Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Nebraska Cooperative Republican Platte Enhancement (N-CORPE), a political subdivision of the State of Nebraska, brought condemnation proceedings against Appellant seeking an easement across Appellant’s real estate. In response, Appellant filed a complaint for injunction against board members of the N-CORPE project and N-CORPE (collectively, Appellees), alleging, inter alia, that N-CORPE does not have the power of eminent domain. In addition, Appellant filed an application for temporary restraining order and a motion for temporary injunction, both of which the district court denied. The district court then granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) N-CORPE had the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain; (2) N-CORPE did not need certain permits and approvals as alleged by Appellant; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to amend the complaint; (4) N-CORPE is not prohibited by common law from removing ground water from overlying land; and (5) there is not material issue of fact regarding whether the condemnation is for a public use. View "Estermann v. Bose" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs suffered from disabilities, for which each was prescribed an emotional support animal. Each woman obtained a dog. This violated the “no dogs” rule of their condominium association. Plaintiffs each sought an accommodation for an emotional support animal by filing paperwork, with a doctor’s letter prescribing an emotional support animal, and a dog certification. Other residents became upset about the presence of the dogs. The condominium board voted to impose a fine. When a new Board President took office, the Board granted the accommodation requests and waived the accrued fines. Plaintffs filed suit under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the association denied their reasonable requests for accommodation (42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B)) and interfered with the exercise of their fair housing rights (42 U.S.C. 3617). Plaintiff Walters committed suicide while her case was pending. The district court dismissed Walters’ Fair Housing Act claims entirely due to her death and rejected Kromenhoek’s claims on the merits. The Third Circuit reversed. The survival of claims under the Fair Housing Act is not governed by Section 1988(a), but by federal common law, under which a claim survives the death of a party. There were genuine issues of material fact regarding the merits of the claims. View "Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to force the West Virginia Department of Highways, Division of Highways (DOH) to institute a condemnation proceeding for limestone it excavated from a certain parcel of land during its construction of a portion of the Corridor H highway. The mandamus proceeding was resolved through an agreed order whereby the DOH was required to institute a condemnation proceeding against Respondent’s mineral interest in the property. After a jury trial, the circuit court awarded Respondent $941,304.53 as just compensation for the removal of the limestone from the property. The circuit court subsequently determined that Respondent was entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses for both the mandamus proceeding and condemnation proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an award of attorney’s fees and expenses was warranted in this case; but (2) the final order was devoid of factual findings regarding the reasonableness of the amount of the attorneys fees and expenses awarded. Remanded for an additional hearing on that issue. View "West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. Newton" on Justia Law

Defendant, a homeowner in Rancho Palos Verdes, submitted an application to his HOA, seeking to invoke the HOA's dispute resolution process against a neighbor who refused to trim trees blocking defendant's views. Plaintiff, another neighbor and HOA member, filed suit against defendant and the HOA, alleging that two of the offending trees were actually on his property, that the relevant tree-trimming covenant did not encumber his property, and therefore that defendant and the HOA were wrongfully clouding his title by seeking to apply such an encumbrance. The trial court granted defendant's special motion to strike the claims alleged against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The court concluded that defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's complaint arose from defendant's statements made in connection with an issue of public interest. Therefore, defendant's statements were protected under section 425.16. The court also concluded that plaintiff could not show a probability of success on the merits of his claims against defendant, particularly because defendant dismissed his application shortly after the lawsuit was filed and has never sought to invoke the HOA's tree-trimming process against plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Association" on Justia Law

After Crook County Weed and Pest Control District applied herbicides to control leafy spurge found on property owned by Bush Land Development Company and Victoria Bush (collectively, Bush), many trees in the area of the spraying died. Bush filed this inverse condemnation action in the district court alleging that it was entitled to just compensation for the loss of its trees as a result of the District’s improper application of herbicides. The district court dismissed Bush’s claim, concluding that the action was not proper under the inverse condemnation statute. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, concluding that the inverse condemnation was not properly before the district court because Bush failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before claiming inverse condemnation. View "Bush Land Development Co. v. Crook County Weed & Pest Control District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action opposing the use of portions of a former industrial park in the City of Lewes, now owned by the state. This action involved a lease of a portion of that property to the City and a sublease from Lewes to a non-profit that maintained a dog park on the property. At a regularly scheduled city council meeting, the Lewes City Council voted to approve an amendment to the sublease to the non-profit, which added an access road to the sublease. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged numerous violations of the Delaware Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Court of Chancery granted the motion to dismiss of the Mayor, the City Council, and the City, holding that a violation of FOIA did not occur here. View "Lechliter v. Becker" on Justia Law

Prior to reconstructing the interchange at Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenues in Sioux Falls, the State instituted a quick-take condemnation action against two landowners (together, Defendants) and effected a partial taking of their real property south of the interchange on-ramp. Defendants did not contest the taking and requested that a jury determine damages. After a four-day trial, the jury awarded Defendants $551,125. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) before a landowner may present evidence of and recover for loss resulting from a change in access, the court must first determine that such change amounts to a substantial impairment of access; (2) if the change in access amounts to a substantial impairment and is not caused by the State’s actual taking of the landowner’s property, the landowner must prove that the injury is peculiar to the landowner’s property and not of a kind suffered by the public as a whole; and (3) because the circuit court in this case did not make these determinations, the case must be remanded. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

JB Enterprises (JBE) owned property located on a corner lot abutting Cliff Avenue and 63rd Street in Sioux Falls. Prior to initiating a public improvement reconstructing the interchange at Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenue, the State instituted a quick-take condemnation action against JBE, contesting JBE’s “control of access” to its property. The State ultimately changed the public improvement and left intact JBE’s curb cut along Cliff Avenue. After the State closed the intersection of 63rd Street and Cliff Avenue, JBE requested a jury trial on damages, alleging that the State owned JBE’s right to “control of access” to its property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State’s public improvement did not result in a compensable taking because the State did not physically take any of JBE’s property and did not eliminate JBE’s direct access to Cliff Avenue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the State acquired the right to deprive JBE of access to Cliff Avenue, JBE must be compensated under the assumption that the State will do so. Remanded for a trial on damages. View "State v. JB Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Carlyle Schleim owned, and Farmers State Bank of Canton held a mortgage on, property located near an intersection that was closed in connection with the State’s reconstruction of the interchange between Interstate 90 and Cliff Avenue. Schliem and the Bank brought an inverse-condemnation action against the State alleging that the closure of the intersection diminished the value of the subject property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Schliem did not identify a property interest that had been taken or damaged by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Schliem did not suffer compensable loss by the intersection’s closure, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for the State. View "Schleim v. S.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

For 60 years, a butcher shop operated on property in Black Earth that is zoned for commercial use, as a legal nonconforming use. In 2001, BEM purchased the property. After 2009, the volume and frequency of slaughter increased. By 2011, neighbors were complaining about increased traffic, trucks blocking the road, livestock noise, foul odors, improper storage of animal parts, and the presence of offal, blood, and animal waste in the streets. Steers escaped from the facility three times and had to be shot dead on Village streets. In 2013, the Village held several public meetings, and, because citations had no effect on BEM’s behavior, ordered BEM to propose an acceptable plan for relocating its slaughter activities. BEM did not relocate. After several delays, the Village threatened litigation. As a result of that threat, the USDA refused to guarantee a bank loan to BEM. BEM lost its financing, closed, and sued the Village and board members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if the threat of litigation could, itself, constitute a due process violation and were a sufficiently direct cause of BEM’s alleged deprivations, there is no evidence that the process accorded to BEM was inadequate. Procedural due process generally requires only “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” View "Black Earth Meat Mkt., LLC v. Village of Black Earth" on Justia Law