Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Misty Jo Oliver asked the trial court to expunge her record of two misdemeanor convictions pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-26 through 23A-3-33 (collectively, the expungement statutes). The trial court granted her request. The State appealed on the grounds that under both the expungement statutes and the state Constitution the trial court was without jurisdiction to expunge records of Oliver's convictions. After analyzing the statutes and the legislative history, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the expungement statutes to apply to convictions, and therefore, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by expunging the records of Oliver's convictions.

Stacy Brant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. As part of his sentencing, the court ordered that Brant provide a full and honest debrief as to the incident. The state Board of Pardons and Paroles later determined that Brant had violated the terms of his sentence by failing to comply with the court order to honestly debrief the incident and issued an order that partially revoked his suspended sentence. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. Brant appealed, contending that he was not given a fair warning that a failure to honestly debrief would result in the loss of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brant received a prior fair warning that failing to give an honest debrief could result in a revocation of his suspended sentence; and (2) the circuit court and Board did not clearly err in finding that Brant had violated a condition of his suspended sentence.

John Willey was arrested for three DUIs: in 2008, May 2010 and August 8, 2010. Willey pleaded guilty to charges for his May 2010 arrest on August 30, 2010 and was convicted on September 27, 2010. For Willey's August 8, 2010 arrest, the State filed a Part II information that alleged Willey had two prior DUI convictions. Willey argued that the conviction on September 27, 2010 was invalid for enhancement purposes. The circuit court denied the motion. After a stipulated court trial, Wiley was convicted of DUI based on the August 8, 2010 arrest. The next day, a jury convicted him on the Part II information, finding that he had two prior DUI convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-5.2, (1) the Part II information in this case constituted an enhanced penalty, and (2) Willey could not receive an enhanced penalty for a third offense DUI because he had not been convicted or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to the second offense previous in time to committing the third subsequent offense. Remanded.

Under the terms of a plea agreement entered into with the State, Chris Jones agreed to plead guilty to three counts of second-degree rape and one count of kidnapping. After sentencing, Jones filed a motion to reconsider the sentence based upon an alleged violation of the plea agreement by the State. The trial court granted the motion and held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Jones's oral motion for a different sentencing judge. Jones appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jones did not contemporaneously object to the state's violation of the plea agreement, he forfeited his claim; (2) Jones did not demonstrate that the violation of the plea agreement resulted in plain error; and (3) given Jones's conduct and the fact that the sentence was well within the statutory maximums for his crimes, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.

Robert Dahl was convicted for third-offense DUI. Dahl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The arresting officer initiated the investigatory stop to determine whether Dahl violated the statute requiring a vehicle executing a right turn to be driven as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer did not make a mistake of law by concluding that Dahl's vehicle did not stay as close as practicable to the right-hand curb when making the turn; and (2) even if Dahl did not violate any traffic laws, his wide turn and crossing over the dividing line were sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.

Shanna Starkey was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The stop was based on the officer's perception that Starkey was attempting to evade the police. Starkey was ultimately arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to consider that conduct designed to evade contact with the police may establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention; and (2), under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Starkey's evasive driving provided reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Remanded.

Former county deputy sheriff Buckly McColl entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to one count of third-degree rape. In exchange, the State dismissed other charges and agreed not to release an analysis of McColl's use of the sheriff's department's computers. More than one year after McColl was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that the State violated the plea agreement by "leaking" the computer analysis. The circuit court denied the motion. McColl moved for reconsideration and a hearing to present witnesses who would testify they heard information about the computer analysis. The circuit court also denied that motion. McColl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in not allowing a hearing to present evidence that the State breached the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because McColl failed to allege specific facts, which, if true, would entitle him to withdraw his plea, the circuit court was not required to hold a hearing to determine if the plea agreement had been breached.

Appellant Richard Litschewski was convicted by a jury of three separate offenses. The circuit court ordered that the sentence for count two was to run consecutive to the sentence for count one, and the sentence for count three was to run consecutive to counts one and two. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the circuit court imposed consecutive sentences in an order that was inconsistent with the chronological order in which his crimes occurred. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the version of S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-6.1 that was in effect when Appellant was sentenced, the circuit court lacked the authority to order Appellant's sentence for count two, which occurred first in time, to run consecutive to count one. Remanded.

Appellant Jason Larsen-Smith was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to life without parole. Appellant appealed, arguing that the sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant where (1) the sentence did not appear grossly disproportionate to the crime, (2) Appellant received a statutorily authorized sentence for his conviction, and (3) the circuit court properly acquired a thorough acquaintance with Appellant and imposed a sentence that took into consideration the safety of the public and Appellant's prospects for rehabilitation.

Defendant Christopher Jones was convicted of raping a twenty-three-year-old woman who testified that she was too intoxicated to have consented. The defendant appealed, asserting that although S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(4) does not explicitly include a knowledge element, the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the State must prove that the defendant knew that the woman's intoxicated condition made her unable to consent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature intended that a rape conviction under section 22-22-1(4) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim's intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting. Remanded for a new trial.