Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of children eligible for Texas's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of federal Medicaid law. Plaintiffs subsequently entered into a consent decree with various Texas state officials (defendants) calculated to improve implementation of the Program. In 2007, the parties agreed to a "Corrective Action Order." In 2013, defendants moved to terminate a portion of the Order and associated consent decree paragraphs under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed. Determining that plaintiffs have not forfeited their appeal, the court concluded that the district court properly terminated the portion of bullet points 8-10 concerning the completion of the four assessments at issue. The court relied on certain district court decisions to interpret the proper interpretation of "shortage" - which compares the provider-to-class-member ratio with the average client load of the relevant class of provider - and concluded that the district court erred in terminating the portion of bullet points 8-10 that orders defendants to develop plans to address “shortage[s]” identified by the assessments. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order in part and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the portion of the district court’s order terminating bullet points 6-7 and consent decree paragraph 93, and the court vacated the portion of the district court's order terminating the challenged sentence of bullet point 5. View "Frew v. Janek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including many with disabilities, had cases pending in state courts and were represented by an attorney who uses a wheelchair. They claimed that the St. Joseph County Courthouse and the Mishawaka County Services Building did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, particularly with respect to restrooms, elevators, witness stands, jury boxes, jury deliberation rooms, attorney podiums, spectator seating, entrance ramps, clerk counters, services for the blind, water fountains, and parking. While the case was pending, defendants remodeled the courthouse restrooms, which are now accessible. Defendants presented evidence that their facilities complied with the statutes. Plaintiffs offered little evidence in rebuttal. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The court dismissed the claims of non-disabled plaintiffs represented by a disabled lawyer and claims relating to jury facilities, saying that the ADA did not provide for “associational” standing. The court found no evidence that other plaintiffs had suffered past injuries that would support standing for damages, and that the prospect of future injury was too speculative to support an injunction. Some plaintiffs had died; some were no longer in litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, without finding the facilities compliant and without expressing an opinion on possible future claims. View "Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leslie Taylor asked the Colorado Medicaid program to combine the benefits she received through two assistance programs to help her get to medical appointments. If approved, this combination would allow the agency to pay attendants for time driving Taylor to and from her appointments. The agency refused, and the plaintiffs in this case alleged that the refusal constituted discrimination against Taylor based on her disability. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this refusal did not constitute discriminate against Taylor based on her disability. View "Taylor v. Colorado Dept of Health Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of dual status National Guard technicians who had their benefits determined prior to the court's issuance of Petersen v. Astrue and would like to have their benefits readjusted to take advantage of the decision to avoid application of the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's decision to reject the application of mandamus jurisdiction where the district court held that there is no clear, nondiscretionary duty on behalf of the SSA to apply the Peterson decision to plaintiffs. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to present a colorable constitutional claim on equal protection grounds that would justify the application of the exception to 42 U.S.C. 405(g)’s jurisdictional limitations. Plaintiffs’ due process claim also does not support application of an exception to 405(g). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mitchael v. Colvin" on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law

The Centralia state-operated developmental center, one of seven Illinois SODCs, houses approximately 200 severely disabled individuals, some having the mentality of an infant or toddler. Many also have serious aggressive, or self-destructive behavioral disorders. The seven SODCs have, in total, about 1800 residents, while about 10,000 people with severe developmental disabilities live in community-based facilities: houses or apartments in residential settings that accommodate one to eight residents. The state agency provides services (such as housing and medical care) to approximately 25,000 developmentally disabled persons. Another 23,000 or so are on a waiting list; 6000 are considered to be in emergency situations. Since 2012 Illinois has been trying to shift SODC residents to community-based facilities, in accordance with a national trend: community-based facilities are cheaper than SODCs and there is evidence that even persons who are severely disabled mentally or behaviorally or both do better in community-based facilities. A suit, on behalf of the Centralia SODC residents, alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a preliminary injunction to prevent assessment and transfer of those residents, reasoning that the urgency required for emergency relief had not been shown. View "Ill. League of Advocates for Developmentally Disabled v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Medicaid recipients who unsuccessfully sought coverage for prescription drugs, filed suit contending that the District and its officials unlawfully failed to afford them notice of their entitlement to a hearing before denying their prescription drug claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Title XIX’s notice regulations are triggered whenever there has been a denial of a claim for prescription drug coverage at the point-of-sale. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the due process claims because the prescription drug coverage sought by plaintiffs qualifies as a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment; plaintiffs adequately alleged that Xerox, a private company, determined their eligibility for benefits while acting as an agent of the District; and the court remanded the case to permit the district court to conduct an inquiry in the first instance into what process is due. The court also remanded to the district court to reconsider its jurisdiction over the D.C. -law claims in light of the court's partial reversal. View "NB v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against DSS to enforce the Food Stamp Act's, 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9), time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. The district court certified a class consisting of all past, current, and future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely manner and the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring DSS to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. The court concluded that plaintiff can maintain a private lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits in section 2020(e)(3) and (9). The court also concluded that federal regulations do not excuse DSS from processing food stamp applications within the statutory time limits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Briggs v. Bremby" on Justia Law

The federal government provides low-income housing tax credits that are distributed to developers by state agencies, including the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), which assists low-income families in obtaining affordable housing, brought a disparate-impact claim under Fair Housing Act sections 804(a) and 805(a), alleging that allocation of too many credits to housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods resulted in continued segregated housing patterns. Relying on statistical evidence, the district court ruled in favor of ICP. While appeal was pending, HUD issued a regulation interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate-impact liability and establishing a burden-shifting framework. The Fifth Circuit held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, but reversed, concluding that the court had improperly required proof of less discriminatory alternatives. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The Court noted that the statute shifts emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions. Disparate-impact liability must be limited so that regulated entities can make practical business choices that sustain the free-enterprise system. Before rejecting a business justification—or a governmental entity’s public interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown “an available alternative . . . that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.” A disparate-impact claim relying on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a policy causing that disparity. Policies, governmental or private, are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they are “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” When courts find disparate impact liability, their remedial orders must be consistent with the Constitution and should concentrate on eliminating the offending practice. Orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise difficult constitutional questions. View "Texas Dep't of Hous, & Cmity Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a disabled student, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking reimbursement by the DOE for the costs of attending a private program. The hearing officer denied the request for reimbursement, concluding that it was untimely under Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-443(a). The district court held, however, that the student's placement by the parents was “bilateral,” not “unilateral,” so that the parents’ request was not untimely, and concluded that the parents were entitled to reimbursement. The court agreed and concluded that the student's family is entitled to reimbursement for the 2010–11 school year because the DOE tacitly consented to his enrollment at the private school program by failing to provide an alternative. The court also affirmed the district court's fee award. View "Sam K. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law