Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant hired Plaintiff twice when Plaintiff was sixty-seven years old for brief periods of employment. When Plaintiff was sixty-eight, Defendant rehired her as a titles and registrations clerk. When Plaintiff was seventy-two years old, Defendant terminated her employment. Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant for unlawful age and disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment Practices Act. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant on both employment discrimination claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) in finding that Defendant met its burden of producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s dismissal, and (2) in holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that those reasons were merely pretextual. View "Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of a union, filed a complaint against Defendant, her former employer, alleging that during her employment she was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of her race and color and that she was wrongfully terminated. Defendant filed a motion to stay proceedings, arguing that the proper forum for resolution of Plaintiff’s claims was binding arbitration as required by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and Defendant. A hearing justice granted Defendant’s motion to stay and ordered that the matter be resolved through arbitration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the hearing justice’s decision was in error because the CBA’s arbitration provision did not preclude her from asserting her statutorily created rights under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) in a judicial forum. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding that the CBA’s general arbitration provision, which contained no specific reference to the state anti-discrimination statutes at issue, did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of Plaintiff’s right to a judicial forum in which to litigate her claims arising under the RICRA and the FEPA. Remanded. View "Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree sexual assault. A jury trial commenced, but the trial justice granted Defendant’s motion for a mistrial due to a discovery violation. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss the sexual-assault charge on double jeopardy grounds because of prosecutorial goading. The trial justice denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, holding that sufficient evidence in the record supported the trial justice’s finding that the objective facts did not give rise to an inference of intentional goading. View " State v. Rolle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial justice erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements made to police during a post-arrest interrogation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial and discerned no error arising from the justice’s evidentiary rulings; but (2) remanded the case to the superior court with directions to make additional findings of fact and credibility determinations concerning the voluntariness of Defendant’s confessions, as the trial justice failed to make the findings of fact and credibility determinations essential to support his ultimate finding of voluntariness. View "State v. Bojang" on Justia Law

Defendant pled nolo contendere to three counts of second-degree child molestation. Before he was sentenced, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The trial justice denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to three concurrent sentences of fifteen years at the Adult Correctional Institutions. Eighteen months after sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence, arguing that his plea to the criminal charges should be set aside because his attorney did not inform him that the attorney was undergoing personal struggles during his representation of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's appeal was not properly before the court; and (2) even if Defendant's argument was properly made, the argument was without merit. View "State v. Castriotta" on Justia Law

In 1998, Applicant was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Applicant later filed an application for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In connection with his application, Applicant filed a subpoena duces tecum seeking discovery of the mental health records of Appellant, who testified as an eyewitness in Applicant's murder trial. Appellant filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded with directions to make further factual findings, holding that the trial justice erred in ordering the release of Appellant's health care records without first conducting the necessary statutory analysis. View "DePina v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation and five counts of second-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial justice erred in admitting evidence that Defendant also allegedly molested the complainant's sister. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's other sexual misconduct; (2) the trial justice did not clearly err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (3) the trial justice correctly denied Defendant's request for new counsel prior to sentencing. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a larceny therein. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that newly discovered evidence revealed a cooperation agreement between the police and a prominent state's witness in Defendant's murder trial and that the prosecution violated Defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose the full extent of the agreement. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that the alleged newly discovered evidence failed the first prong of the test to be applied for motions based on newly discovered evidence; and (2) Defendant's due process rights were not violated because the state did not fail to disclose information regarding the cooperation agreement. View "State v. Drew" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation and two counts of first-degree child abuse on a child under the age of five. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent life sentences on the child molestation counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, as that the trial justice conducted the appropriate analysis and reached the same result as the jury after considering the evidence and independently assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. View "State v. Baptista" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses, including murder, robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and other firearm-related counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err when she denied Defendant's motion for new trial and did not misconceive material evidence relating to a critical trial issue; (2) did not give confusing or unwarranted instructions to the jury; (3) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury that Defendant was in custody; and (5) did not permit the excessive use of leading questions during the direct examination of the State's witnesses. Lastly, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because certain bench conferences were not placed on the record. View "State v. Whitaker" on Justia Law