Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff David Eldridge was a resident and condominium owner at the Whip-Poor-Will Condominium Complex in Hudson. The condominium complex was governed by two different entities: the Condominium Owners' Association (COA) and the Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Townhouse Owners' Association (TOA). Each association had separate and distinct legal obligations as set forth in the Condominium Declaration. Plaintiff has several disabling impairments that impact his mobility. When a walkway had not been repaired as he requested, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the COA with the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (HRC). Shortly thereafter, the COA repaired the plaintiff's walkway. The HRC, which continued to investigate the matter despite the repair, determined that there was probable cause to support a finding of discrimination and notified the COA that it had scheduled a public hearing on the complaint. The COA subsequently removed the case to superior court and filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds. As relevant to this appeal, the COA argued that plaintiff's discrimination complaint should be dismissed because the HRC had not commenced proceedings within twenty-four months after the filing of the charge of discrimination, as required by statute. The Superior Court denied the COA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the twenty-four month limit specified in the statute was not jurisdictional. The COA then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that: (1) the case was moot because the walkway had been repaired; (2) the COA was not an entity covered by the Human Rights Act; (3) the plaintiff's claim was time-barred; (4) there was no dispute that the COA had accommodated the plaintiff; and (5) the COA had no legal obligation or authority to replace the walkway because it was located in a Townhouse Limited Common Area. The Superior Court (Temple, J.) granted the COA's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under the plain language of the Declaration, the COA lacked authority over plaintiff's walkway and, as such, plaintiff had pursued the wrong party in seeking an accommodation. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in which he asserted, for the first time, that because the COA had arranged for the walkway to be repaired, it had authority to repair the walkway. The court denied plaintiff's motion, reaffirming its earlier determination that the TOA, not the COA, had sole control over the walkway, and refusing to consider both plaintiff's theory regarding the COA's "assumed" authority over the walkway and any "new evidence" in support thereof. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was untimely under RSA 354-A:21, III, and as such, affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Eldridge v. Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Condo. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Yangs listed their building for sale. In February 2011 the restaurant leasing the property closed. The Yangs never sold the building or found another tenant. They continued to pay property taxes. The building was vandalized and started to fail. In October 2011, city officials posted an abandonment notice and mailed a copy to the owner listed in its files. The notice went to the abandoned building and named the previous owner. Nine months later, the city posted a “repair/demolish” notice and sent notices by certified mailing to the property’s address; the notices were returned. After a title search, which identified the Yangs, the city sent certified mail notices to their home in September 2012. Having no response, the city scheduled a November 1 hearing about demotion and sent the Yangs notice by regular mail, with a copy to their realtor. The post office returned as “unclaimed” the certified mailing. The non-certified mailing was not returned. The Yangs did not appear. Demolition was approved. The city mailed another notice to the home address, but got no response. In January 2013, the city razed the building and mailed a $22,500 bill. The Yings claim to remember getting mail that said something about fixing up the building but ignoring it and that they did not receive notice concerning demolition. The Yangs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city provided all of the notice that was reasonably due. View "Yang v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Ad America owned commercial rental property. When Ad America’s tenants were informed that Ad America’s property would be acquired for Project Neon, a freeway improvement project, Ad America’s net rental income decreased, and Ad America could no longer meet its mortgage requirements. Ad America filed an inverse condemnation action against Nevada’s Department of Transportation (NDOT), the lead agency for Project Neon, seeking precondemnation damages for alleged economic harm and just compensation for the alleged taking of its property. The district court granted summary judgment for Ad America even though NDOT had not physically occupied Ad America’s property or taken any formal steps to commence eminent domain proceedings against Ad America’s property. At issue on appeal was whether a taking occurred where NDOT publicly disclosed its plan to acquire Ad America’s property to comply with federal law, the City of Las Vegas independently acquired property that was previously a part of Project Neon, and the City rendered land-use application decisions conditioned on coordination with NDOT for purposes of Project Neon. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate that NDOT committed a taking of Ad America’s property warranting just compensation. View "State Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The federal government provides low-income housing tax credits that are distributed to developers by state agencies, including the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), which assists low-income families in obtaining affordable housing, brought a disparate-impact claim under Fair Housing Act sections 804(a) and 805(a), alleging that allocation of too many credits to housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods resulted in continued segregated housing patterns. Relying on statistical evidence, the district court ruled in favor of ICP. While appeal was pending, HUD issued a regulation interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability and establishing a burden-shifting framework. The Fifth Circuit held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, but reversed, concluding that the court had improperly required proof of less discriminatory alternatives. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The Court noted that the statute shifts emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions. Disparate-impact liability must be limited so that regulated entities can make practical business choices that sustain the free-enterprise system. Before rejecting a business justification—or a governmental entity’s public interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown “an available alternative . . . that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.” A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a policy causing that disparity. Policies, governmental or private, are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” When courts find disparate impact liability, their remedial orders must be consistent with the Constitution and should concentrate on eliminating the offending practice. Orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise difficult constitutional questions. View "Texas Dep't of Hous, & Cmity Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were more than 400 residents and homeowners in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in Harris County. From 1998 to 2002, most of Plaintiffs’ homes were inundated in three successive floods. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against several government entities, arguing that Defendants knew that harm was substantially certain to result to Plaintiffs’ homes when Defendants approved private development in the White Oak Bayou watershed without mitigating its consequences. Defendants responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised on the elements of the takings claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a fact question existed as to each element of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, and therefore, the government entities’ plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied. View "Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of minor child A.R., filed suit against a real estate agency and its agent for disability discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made housing unavailable on the basis of disability; provided different terms, conditions, and privileges of rental housing on the basis of disability; expressed a preference on the basis of disability; and misrepresented the availability of rental housing on the basis of disability. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held, however, that the district court erred because there was sufficient evidence presented that A.R. qualifies as disabled under the FHA; the FHA’s prohibition against statements that “indicate[ ] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap,” pursuant to section 3604(c), may be violated even if the subject of those statements does not qualify as disabled under the FHA; and the “ordinary listener” standard is not applicable to claims under section 3604(d) for misrepresenting the availability of housing. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners’ property directly abutted property identified as the Hines Road property, owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff and the Town of Cumberland came to an agreement regarding a retaining wall on the Hines Road property in close proximity to Petitioners’ property. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against the Town to litigate issues relating to the agreement. Petitioners moved to intervene in the underlying superior court action. The hearing justice denied the motion to intervene, concluding that Petitioners were not entitled to intervention as a matter of right or to permissive intervention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ status as abutting property owners did not ipso facto entitle them to intervene in this case as a matter of right; (2) the hearing justice did not err in ruling that Petitioners’ interest in the superior court action was “contingent” upon the agreement between Plaintiff and the Town; and (3) the hearing justice did not err in considering Petitioners’ failure to appeal from an adverse Board decision previously filed in regard to the agreement as one factor weighing against intervention in the underlying action. View "Hines Road, LLC v. Hall" on Justia Law

Appellants filed this putative class action challenging the California State Controller’s application of California’s Unclaimed Property Law (“UPL”), which provides for the conditional transfer of unclaimed property to the State of California. Appellants claimed that the procedures used both before unclaimed property is transferred to the Controller (“pre-escheat”) and after it is transferred (“post-escheat”) violate their due process rights. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ argument that the pre-escheat notice provided by the Controller is constitutionally inadequate because the Controller does not attempt to locate property owners using the data sources required by Section 1531 of the UPL was based on a misinterpretation of the statute, and Appellants’ suggested requirement that the Controller use additional databases exceeded due process requirements; (2) Appellants’ argument that the Controller’s pre-escheat notice process is inadequate because it is carried out by companies that received a portion of the escheated value and therefore have a conflict of interest was not supported by law or the alleged facts; and (3) Appellants’ challenged to the post-escheat procedure was not ripe for review. View "Taylor v. Chiang" on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a complaint alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium violated Va. Code 36-96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules or services that were necessary to afford Michael Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging additional causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Windsor Plaza. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the evidence relating to conversion of a bicycle storage space into an accessible parking space supported a claim for reasonable modification rather than a claim for reasonable accommodation; (2) did not err in ruling granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike; (3) erred in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth was not barred by sovereign immunity, but the error was harmless; (4) did not err in concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Fishels’ additional claims; and (5) did not err by refusing to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fischels.View "Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law