Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Indiana
Citizens Action Coalition of Ind. v. Koch
The Energy and Policy Institute made three separate requests to Indiana House Representative Eric Koch under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA) seeking copies of Koch’s correspondence with various business organizations in relation to specific legislation. The Chief Counsel of the Republic Caucus denied each of these requests. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Koch and the Indiana House Republic Caucus seeking a declaratory judgment that APRA was applicable to Defendants and that Defendants violated APRA by denying some or all of Plaintiffs’ requests. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability and, alternatively, for failure to state claim, arguing that Plaintiffs’ requests would interfere with the internal workings of the legislature and should be found non-justiciable on those grounds. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the question of whether the APRA is generally applicable to the legislature is justiciable, and the APRA does apply to the General Assembly; but (2) the question of whether the APRA requests at issue in this case are exempt from disclosure as legislative “work product” is non-justiciable. View "Citizens Action Coalition of Ind. v. Koch" on Justia Law
Hitch v. State
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery as a class A misdemeanor. Under the provisions of Ind. Code 35-38-1-7.7(a), the trial court also determined that Defendant committed a crime of “domestic violence,” which determination rendered Defendant ineligible to possess a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing, in part, that the firearm restriction amounted to additional punishment above the statutory maximum for misdemeanor battery, and because the facts supporting the enhancement were not submitted to a jury, the determination violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no violation of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the determination that Defendant committed a crime of domestic violence. View "Hitch v. State" on Justia Law
Ammons v. State
In 1998, Appellant committed child molesting in Indiana. Appellant was released in 2006 and completed parole the next year. In 2009, Appellant moved to Iowa, where he was subject to a registration requirement. When Appellant moved back to Indiana in 2013, the State notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender. Appellant sought removal from the registry. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant argued that because he committed his offense six years prior to the passage of Indiana’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA), application of SORA to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant was already under an obligation to register in another jurisdiction and Ind. Code 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and -19(f) do not impose any additional punishment on him, there was no ex post facto violation. View "Ammons v. State" on Justia Law
Ackerman v. State
In 2013, Defendant was charged with second degree murder for the death of a toddler that occurred in 1977. During a bench trial, the court admitted into evidence an autopsy report. The autopsy was performed by a pathologist who was unavailable to testify at trial. In addition to the autopsy report, the State called a forensic pathologist to testify regarding his independent opinion of the child’s death and injuries based on the autopsy report. The trial court found Defendant guilty of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment under the relevant sentencing statutes in 1977. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the autopsy report was not testimonial, Defendant’s confrontation right was not violated when the report was admitted into evidence or when the surrogate pathologist testified regarding the information detailed in the autopsy report; (2) the delay between the murder of the child and Defendant’s prosecution did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; and (3) even if the trial court erred at sentencing by taking into consideration the current sentencing scheme that was inapplicable in this case, the error was harmless. View "Ackerman v. State" on Justia Law
State v. Taylor
Defendant was arrested for suspected murder. During Defendant’s pre-interrogation with his lawyer, police officers and a prosecutor eavesdropped as Defendant and his attorney discussed the location of evidence and defense trial strategy. Defendant was charged with murder. The officers involved in the investigation invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to all questions related to the eavesdropping, thus preventing Defendant and the court from learning the identity of the eavesdroppers and what they had overhead. Before trial, the trial court ordered blanket suppression of trial testimony from any witness who pleaded the Fifth. The State appealed the blanket suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed the pretrial blanket suppression. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, holding that prospectively imposing blanket suppression of all testimony from witnesses pleading the Fifth Amendment is inappropriate because a presumption of prejudice, rebuttable only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, adequately protects Defendant from prejudice caused by the officers’ eavesdropping and their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Remanded for a determination as to whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt an independent source for each presumptively tainted witness’s testimony without implicating the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege and without derogating Defendant’s right of confrontation. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law
Wahl v. State
After a jury trial, Defendants, a married couple, were each convicted of involuntary manslaughter. After they were sentenced, Defendants filed a motion to correct error seeking a mistrial based on one juror’s affidavit describing the conduct of an alternate juror during the jury’s deliberations. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted transfer, consolidated the cases, and reversed the convictions, holding (1) the juror’s affidavit established that the alternate juror’s participation in jury deliberations was an external influence that pertained to the case, which showings resulted in a presumption of prejudice to Defendants; and (2) the State did not rebut the presumption by showing that the jury was nonetheless impartial, and therefore, a new trial is required. Remanded. View "Wahl v. State" on Justia Law
Ward v. State
Defendant was charged with battering J.M., his girlfriend. While she was being treated for her injuries, J.M. told a paramedic and forensic nurse that Defendant was the source of her injuries. J.M. was reported missing shortly after the assault and failed to appear for scheduled depositions. The State later provided notice of intent to introduce J.M.'s statement identifying Defendant as her attacker through the testimony of the paramedic and forensic nurse. The trial court granted the motion. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of C-felony battery and A-misdemeanor domestic battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that J.M.’s statements were testimonial hearsay admitted in violation of his confrontation rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.M.’s hearsay statements were non-testimonial and, therefore, were properly admitted into evidence. View "Ward v. State" on Justia Law
Garcia v. State
Defendant was lawfully placed under arrest for driving without a valid driver’s license. Before the police officer placed Defendant in his police cruiser, he conducted a pat-down search of Defendant’s clothing to check for weapons. The officer discovered a pill container in Defendant’s pocket, opened the container, and found a single narcotic pill for which Defendant did not have a valid prescription. Defendant was charged with driving without a license and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the pill container’s contents, arguing that the officer’s opening of the pill contained was an unreasonable search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the opening of the pill container was within the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest and reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. View "Garcia v. State" on Justia Law
Thornton v. State
Plaintiff brought several claims against multiple defendants arising out of his incarceration for a probation violation that occurred after his term of probation had expired. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff sought transfer, contending that his claim against four individual probation officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was incorrectly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the individually-named probation officers, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim for relief under section 1983 against these defendants. View "Thornton v. State" on Justia Law
Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter
Plaintiffs, as a certified class, challenged the constitutionality of the program utilized by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) in the processing of applications for personalized license plates (PLPs), arguing that the decision making process used in denying or revoking PLPs violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the class, concluding that the statute that authorizes the BMV to refuse to issue PLPs and its related policies are vague, overbroad, and lacking in content-neutrality and that the Bureau violates due process safeguards by providing insufficient reasons for a denial or revocation of a PLP. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) PLPS are government speech; and (2) therefore, the statute and policies at issue in this case are constitutional. View "Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter" on Justia Law