Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

HRT Enterprises owned an 11.8-acre parcel adjacent to Detroit’s Coleman A. Young International Airport, with about 20 percent of the property falling within a regulated runway “visibility zone” that restricted development. Over time, the City of Detroit acquired other properties in a nearby area for airport compliance but did not purchase HRT’s. By late 2008, HRT’s property had become vacant and vandalized, and HRT alleged it could no longer use, lease, or sell the property due to City actions and regulatory restrictions.HRT first sued the City in Michigan state court in 2002, alleging inverse condemnation, but the jury found for the City; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, HRT sued in federal court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the action without prejudice because HRT had not exhausted state remedies. HRT then filed a second state suit in 2009, which was dismissed on res judicata grounds; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. HRT did not seek further review.In 2012, HRT filed the present action in federal court, alleging a de facto taking under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the City’s preclusion arguments, granted summary judgment to HRT on liability, and held that a taking had occurred, leaving the date for the jury. A first jury found the taking occurred in 2009 and awarded $4.25 million; the court ordered remittitur to $2 million, then a second jury, after a new trial, awarded $1.97 million.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that HRT’s claim was ripe, not barred by claim or issue preclusion, that the district court properly granted summary judgment on liability, and that its remittitur decision was not an abuse of discretion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Jay and Kendall Nygard, who have had a long history of disputes with the City of Orono regarding property matters, became involved in a conflict when Jay replaced their driveway without obtaining a permit as required by city code. Throughout the permitting process and subsequent communications with the City, Kendall was copied on email exchanges but did not perform the driveway work herself. After efforts by city officials to secure compliance failed, both Jay and Kendall were referred for prosecution for violating the permit requirement. However, a state court later dismissed the charge against Kendall, finding that the ordinance required only the person actually performing the work to obtain the permit, and Jay, not Kendall, had done the work.Following this dismissal, Kendall and Jay brought federal claims against the City, including a malicious prosecution claim. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed all claims, but on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed Kendall’s malicious prosecution claim to proceed, finding her complaint sufficiently alleged the City lacked probable cause. On remand, the district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Kendall then filed a new malicious prosecution claim based on diversity jurisdiction, but the district court again granted summary judgment to the City, concluding Kendall could not prove the City acted with malicious intent.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that Kendall failed to offer evidence that the City knowingly and willfully instituted a groundless prosecution against her, as required to establish malicious intent under Minnesota law. The court found that, even if probable cause was lacking, there was no evidence of malice, and that any deficiency in probable cause was not so blatant as to permit an inference of malicious intent. The judgment in favor of the City was therefore affirmed. View "Nygard v. City of Orono" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a university in Nebraska instituted a policy requiring all students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by a specified deadline, with the only exemptions allowed for medical reasons or until a vaccine received full FDA approval. Religious exemptions were not permitted. Students who failed to comply were unenrolled and barred from campus, and some had holds placed on their accounts, preventing access to transcripts. One student complied with the mandate but suffered adverse effects and was medically exempted from further doses. Another student withdrew voluntarily before the deadline.After the university enforced the mandate, several students sought injunctive relief in the District Court for Douglas County to prevent their unenrollment, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The court denied relief, finding that any contract included the Emergency Use Authorization waiver agreements and that the students breached the contract by not being vaccinated after FDA approval. An initial appeal was dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court for lack of a final, appealable order. The students then consolidated their actions and filed an operative complaint alleging breach of implied contract, denial of due process, conversion, negligence, and violations of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (NCPA). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied leave to amend.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and found that the students plausibly alleged claims for breach of an implied contract and conversion, based on the university’s unilateral modification of conditions mid-semester and the withholding of transcripts. The court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence and NCPA claims, finding them preempted by the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, and held that the due process claim was abandoned on appeal. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the breach of contract and conversion claims. View "Ramaekers v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are entities that own and operate a four-story building in Kemah, Texas. The building houses a bar, residential rental units, and a food truck. The dispute began when, in July 2021, the city issued a zero-occupancy notice for the building after an inspection found multiple safety hazards, prohibiting anyone except the owner and repair contractors from entering. Plaintiffs allege this deprived them of almost all economic use of the property. Separately, the city took enforcement action against the food truck, culminating in its removal from the property in October 2021. Plaintiffs challenged the food truck towing in state court, but ultimately dropped their appeal. They then sued the city in federal court, raising federal and state takings, due process, and equal protection claims regarding both the zero-occupancy notice and the food truck towing, and sought declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the city’s motion to dismiss. The court found the claims related to the zero-occupancy notice were not ripe because plaintiffs had not pursued available administrative appeals to the city council, as allegedly required by city ordinances. The court dismissed the food truck claims on the merits, and dismissed the request for declaratory relief because no substantive claims remained.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the zero-occupancy notice claims as unripe. The appellate court determined that the city’s issuance of the zero-occupancy notice constituted a sufficiently final decision for purposes of ripeness and that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reversed the dismissal of the zero-occupancy notice claims and remanded those claims, including the related request for declaratory relief, for further proceedings. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had waived their food truck claims by failing to adequately brief them on appeal and affirmed their dismissal. View "T&W Holding v. City of Kemah, Texas" on Justia Law

A resident of University Heights, Ohio, who practices Orthodox Judaism, sought to use his home for group prayer sessions due to religious obligations and restrictions on travel during the Sabbath. After inviting neighbors to participate in these gatherings, a neighbor complained to city officials, prompting the city’s law director to send a cease-and-desist letter, warning that using the home as a place of religious assembly violated local zoning laws. The resident then applied for a special use permit to operate a house of worship but withdrew his application before the city’s Planning Commission could reach a decision, stating he did not wish to operate a house of worship as defined by the ordinance. Despite withdrawing, he later filed a federal lawsuit against the city and several officials, alleging violations of federal and state law, including constitutional and statutory claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the city and its officials. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ohio Constitution were unripe because there was no final decision by the relevant local authorities regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property. The court also rejected his Fourth Amendment and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) claims on the merits and declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that most of the plaintiff’s claims were unripe because he withdrew his application before any final decision was made by the city’s zoning authorities, and thus there was no concrete dispute for federal review. The court also held that his facial challenges to the ordinance were forfeited and, in any event, failed as a matter of law. The court further concluded that the Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims failed on the merits and found no abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio" on Justia Law

In 2023, the Florida Legislature enacted Senate Bill 264, which, among other provisions, imposed restrictions on real property transactions involving persons domiciled in China who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. The law included three key requirements: a purchase restriction barring certain Chinese domiciliaries from acquiring Florida real estate, a registration requirement mandating such individuals to register their existing property interests, and an affidavit requirement obligating all purchasers of Florida real estate to attest compliance with the law. Four Chinese citizens residing in Florida on various nonimmigrant visas and a real estate brokerage firm serving Chinese-speaking clients challenged these provisions, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Fair Housing Act, the Due Process Clause, and federal preemption.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against several state officials responsible for enforcing SB 264. They sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the purchase restriction, registration requirement, and affidavit requirement. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge all three provisions but denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were not substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the purchase restriction because none had shown an imminent injury from that provision. However, at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge the registration and affidavit requirements. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the registration and affidavit requirements, finding no substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the constitutional, statutory, or preemption claims. The court reversed and remanded the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the purchase restriction, instructing the district court to deny it without prejudice for lack of standing. View "Shen v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services" on Justia Law

Legacy Housing Corporation purchased several hundred vacant lots in Horseshoe Bay, Texas, intending to develop manufactured housing. The lots were subject to zoning restrictions, including a cap on speculative housing permits, contractor requirements, utility hookup fees, and setback rules. Legacy also acquired adjacent land in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) to build a road connecting the lots to a nearby highway, but this land was restricted to agricultural and residential use. Despite these limitations, Legacy constructed a road over the ETJ property, a greenbelt strip, and some development lots, advertising it as a shortcut and access to planned amenities. The City and other defendants opposed the road, citing violations of existing restrictions. Legacy alleged a conspiracy among the City, the property owners’ association (POA), and developers to prevent its development.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas addressed multiple claims and counterclaims. It denied Legacy’s motion to dismiss the City’s counterclaims, granted the City’s motion to dismiss most claims against it, and granted summary judgment to all defendants on the remaining claims, including regulatory takings, Section 1983 violations, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and a strips and gores claim. Legacy’s own motion for partial summary judgment was denied, and final judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, with one modification. The appellate court held that Legacy’s regulatory takings claim regarding the two-permit cap was not prudentially ripe and should be dismissed without prejudice. The court otherwise affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and concluding that Legacy did not have property rights to build the road, nor did the defendants breach any legal duties or restrictive covenants. View "Legacy Hsing v. City of Horseshoe Bay" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization that assists individuals recovering from alcoholism and substance abuse sought to establish a group home in a New Jersey township by leasing a two-family dwelling. Before residents could move in, the township required a Certificate of Continuing Occupancy (CCO). The organization’s application for the CCO was denied by the township’s zoning officer, who stated that the intended use violated local zoning ordinances. The township’s attorney later explained that the group home was considered a “Community Residence” under state law and thus could not operate in a two-family dwelling. The organization disputed this classification but received no further response from the township.After the denial, the organization filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and sought a preliminary injunction. The District Court denied the preliminary injunction, finding the organization had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that denial. The organization then filed a First Amended Complaint, which the township moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion, holding that the amended complaint failed to state a claim and denied leave to amend further, reasoning that prior rulings had already provided notice of deficiencies and that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, finding insufficient factual allegations to support a plausible inference of discriminatory intent or disparate impact. However, the court vacated the denial of leave to amend, holding that the District Court erred in concluding amendment would be futile, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oxford House Inc v. Township of North Bergen" on Justia Law

Amy Hadley’s home in South Bend, Indiana, was significantly damaged when law enforcement officers executed a search warrant in pursuit of a murder suspect they believed was inside her residence. The officers, acting on information that the suspect had accessed his Facebook account from Hadley’s IP address, obtained a warrant and forcefully entered the home, causing extensive property damage, including the use of tear gas and destruction of personal items. Hadley, who had no connection to the suspect, was denied compensation by both the City of South Bend and St. Joseph County for the $16,000 in damages.After her request for compensation was denied, Hadley filed suit in Indiana state court, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, specifically invoking the Takings Clause. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Seventh Circuit precedent, particularly Johnson v. Manitowoc County, foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint, finding that the Takings Clause did not entitle her to compensation for property damage resulting from the execution of a lawful search warrant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that, under its precedent in Johnson v. Manitowoc County, the Fifth Amendment does not require the government to compensate property owners for damage caused by law enforcement executing a valid search warrant. The court declined to overrule Johnson and found that Hadley’s arguments did not warrant revisiting the established rule. View "Hadley v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

Ann Tierney Smith owned real property in West Virginia but failed to pay the assessed real estate taxes for 2016. As a result, the Mercer County Sheriff sold a tax lien on the property to Ed Boer. Boer sought a tax deed and provided the West Virginia State Auditor’s Office with a list of individuals to be notified about the right to redeem the property, including Smith. However, Boer did not include Smith’s current mailing address, which was available in county records. Notices sent by mail were returned as undeliverable, and attempts at personal service were unsuccessful, leading to notices being posted at the property and other addresses. After the redemption deadline passed, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., an employee of the State Auditor’s Office, issued a tax deed to Boer. Smith learned of the deed in late 2020.Smith, and later her estate representatives, sued Rollyson and Boer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment to Rollyson, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that while Rollyson could have directed Boer to search county records for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned, the duty to do so was not clearly established at the time. The estate representatives appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment and qualified immunity rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that it was not clearly established on April 1, 2019, that Rollyson was required to have Boer search county records anew for Smith’s address after the mailed notices were returned. The court found that existing precedent did not prescribe a specific follow-up measure and that Rollyson’s actions did not violate clearly established law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Ann deWet v. G. Russell Rollyson, Jr." on Justia Law