipe data were public records, and the County failed to demonstrate that they were exempt from disclosure. View "State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a public-records mandamus case in the court of appeals to obtain records she had requested from the City of South Euclid. During the litigation, the City and its employee (collectively, Appellees) produced all of the requested records. The court of appeals granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant’s request for statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was entitled to damages and remanded with instructions to determine damages. On remand, the court of appeals awarded damages. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for sanctions against Appellees and their counsel. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion for sanctions was untimely and that the actions of Appellees and their counsel in defending the case were not taken in bad faith or with the purpose of delay. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law