Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Father and Mother divorced in 2011. In 2013, the district court ordered Father to pay additional child support for failing to previously pay child support. In 2014, Mother filed a motion to modify custody and enforce the 2013 order. After a hearing, at which Father represented himself, the district court awarded Mother primary physical custody of the child. The district court then held Father in contempt of court for failing to pay child support. The court sentenced Father to a total of eighty days in jail and stayed the contempt sentence on the condition that Father “follow the Orders of the Court.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a contempt order that does not contain a purge clause is criminal in nature, and because the district court’s contempt order did not contain a purge clause, the district court violated Appellant’s constitutional rights by imposing a criminal sentence without providing Appellant with counsel; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision to modify custody on Appellant’s failure to comply with a court order and by failing to consider and set forth its findings as to the Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.480(4) factors for determining the child’s best interest. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with felony eluding a police officer and misdemeanor reckless driving based on the same incident. Appellant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor reckless driving and then moved to dismiss the felony eluding a police officer charge on the basis of double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that misdemeanor reckless driving did not constitute a lesser included offense of felony eluding. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to felony eluding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the offense of reckless driving is a lesser included offense of felony eluding as charged in this case, and therefore, Appellant’s conviction for felony eluding a police officer violated double jeopardy. View "Kelley v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a firearm, conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State’s warrantless access of historical cell site location data obtained from his cell phone service provider pursuant to the Stored Communications Act violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location information data because it is a part of the business records made, kept, and owned by cell phone providers, and therefore, a search warrant is not required to obtain such historical cell site location information; (2) certain out-of-court and in-court identifications did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law; (3) prosecutorial conduct and statements during closing arguments did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to life with the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred when it admitted Defendant’s inculpatory statements to detectives because he was not advised of his Miranda rights and was subject to an alleged custodial interrogation. The State, in response, claimed that Defendant spoke voluntarily with the police and, therefore, Miranda warnings were unnecessary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the police subjected him to a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting recordings taken by Defendant, who wore a wire and spoke with others involved in the murder to corroborate his story; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to convicted Defendant of conspiracy and murder. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

The Washoe County Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights as to his three minor children. Father filed a demand for a jury trial. The district court denied Father’s demand, concluding that the right to a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding is not guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution, common law, or statute. After a bench trial, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his three minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Father’s demand for a jury trial in the termination of parental rights proceeding, as neither the Nevada Constitution nor the United States Constitution guarantees a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to the three minor children. View "Jesus F. v. Washoe County Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The district court denied Defendant’s motion so suppress statements he made in two interviews with police after his initial appearance before a magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before the magistrate, but Defendant waived his right to have counsel present at the subsequent interviews; but (2) the district court clearly erred when it rejected Defendant’s objection under Batson v. Kentucky to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove an African American from the venire during jury selection. Remanded. View "McCarty v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related felonies. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant filed a postconviction habeas proceeding but was denied relief. Defendant then filed a second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the ineffective assistance of the attorney who represented him in the first postconviction proceeding excused the procedural bars to claims raised in his second petition. The district court denied the petition as both untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied the petition as procedurally barred because, although Defendant filed his petition within a reasonable time after the postconviction-counsel claims became available, those claims lacked merit, and therefore, Defendant had not demonstrated good cause for an untimely petition or good cause and prejudice for a second petition. View "Rippo v. State" on Justia Law

The City of Fernley filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief arguing that the Local Government Tax Distribution Account under Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.660 violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the prohibition on special or local legislation under Nev. Const. art IV, 20. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly found the Local Government Tax Distribution Account to be general legislation because the system is a “general law that applies neutrally to local government entities and is based on classifications that are rationally related to achieving the Legislature’s legitimate government objective of promoting general-purpose governments that have public services.” View "City of Fernley v. State, Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

Respondents Dawn Stockman, an animal control officer for Clark County Animal Control, and Clark County obtained a warrant to search Appellant Judy Palmieri’s residence by relying in part on a tip from an informant who, Palmieri later alleged, provided a false identity when she filed a complaint against Palmieri. A search of Palmieri’s residence revealed several violations of the Clark County Code’s provisions for the health and welfare of animals. Palmieri later sued Respondents, asserting a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, a Monell claim, and several state law causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The primary issue on appeal was whether the district court appropriately granted Stockman summary judgment on Palmieri’s 1983 claim based on a finding that Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore, the district court appropriately granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. View "Palmieri v. Clark County" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes, was sentenced to serve fourteen consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of ninety-two years in prison. In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Graham v. Florida. The district court granted Defendant’s petition and ordered a new sentencing hearing, determining (1) Graham prohibited aggregate sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, and (2) Graham also provided good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar of Defendant’s untimely and successive petition. Although the Supreme Court agreed that Graham precludes aggregate sentences that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against nonhomicide juvenile offenders and that the decision in Graham provides good cause and actual prejudice for Defendant’s untimely and successive petition, the Court nonetheless vacated the district court’s order, holding that A.B. 267 remedies Defendant’s unconstitutional sentence. View "State v. Boston" on Justia Law