Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2014, the Bozeman City Commission adopted the Nondiscrimination Ordinance 1890, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender expression by landlords, providers of public accommodations, and parties engaged in residential real estate transactions. Petitioners, certain Bozeman residents, filed suit against the City of Bozeman, the Commission, and the City Commissioners (collectively, Respondents) seeking a declaration that the Ordinance is invalid as a matter of law. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Petitioners did not present a justiciable case or controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing their complaint based on the conclusion that Petitioners were requesting an advisory opinion; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and to amend. View "Arnone v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Scott County and Credit River Township, claiming that the County took his property without just compensation by placing conditions on the approval of his plat application. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because Appellant’s exclusive avenue for review of the County’s decision was to seek a writ of certiorari from the court of appeals. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the County’s plat approval subject to conditions was a quasi-judicial action, which was reviewable only by certiorari appeal within sixty days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s section 1983 action. View "Zweber v. Credit River Township" on Justia Law

This case was one of several cases involving litigation between Lands’ End and the City of Dodgeville challenging the City’s property tax assessment of Lands’ End’s headquarters. In 2009, Lands’ End made an offer of settlement, which the City rejected. Eventually, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Lands’ End in the amount of $724,292 plus statutory interest. At issue on remand was whether Lands’ End was entitled to interest at the statutory rate of interest in effect when the offer of settlement was made under Wis. Stat. 807.01(4) or at the statutory rate of interest in effect when Lands’ End recovered the judgment under the amended version of the statute. The circuit court awarded interest at “1 percent plus the prime rate,” the rate in the amended version of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lands’ End did not have a vested right in the twelve percent interest rate in effect in section 807.01(4) at the time Lands’ End made its offer of settlement; and (2) awarding interest under the amended version of the statute did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. View "Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville" on Justia Law

In 2005 the City of Joliet filed a condemnation action concerning the Evergreen Housing Complex. The complex’s owner filed suit under the Fair Housing Act and other federal statutes. After a remand by the Seventh Circuit, the condemnation suit went to trial, spread over more than 18 months of calendar time. In 2014, the district court held that Joliet is entitled to possess (and demolish) Evergreen Terrace, but did not decide the amount of compensation. Pursuant to 735 ILCS 30/10-5-5(a), a jury concluded that $15,077,406 was just compensation. The owner appealed, arguing that Evergreen Terrace is not dilapidated and that razing the buildings would have a disparate impact on its predominantly black tenants, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district judge’s rejection of those arguments. There was substantial evidence to support a finding of no discriminatory intent or disparate impact. The complex is dilapidated and crime-ridden and the city plans to use the land to extend the existing Riverwalk park. View "City of Joliet v. New West, L.P." on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiff, a participant in the Section 8 Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, listed among her assets a trust that had been established in 2010 to hold Plaintiff's proceeds from a series of tort settlements. The Brookline Housing Authority (BHA) subsequently determined that Plaintiff was “over-income” for continued participation in the Program, as locally administered by the BHA. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the BHA exclude at least some of these trust disbursements from its income calculation in reasonable accommodation of her disability. The BHA reaffirmed its determination. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued, alleging that the BHA had violated state and federal law by incorrectly calculating her income under the relevant federal regulations and by engaging in disability-based discrimination. The district court ruled in favor of BHA. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim brought under the Housing Act, holding that the BHA misconstrued federal regulations in calculating Plaintiff’s income; (2) vacated the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s state and federal discrimination claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as moot; and (3) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Remanded. View "DeCambre v. Brookline Housing Auth." on Justia Law

When Carlo Gimenez Bianco (Gimenez) refused to remove his emotional support dog from his condominium unit in violation of the Castillo Condominium Association’s “no pets” bylaw, the Association forced Gimenez to vacate and sell the unit. Gimenez brought a complaint of disability discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which filed a charge of discrimination against the Association. An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended decision concluding that the Association had not violated the Fair Housing Act. The Secretary of HUD set aside the ALJ’s recommended decision and found the Association liable for discrimination. On remand, the ALJ issued a recommended decision proposing to award Gimenez $3,000 in emotional distress damages and assessed a $2,000 civil penalty against the Association. The Secretary increased the proposed award of emotional distress damages to $20,000 and increased the civil penalty to $16,000. The First Circuit denied the Association’s petition for review and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for enforcement of his order, holding (1) the Secretary’s final order was supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ did not err in refusing to apply res judicata to pretermit Gimenez’s HUD charge; and (3) the Secretary’s final order was not tainted by procedural error. View "Castillo Condo. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

The City filed a petition for condemnation asking for a determination of just compensation for property taken and damages to the residue. The circuit court awarded Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC $44,141 for the value of the fee take and more than $2.1 million for the damages to the residue, including loss of visibility and loss of direct access. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Dominion damages to the residue and entered final judgment in favor of the City on that claim, holding that Dominion failed to present any evidence by which any of over $2.1 in damages that the circuit court awarded could be apportioned to the City’s take of a utility easement and a temporary construction easement outside the area of reservation. View "City of Chesapeake v. Dominion SecurityPlus Self Storage, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Simstads, developers, began the process of seeking approval from the Lake County Plan Commission for a proposed subdivision, “Deer Ridge South.” In late 2006, the Commission approved the plans. The Simstads believed that approval was delayed, at great cost to them, because of their support in 1996 for commission member Scheub’s opponent in the County Commissioner primary race. They sued Commission members and Lake County, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various Indiana laws. A jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that a defense of claim preclusion, based on earlier state proceedings, had been waived. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a belated answer to the amended complaint or in allowing the defendants to withdraw their deemed admissions. Rejecting an argument that approval was a ministerial act, the court stated that determination of whether a project meets the ordinances, with or without waivers, involves some degree of discretion. The court noted the absence of evidence of animus. View "Simstad v. Scheub" on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) brought this action to set aside a tax sale of real property, arguing that the county’s failure to provide it with notice of the sale violated his right to due process. The purchaser of the real property (Defendant) moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that MERS did not tender payment of the sale price plus the accrued taxes before bringing suit, as is statutorily required in a suit challenging the validity of a tax sale, and that MERS did not have a protected interest in the subject property. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, concluding that MERS did not have an interest in the property. The Court of Appeals on the grounds that MERS lacked standing to file suit. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) MERS was not required to tender payment before filing this lawsuit; and (2) MERS acquired no protected interest in the subject property, and therefore, its due process rights were not violated by the county’s failure to notify it of the tax foreclosure proceedings or the tax sale. View "Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ditto" on Justia Law

In 2014, Perfect Puppy, Inc. signed a lease to use a City of East Providence building for a “Puppy Sales store.” Less than two months later, the East Providence city council formally passed an ordinance banning dog and cat sales. Perfect Puppy sued East Providence in state court. The case was removed to federal court on federal-question grounds. The district judge granted East Providence summary judgment on all claims except Perfect Puppy’s takings claim. As for any possible facial-takings challenge, the judge concluded that the claim lacked development. Noting that Perfect Puppy had not asked the state for compensation, the judge deemed the as-applied challenge unripe and remanded the suit to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed the judge’s handling of the facial-takings issue and dismissed Perfect Puppy’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to that part of the judge’s order remanding the as-applied claim to state court, holding (1) Perfect Puppy failed to bring a facial-takings challenge; and (2) the lack-of-jurisdiction ground for the remand of the as-applied challenge was colorable, which meant that the First Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the judge’s decision. View "Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law