Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

JB Enterprises (JBE) owned property located on a corner lot abutting Cliff Avenue and 63rd Street in Sioux Falls. Prior to initiating a public improvement reconstructing the interchange at Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenue, the State instituted a quick-take condemnation action against JBE, contesting JBE’s “control of access” to its property. The State ultimately changed the public improvement and left intact JBE’s curb cut along Cliff Avenue. After the State closed the intersection of 63rd Street and Cliff Avenue, JBE requested a jury trial on damages, alleging that the State owned JBE’s right to “control of access” to its property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State’s public improvement did not result in a compensable taking because the State did not physically take any of JBE’s property and did not eliminate JBE’s direct access to Cliff Avenue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the State acquired the right to deprive JBE of access to Cliff Avenue, JBE must be compensated under the assumption that the State will do so. Remanded for a trial on damages. View "State v. JB Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Carlyle Schleim owned, and Farmers State Bank of Canton held a mortgage on, property located near an intersection that was closed in connection with the State’s reconstruction of the interchange between Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenue. Schliem and the Bank brought an inverse-condemnation action against the State alleging that the closure of the intersection diminished the value of the subject property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Schliem did not identify a property interest that had been taken or damaged by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Schliem did not suffer compensable loss by the intersection’s closure, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for the State. View "Schleim v. S.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence after police officers approached a parked vehicle and found Defendant in the driver’s seat and smelled the odor of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the intrusion. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the officer’s investigation was justified under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it concluded that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement applied and thus denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Kleven" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, Defendant argued that the court erred when it found that exceptions to the warrant requirement existed and erred by failing to suppress his statements made to law enforcement prior to receiving Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) exigent circumstances existed justifying the officers’ warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment; and (2) the admission of Defendant’s statements that he made to law enforcement before he received Miranda warnings was proper. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by a police officer because his vehicle’s left brake light was not working. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding (1) since the relevant statute required only two working brake lights Defendant did not violate the law because his vehicle’s right and top-center brake lights were working; and (2) the officer’s belief that South Dakota law required a working left and right brake light was objectively unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the most reasonable interpretation of the pertinent statute is that the Legislature intended the display and actuation requirements to apply only to two brake lights; but (2) it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that Defendant’s inoperative left brake light constituted a violation of law. View "State v. Lerma" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison with four years suspended and credit for time served. Defendant appealed, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the circuit court erred in denying his request for a new trial, and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it did not address Defendant’s motion for a change of counsel. Remanded for the circuit court to appoint new counsel and conduct a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to simple assault. Appellant was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary - the maximum penalty - with no credit for time served. Appellant appealed, challenging the circuit court’s failure to give credit for time served and the constitutionality of his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give credit for time served; and (2) Appellant’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime of simple assault and was thus constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Remanded for correction of Appellant’s sentence to give credit for time served. View "State v. Ainsworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s reference to Defendant’s attorney in cross-examination and closing argument violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor’s statements improperly suggested to the jury that Defendant and his defense counsel concocted a false defense to avoid a guilty verdict; but (2) a new trial was not warranted because Defendant was not prejudiced. View "State v. Pursley" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. After a hearing, the circuit court denied habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his right to appeal and his right to remain silent during the presentence investigation; and (2) Appellant’s sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. View "Stark v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury on second-degree murder did not deprive Defendant of his constitutional right to notice of the charges against him and his right to defend against such charges where second-degree murder was not charged in the indictment; (2) the circuit court did not deny Defendant his right to confront witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of a State witness; (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to suppress Defendant’s statements made to an officer immediately after the shooting; and (4) Defendant’s sentence for aggravated assault was not cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. McCahren" on Justia Law