Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of burglary, robbery in the first degree, and assault on a person over the age of sixty. The complainant, who was seventy-one years old at the time of trial, had suffered a stroke and couldn't remember "a lot of things" and also took prescription medication daily. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) refusing to explicitly instruct the jury that, in assessing credibility, it could consider a witness's ability to observe and recall; (2) refusing to instruct the jury that a history of drug abuse may weaken the credibility of a testifying witness; and (3) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, as "any reasonable jury would found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." View "State v. Ricci" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a superior court judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and three related crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his pretrial motions to suppress evidence and that the trial justice improperly denied his motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress; and (2) because the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions, the trial justice did not err when it denied Defendant's motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. View "State v. Musterd" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a conviction of two felony counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) his statement to police should have been suppressed as the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest; and (2) the trial justice deprived him of his right to confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining two police witnesses concerning his statements to police. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding, (1) the issue concerning the trial justice's denial of the motion to suppress was not a proper subject on appeal because at no point during Defendant's trial did the state introduce into evidence the statement he gave to the police, and moreover, Defendant's contention was without merit; and (2) Defendant did not properly preserve for the Court's review any challenge to the trial justice's limitations on his cross-examination, but nonetheless, the contention lacked merit. View "State v. Chum" on Justia Law

On August 27, 2007, an eighty-seven-year-old woman's purse was stolen in a supermarket parking lot. As a result, Defendant Nelson Rolon was charged with and ultimately convicted of first-degree robbery. Rolon appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence produced at trial was legally insufficient to prove the element of force. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant used force to take the victim's purse; and (2) therefore, sufficient evidence existed that would justify a reasonable juror in finding that Defendant robbed the victim on August 27, 2007.

Plaintiff, an African-American male of Nigerian origin, was hired by Atlantek, Inc. Zebra Technologies later acquired Atlantek. Three years later, Plaintiff was laid off. Plaintiff signed a release document and submitted it to Zebra Atlantek without consulting with his attorney. According to another document received by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's receipt of separation benefits was contingent on the receipt by Zebra Atlantek of a signed copy of the release document wherein Plaintiff released any claims under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) or any state law prohibiting employment discrimination or harassment. Plaintiff later commenced an action against Defendants, Zebra Atlantek and several individuals, alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of the FEPA and State Civil Rights Act. Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit constituted a material breach of the release document. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that FEPA did not render the release document void as it applied to Plaintiff's pending FEPA claims.

After a jury trial, Defendant Emmanuel Barbosa was found guilty of felony assault, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of a firearm after previous conviction of a crime of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. Defendant subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective. The superior court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice made adequate findings of fact and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in finding that Defendant failed to prove to a reasonable probability that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's purported deficiencies.

Defendant Jeffrey Murray was charged by criminal information with a felony pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-29-5 for violating a no-contact order. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and was sentenced under the terms of section 12-29-5. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that the sentence imposed on him was illegal because, in his view, the provisions of section 12-29-5 applied only to individuals with two prior misdemeanor convictions, and one of his predicate offenses was a felony. The superior court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that the provisions of section 12-29-5 did apply because Defendant had been convicted of two prior domestic violence offenses, and the statute did not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's argument was not an attack on the legality of his sentence, but rather on the propriety of his conviction, and Defendant unequivocally waived all nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal information by virtue of his decision to enter a plea of nolo contendere; and (2) the sentence in this case was not illegal because it was within the prescribed statutory limits.

Gary Tassone was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Tassone subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that his constitutional rights had been adversely impacted by the ineffective assistance of counsel and by witness perjury. The superior court denied the application without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, from this point forward, an evidentiary hearing is required in the first application for postconviction relief in all cases involving applicants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant Shurron Washington sought review of an adjudication of a probation violation after a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and the hearing justice revoked the suspension of a ten-year sentence that had previously been meted out. On appeal, Defendant contended that the hearing justice erred in adjudicating him to be a probation violator because, in Defendant's view, the record raised "too many questions" about the reliability of the identification of him as the perpetrator of an alleged attack. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he declared that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

Defendant Esteban Carpio was convicted of first-degree murder of a police officer, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and felony assault with a dangerous weapon. The superior court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment for committing a crime of violence with a firearm resulting in death, and another consecutive twenty-year term for felony assault on an elderly woman. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and affirmed the superior court, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction; (2) the trial justice properly instructed the jury on the question of criminal responsibility; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.