Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Plaintiff, a Honduran national, pleaded guilty to a felony in South Dakota and received a four-year suspended sentence. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeking to vacate his 2001 conviction, asserting that the conviction was invalid because he pleaded guilty without being given Padilla and Boykin advisements. The circuit court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because coram nobis was unavailable to remedy Plaintiff’s claimed Padilla and Boykin violations, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the State. View "Garcia v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to several offenses, including first-degree felony murder. Defendant was sentenced to death on the murder charge. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. Defendant subsequently filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he did not validly waive his right to have a jury determine whether to impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court granted the writ and vacated Defendant’s death sentence. On remand, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits, and the case proceeded to a jury sentencing. Thereafter, the jury sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and the proportionality of his sentence, holding (1) although the circuit court’s denial on the merits of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was in excess of what was permitted by the limited remand, Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was properly denied; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was lawfully imposed by the jury. View "State v. Piper" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography and sentenced to eight years incarceration. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. At issue on appeal was whether there was substantial evidence establishing that Defendant exercised dominion or control over a video file containing child pornography when the State presented no direct evidence that Defendant possessed the video, but rather relied on circumstantial evidence to convict Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and obstructing a law enforcement officer. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence. Specifically, Defendant contended that police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop or frisk him, and therefore, the evidence against him was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore, the subsequently discovered evidence was admissible. View "State v. Mohr" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several sex-related crimes, all involving one particular child victim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by allowing a police detective's opinion on why defendants accused of sex offenses against children do not confess during interrogation; (2) did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the child victim's statements made to a forensic interviewer; and (3) abused its discretion in allowing an expert witness for the State to give a medical diagnosis of "child sexual abuse." View "State v. Buchholtz" on Justia Law

In 2002, Petitioner, an inmate serving a fifteen-year sentence, pleaded guilty to possession of an unauthorized article by an inmate. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. In 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging several constitutional violations, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to preserve Petitioner's right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court denied the petition based on prejudice to the State caused by Petitioner's failure to timely file his petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to rebut the statutory presumption of prejudice to the State in its ability to respond to the application due to Petitioner's failure to timely file the application. View "Davis v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1995, Petitioner was convicted of child rape, sexual contact, disseminating harmful material to minors, and indecent exposure. Petitioner was acquitted in the same trial of raping two other children. Approximately a decade later, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the counseling records for the child Petitioner was convicted of raping were first disclosed. The habeas court denied Petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Petitioner's amended motion for a certificate of probable cause, concluding that Petitioner had not shown "a reasonable probability that the specific timing of the disclosure would have created reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds considering the entire record." The Supreme Court issued a certificate of probable cause, resulting in this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not denied due process because of the State's failure to produce the counseling records, as there was no reasonable probability that, had the evidence been timely disclosed to the defense, the result of Petitioner's trial would have been different. View "Thompson v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and driving while having a 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood. Appellant appealed in part the trial court's admission of certain testimony regarding the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, which the arresting officer conducted during the stop of Appellant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in allowing the arresting officer to testify about the reliability of HGN testing and the correlation between an individual's performance on an HGN test and the individual's blood alcohol content, the error was harmless; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have convicted Appellant of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Yuel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part two information alleged that Defendant had two previous DUI convictions within the last ten years, including one in 2011. Defendant filed a motion to strike the 2011 conviction from the part two information, claiming that his guilty plea was invalid because he was not fully advised that he would waive his right to a jury trial, right to confrontation, and right against self-incrimination. The circuit court agreed with Defendant and ordered that the 2011 conviction be stricken from the part two information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it struck Defendant's 2011 conviction from the part two information, as the record affirmatively showed that Defendant was fully advised of his rights under Boykin v. Alabama during his 2011 conviction and intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and ingestion of marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search of his hotel room. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the drugs seized during the initial illegal search but denied the motion with respect to evidence gathered during a subsequent call to the hotel. After a trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in denying in part Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as the second call to police constituted an independent source of evidence against Defendant and that the evidence obtained thereby bore no causal connection to the evidence illegally seized in Defendant's hotel room. View "State v. Heney" on Justia Law