Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his home, holding that a waiver of the "right against search and seizure" clearly informs the defendant that a search may be conducted without reasonable suspicion.When a defendant is processed for home detention, he normally signs an agreement in which he forgoes many of his rights. The agreement typically includes consent to allow community corrections to search the defendant's person or home to ensure compliance with the rules. Defendant in this case argued that the search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the contract he signed when he was placed on home detention didn't include a waiver of searches without reasonable suspicion. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract unambiguously informed Defendant that he waived his right against search and seizure absent reasonable suspicion. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's habitual-offender allegation and remanded with instructions to vacate Defendant's habitual-offender enhancement, holding Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a six-plus-year delay.Defendant was serving an eighty-year sentence when the trial court vacated his thirty-year habitual-offender enhancement. More than six years passed before the State retried the habitual-offender allegation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the motion, eventually finding Defendant to be a habitual offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Criminal Rule 4(C) does not apply to a habitual-offender retrial; but (2) Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to relief. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of dealing in a look-a-like substance, a Level 5 felony under Ind. Code 35-348-4-4.6, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant offered to sell a substance to a strange at a casino, and the incident was captured by video surveillance. A gaming enforcement agent took Defendant to an interview room, patted him down, and found packaged drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence stemming from the pat-down. The trial court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the search and seizure proceeded within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of the murder and attempted murder of his family members, holding that one of the jurors committed gross misconduct and that, under the circumstances, Defendant did not demonstrate that the misconduct probably harmed him.After Defendant was convicted, he filed a motion to set aside the verdict based on juror misconduct, alleging that one juror, L.W., falsely answered the juror questionnaire. The juror wrote "N/A," meaning not applicable, in response to questions about the jurors past criminal history and whether she had been a victim of a crime, when those answers should have been a yes. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) juror L.W. committed gross misconduct; but (2) despite the gross misconduct, it was unlikely that Defendant was harmed. View "Loehrlein v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of "dealing in a look-a-like substance," a level five felony under Ind. Code 35-48-4-4.6, holding that trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.At a casino, Defendant offered to sell a substance to a stranger, who reported the incident. Thereafter, a Gaming Enforcement Agent led Defendant to an interview room and proceeded to pat him down. The trial court admitted the evidence discovered as a result of the pat down. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the search and seizure proceeded within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss his habitual offender enhancement, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by an extraordinary six-plus-year delay.Defendant was serving an eighty-year sentence when the trial court vacated his thirty-year habitual offender enhancement. The court granted the State permission to retry the habitual offender allegation, but it would be nearly six and a half years before Defendant was retried. Before his retrial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a violation of Ind. Crim. R. 4(C) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. After a trial, a jury found that Defendant was a habitual offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to discharge under Rule 4(C) because that rule does not apply to the retrial of a habitual offender allegation; but (2) Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to relief. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court expressly overruled the constitutional tests set forth in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), in resolving claims of substantive double jeopardy and adopted an analytical framework that applies the statutory rules of double jeopardy.The Richardson court adopted a comprehensive analytical framework constituting of a statutory elements test and an actual evidence test for deciding all substantive double jeopardy claims under Ind. Const. art. I, 14. Application of the tests, however, proved largely untenable, resulting in a patchwork of conflicting precedent and inconsistent standards. Defendant in this case was convicted of several offenses for leaving the scene of an accident after striking and injuring the victim while driving drunk. The Supreme Court overruled Richardson and adopted a framework that applies when a defendant's single act or transaction implicates multiple criminal statutes. The Court then held that Defendant's multiple convictions violated the statutory rules of substantive double jeopardy. View "Wadle v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court suppressing blood test results obtained the morning of a vehicle collision, holding that the blood-draw search warrant application satisfied the filing requirement under Ind. Code 35-33-5-2(a).Defendant caused a head-on collision when he drove the wrong way on a freeway. Defendant filed a motion to suppress blood test results obtained the morning of the accident, arguing that Ind. Code 35-33-5-2 and his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated when the arresting state trooper failed properly to file a probable cause affidavit to obtain a blood-test search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a copy of the probable cause affidavit was not properly "filed" until a few hours after it had been presented to the warrant-authorizing judge and swiftly executed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the blood-draw search warrant application satisfied the filing requirement under section 35-33-5-2(a) because (1) the warrant-authorizing judge certified that the affidavit had been properly filed with her when the search warrant was issued; and (2) even if the affidavit was filed a few hours late it was still valid under Indiana's substantial compliance filing doctrine. View "State v. Ryder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court overruling Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle, holding that law enforcement officers do not violate either the state or federal constitution by searching a person's vehicle when the person drives that vehicle up to his house while officers are executing a search warrant for the house that does not address vehicles.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the law enforcement in his case exceeded the scope of the search warrant by searching his vehicle, which was not mentioned in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the general premises warrant permitting law enforcement's search of Defendant's home also supported law enforcement's search of Defendant's vehicle, and therefore, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the search of Defendant's vehicle did not violate Ind. Const. art. I, 11 because it was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. View "Hardin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court holding Defendant in contempt when Defendant refused to unlock her iPhone for a detective, holding that forcing Defendant to unlock her iPhone would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.The State charged Defendant of several offenses. When Defendant was placed under arrest, law enforcement took her iPhone. Believing it contained incriminating evidence, a detective got a warrant ordering Defendant to unlock her iPhone. When Defendant refused, the trial court held her in contempt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) allowing the State to force Defendant to unlock her iPhone for law enforcement would provide law enforcement with information it did not already know, which the State could use in its prosecution against her; and (2) this result is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment's protection from compelled self-incrimination. View "Seo v. State" on Justia Law