Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Georgia
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In 2003, Terry Harper and Emmanuel Ruiz were convicted by a jury of murder and related charges connected to the shooting deaths of Joe Luhrman, David Carty, and Tracy Glover in 2001. Harper appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to due process was violated due to the almost 20-year delay between his conviction and his direct appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after the State referenced a response he gave to police questioning that he contends was previously excluded and prejudicial, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to obtain and introduce evidence that he was suffering a severe injury to his dominant hand at the time of the shootings.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court applied the four-part balancing test from Barker v. Wingo to Harper's claim of a due process violation due to the delayed appeal. Although the court found that the delay was lengthy and Harper consistently asserted his right to appeal, it ultimately held that Harper failed to show actual prejudice from the delay. Regarding the mistrial motion, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as the jury was given prompt curative instructions, and the prosecutor acted in good faith. Lastly, the court denied Harper's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as he failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if his medical records were introduced into evidence. View "HARPER v. STATE" on Justia Law

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The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal challenged the Living Infants Fairness and Equality Act (“LIFE Act”), which regulated abortion procedures in Georgia. Although Appellees claimed at trial that the LIFE Act violated the due-process, equal-protection, and inherent-rights provisions of the Georgia Constitution, those claims were not ruled on below and were not part of this appeal because the trial court concluded that Appellees were entitled to relief on a different ground. Specifically, the trial court concluded that certain provisions of the LIFE Act were void ab initio because, when the LIFE Act was enacted in 2019, those provisions violated the United States Constitution as interpreted by then-controlling-but-since-overruled decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Here, the issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court came from that ruling, and the Court concluded the trial court erred. "The holdings of United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the United States Constitution that have since been overruled cannot establish that a law was unconstitutional when enacted and therefore cannot render a law void ab initio." The judgment was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to consider in the first instance Appellees’ other challenges to the LIFE Act. View "Georgia v. Sistersong Women of Color Reproductive Justice, et al." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Sheriff of Tift County, Gene Scarbrough, in this action brought by Sherrie McBrayer for the wrongful death of her husband, James McBrayer (“the decedent”). The Court of Appeals held that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer’s complaint did not show that the decedent’s death, which occurred while he was restrained in the back seat of a patrol car, arose from the sheriff’s deputies’ “use” of the patrol car “as a vehicle,” which, under Court of Appeals case law construing OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2, was a prerequisite for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the “negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted that McBrayer’s complaint did not allege “that the car was running; that any deputy was seated in the car; that any deputy was poised to start the car or transport the decedent to any location;” or that the deputies were otherwise “actively” using the patrol car “as a vehicle. McBrayer thereafter timely petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the meaning of the word “use” in the phrase “use of a covered motor vehicle” by reading into OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 the words “actively” and “as a vehicle.” Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McBrayer, et al. v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law

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This appeal presented only a discrete and important threshold question to the underlying case: whether the Georgia Constitution required a plaintiff to establish some cognizable injury to bring a lawsuit in Georgia courts, i.e., to have standing to sue, separate and apart from the statutory authorization to bring suit. The Georgia Supreme Court found T. Davis Humphries, as a private citizen, had standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief against her local county government for its planned removal of a Confederate monument in alleged violation of OCGA § 50-3-1. But the other plaintiffs — the various Sons of Confederate Veterans entities — did not show that they were members of the communities the governments of which they sought to sue, and they alleged no other cognizable injury sufficient to establish their standing. The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong to affirm the dismissal of Humphries’s complaint for a lack of standing as to her claim for injunctive relief, but it was right to affirm the dismissal of the complaints filed by the various Sons of Confederate Veterans groups. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether Humphries had standing for her claim for damages under OCGA § 50-3-1, because the cause of action that statute purported to create had not yet arisen; by the statute’s terms, the cause of action arose only upon the occurrence of conduct prohibited by the statute, and that conduct had not yet occurred. View "Sons of Confederate Veterans, et al. v. Henry Cty. Bd of Commissioners" on Justia Law

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On March 25, 2021, Georgia Governor Kemp signed into law Senate Bill 9 (“SB 9”), which created from the former Augusta Judicial Circuit two new judicial circuits: the Columbia Judicial Circuit, and the Augusta Judicial Circuit. The judicial circuit split, which was slated to become effective on July 1, 2021, was briefly stayed by three lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of SB 9. The lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of Richmond County, one by Columbia County citizen Willie Saunders and two by the nonprofit, voting advocacy organization, Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. (“BVMF”). At the heart of each of these suits was a claim that Columbia County officials sought to form their own judicial circuit as a racially discriminatory reaction to the election of District Attorney Jared Williams in November 2020. These appeals and cross-appeals arose from the trial court’s July 13, 2021 final judgment addressing the merits of the appellants’ challenges to SB 9 in each of the three suits. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the appellants’ challenges to SB 9, declaring it “valid and enforceable” and allowing the circuit split to proceed. However, The Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment as to BVMF and remanded those cases to the trial court with instruction that they be dismissed because BVMF lacked standing to pursue its actions. As to Saunders, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of his appeal because Saunders failed to challenge the trial court’s dispositive ruling dismissing the defendants he sued. Thus, the Supreme Court also vacated the judgment as to Saunders’ complaint and directed the trial court to dismiss his action upon remand. View "Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp" on Justia Law

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Georgia law generally required a person to apply for and receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. The General Assembly identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain criminal convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a probate judge could deny an application for a weapons carry license under OCGA 16-11-129 based on a determination that the applicant’s criminal history records report failed to show the outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that a probate judge had no such authority. It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. View "Bell v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

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In 2016, Priscilla Savoy, individually and as executor of her mother’s estate, filed suit against her sisters Eleanor Bowen and Margaret Innocenti (collectively “defendants”) contending that they colluded to appropriate funds from their mother’s estate for their own use. The defendants were served with the summons and complaint on June 20 and 22, 2016. On July 20, 2016, the defendants filed in the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was supported by a sworn affidavit executed by Bowen denying the factual allegations raised in the complaint. When the defendants did not answer the complaint within 30 days of service, as required by OCGA § 9-11-12 (a), the case “automatically [became] in default,” OCGA 9-11-55 (a). The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address the following question: To show a proper case for opening default under OCGA 9-11-55 (b), must the defendant provide a reasonable explanation for the failure to file a timely answer? The Court answered that question in the negative and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bowen v. Savoy" on Justia Law

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The Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc. (the “Garden”) leased land from the City of Atlanta. The Garden wished to enforce a policy precluding the possession of firearms by visitors to, and guests of, the Garden, like Phillip Evans. Evans held a valid weapons carry license under Georgia law and asserted that he was authorized to carry a firearm at the garden under the authority of OCGA 16-11-127 (c). The Garden contended it could enforce its policy based on an exception to the general rule found in the same statutory paragraph. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether OCGA 16-11-127 (c) permitted a private organization that leased property owned by a municipality to prohibit the carrying of firearms on the leased premises. The Court of Appeals determined that it did and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Garden on the petition for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. The Georgia Supreme Court determined this case turned on whether the Garden was indeed private property. Because no lease was entered into the trial court record, judgment was reversed for further proceedings at the trial court. View "GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. et al. v. Atlanta Botanical Gardens, Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellee Bobby Schroeder received a traffic ticket in DeKalb County in 2013. He alleged he appeared in recorder’s court and was ordered to pay a fine and that he timely paid the fine, but the staff of the recorder’s court failed to close his case. He asserted the court staff falsely informed the Georgia Department of Driver Services (DDS) that he failed to appear for his hearing or pay his fine, leading to the suspension of his driving privilege. In August, an officer with the Rockdale County Sheriff’s Office arrested appellee for driving on a suspended license and took him into custody. Appellee claimed he spent significant time in custody before bonding out. Approximately one month later, an officer with the Newton County Sheriff’s Office arrested appellee for driving on a suspended license and took him into custody. According to appellee, at the time of his Rockdale and Newton County arrests, he was on first offender probation; the arrests led to the revocation of his probation, for which appellee was ultimately arrested and spent one month in jail. According to appellee, at some point, the recorder’s court realized that it had provided DDS with incorrect information, and sent a notice of suspension withdrawal to the department. This led to the dismissal of the Rockdale and Newton charges and the withdrawal of the probation revocation petition. Appellee claimed he lost his job because of these events. Appellee alleged DeKalb County Recorder's Court Chief Judge Nelly Withers and court administrator Troy Thompson were aware that the recorder’s court was "understaffed, dysfunctional, and unable to process its cases," and knew the court’s computer systems produced unreliable data because the systems were flawed or "because employees routinely entered data incorrectly, and that employees routinely failed to communicate correct information to DDS." Appellee filed this action for damages alleging that defendants failed to perform their ministerial duties with due care and that their actions led to appellee’s unlawful arrests. In addition to state law claims, appellee asserted claims under 42 USC 1983. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded appellants were protected from suit by the doctrine of judicial immunity and its derivative quasi-judicial immunity, and reversed the Court of Appeals’ opinion to the extent it allowed appellee’s suit to move forward against these two appellants. View "Withers v. Schroeder" on Justia Law

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Searless West was a former employee of the City of Albany who filed a complaint in federal court against the City and two individuals setting forth, among other things, a claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”). With respect to West’s claims under the GWA, she sought economic and non-economic damages resulting from alleged retaliation for disclosing what she deemed to be certain financial irregularities in the City’s utility department. The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the whistleblower claim, asserting it failed as a matter of law because West did not provide ante litem notice prior to filing the complaint. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, in an order finding no controlling precedent from the Georgia Supreme Court that addressed the legal issue raised by the City, certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court: "is a plaintiff required to provide a municipal corporation with ante litem notice pursuant to OCGA 36-33-5 in order to pursue a claim against it for money damages under the [GWA]?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. View "West v. City of Albany" on Justia Law