Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Willow purchased a house that needed repairs. Bids for the work exceeded $100,000. Renovations began in 2017 but soon halted. After several years passed, with the house remaining empty, the Village proposed its demolition as a nuisance. The Village published notice, posted notices on the house, and mailed notice to Willow, which concedes having actual knowledge of the impending demolition. Willow did not respond until the week scheduled for the demolition when its lawyer proposed a meeting. The parcel was sold at auction to satisfy the Village’s lien for demolition expenses.Willow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming a taking without compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Village. Demolition of a dilapidated structure that constitutes a public nuisance is not problematic under the Due Process Clause and does not require compensation. The protection that the federal Constitution offers to property owners is notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Village gave such a notice to Willow, which did not ask for a hearing. Illinois law offers procedures that are constitutionally adequate; someone wanting to stop a demolition need only file suit in state court, which automatically blocks action until the judge decides whether the building meets the statutory criteria for demolition. The district court was not required to decide a state law inverse-condemnation claim. View "Willow Way, LLC v. Village of Lyons, Illinois" on Justia Law

In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained. View "Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Plaintiffs each purchased real estate in Cleveland, planning to rehabilitate and redevelop the properties. Before those purchases, Cleveland declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after the Plaintiffs invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them. After the demolition of the buildings, the Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the demolitions violated state laws and federal constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Each Plaintiff received “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” After their purchases, Cleveland sent “new owner letters” via certified mail both to the property address and to each Plaintiff's statutory agent, including both the notice of condemnation and demolition order. Neither Plaintiff applied for required rehabilitation permits. View "First Floor Living LLC v. City of Cleveland, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's plea in bar alleging that a trial on the pending charges for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act would subject him to Double Jeopardy, holding that forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-431, as amended in 2016, is civil in nature, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar.In his plea in bar, Appellant argued that he was already criminally punished for the same crime in a separate forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 28-431. In denying the plea in bar, the district court concluded that Appellant had failed to demonstrate he was punished by the forfeiture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sanction imposed by forfeiture under section 28-431 is civil and not criminal for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law

Fillmore County Park in Genoa Charter Township, Michigan, includes a 15-station “Leopold the Lion Reading Trail” with large signs, telling the story. On a wooded 40-acre property a few miles away, Catholic Healthcare created a prayer trail with 14 “Stations of the Cross.” None of the improvements were visible from outside the property. The Township treated the prayer trail as a church building, for which a “special land use” permit was required. At considerable expense, Catholic Healthcare submitted two unsuccessful applications. The Township demanded the removal of the Stations of the Cross, plus a stone altar and mural.Catholic Healthcare sought a preliminary injunction to restore the Stations of the Cross, altar, and mural. The district court twice denied that request, holding that its free-exercise and statutory claims are unripe. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In land-use cases, claims are ripe when the government has adopted a “definitive position” as to “how the regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question.” Here, the Township has uniformly insisted that Catholic Healthcare obtain a special land-use permit and has twice refused to grant a permit. Those events have “inflicted an actual, concrete injury” because the Township has actually forced them to remove the religious displays. Catholic Healthcare is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. View "Catholic Healthcare International Inc. v. Genoa Charter Township, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this complaint brought by Appellant requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Mentor to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of Appellant's property, holding that the court of appeals did not err in granting the City's motion to dismiss.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that the decision of the City to deny a permit that would allow him to place a houseboat on a pond that he owned constituted a taking of his property. The court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the City to commence appropriation proceedings; and (2) the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's remaining claims. View "State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor" on Justia Law

Freed fell behind approximately $1,100 on his property taxes. Thomas, Gratiot County’s treasurer, foreclosed on Freed’s property and sold it at a public auction for $42,000. The County retained the entire proceeds. Freed sued the County and Thomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and an unconstitutional excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.Following a remand, the district court granted Freed summary judgment on his Fifth Amendment claim, rejecting Freed’s argument that he was entitled to the fair market value of his property, minus his debt, and holding that Freed was owed just compensation in the amount of the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, plus interest from the date of the foreclosure sale. Freed was owed about $40,900 plus interest, $56,800 less than he was seeking. The court also held that Freed’s claims against Thomas were barred by qualified immunity and denied Freed’s subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Following a public sale, a debtor is entitled to any surplus proceeds from the sale, which represent the value of the equitable title extinguished. Thomas did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of her alleged misconduct. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, under Minnesota statutes in a condemnation proceeding, Blue Earth County did not owe just compensation to Landowners for the loss of a right to access to a newly constructed controlled-access highway built across their property.The district court ruled that Landowners had not been deprived of any right of access for which they should be justly compensated, noting that the County continued to provide farm access to Landowners' property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who owns property abutting a newly constructed controlled-access highway has no right of access to the controlled-access highway. View "Wood v. County of Blue Earth" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wayne County has a policy or practice of seizing vehicles and their contents without probable cause, simply because of the vehicle’s location in an area generally associated with crime. Wayne County impounds the vehicles and their contents until the owner pays a redemption fee: $900 for the first seizure, $1,800 for the second, and $2,700 for the third, plus towing and storage fees. The owner's only alternatives are to abandon the vehicle or to wait for prosecutors to decide whether to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings. Before a forfeiture action is brought, there are multiple pretrial conferences involving the owner and prosecutors, without a judge; prosecutors attempt to persuade the owner to pay the fee by pointing out that storage fees accrue daily. Missing just one conference results in automatic forfeiture. It takes at least four months, beyond any previous delays to arrive before a neutral decisionmaker. The seizure proceedings are conducted under Michigan’s Nuisance Abatement statute, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Omnibus Forfeiture Act, which do not protect plaintiffs from the pre-hearing deprivation of their properties.The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods— with no timely process to contest the seizure. Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. View "Ingram v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law