Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, seven adults who claimed they were molested by a priest when they were children, brought suit against The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles and related parties ("Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' claims were that the Defendants ratified the assaults and acted negligently in failing to supervise the priest who committed the assaults.In response, Defendants moved to strike the complaint, claiming that some of the acts that allegedly ratified the priest's conduct, as well as those serving as the basis for the allegations of negligence, constituted speech and litigation conduct that was protected under California's anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16). The district court rejected Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.The Second Appellate District affirmed. As to the ratification claims, the court held that Defendants mischaracterized Plaintifffs' complaint, "cherry-picking allegations of litigation conduct, and, without support, suggesting that they are the only allegations incorporated by reference into the sexual abuse cause of action."As to the negligence claims, Defendants too narrowly construed Plaintiffs' complaint, focusing only on what Defendants claim was protected speech. Any allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint that may have been "conclusory" when taken out of context, were supported by factual allegations earlier in the complaint. View "Ratcliff v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A." on Justia Law

Kansas City Officer (“Officer”) shot and killed the victim during a foot chase. Family members of the victim filed suit and the district court concluded that the Officer was entitled to both qualified and official immunity. In addition to contesting the grant of summary judgment on appeal, Plaintiffs argued they should receive a trial on their claims against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and the other municipal officials named in their complaint.   In evaluating the family’s excessive-force claim against the Officer, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that the key issue requires answering whether the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and then whether the right was clearly established. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has explained that “the focus” of the clearly-established-right inquiry “is on whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). Here, “judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct,” a reasonable officer would not have had “fair notice” that shooting the victim under these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.     Additionally, to prevail in this case under Kisela, the family would need to establish “the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Here, the family failed to show that the Officer acted in bad faith or with malice. Finally, there is not enough evidence to find that the municipal defendants liable under a deliberate indifference theory. View "N.S. v. Kansas City Board of Police" on Justia Law

In 2014, Tomas Beauford suffered a fatal epileptic seizure in his cell while in pretrial custody at the Mesa County Detention Facility (“MCDF”). The administrator of Beauford’s estate sued various Mesa County and medical defendants in federal district court in Colorado under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to Beauford’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Deputy Dalrymple, finding that whether the deputy was aware that Beauford was not breathing was a material fact in genuine dispute: “We cannot imagine a more material fact in the context of the Estate’s deliberate indifference claim than whether Deputy Dalrymple knew of the risk that Mr. Beauford was not breathing. The district court failed to account for this dispute, which a reasonable jury could resolve in favor of the Estate.” The Court affirmed summary judgment in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Tomas Beauford, et al. v. Correct Care Solutions, et al." on Justia Law

On June 13, 2014, Beaver County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”) officers responded to reports of a truck running into parked cars. The decedent, Troy Bradshaw, was arrested Bradshaw for driving under the influence and he was transported to Beaver Valley Hospital. A deputy completed the Initial Arrestee Assessment (IAA), which reflected that Bradshaw previously considered suicide; was not thinking about it currently; had a brother who committed or attempted suicide; and was intoxicated. Bradshaw stated that he would kill himself if placed in a cell. After the IAA, the officers placed Bradshaw on suicide watch. Bradshaw beat on the cell door for two to three hours. Officers did not place him in a safety smock or create a suicide watch log, in violation of BCCF’s suicide-prevention policy, but a corporal monitored Bradshaw by sitting in the booking area all night. By June 14, Bradshaw was no longer acting violently, and he was transferred from a suicide-watch cell two to cell three, pertinent here, a cell with bed linens. Just after noon on June 15, Bradshaw was found dead in his cell after he hanged himself with some of the provided bedding. Bradshaw’s mother, plaintiff Kathy George, sued on behalf of her son’s estate, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that prison defendants violated Bradshaw’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and “Utah Code Article I, Section 7.” The district court granted summary judgment to all prison defendants because the law entitled them to qualified immunity, and no Beaver County policy violated Bradshaw’s constitutional rights. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that although Plaintiff proved that certain officers failed to follow Beaver County’s suicide-prevention policy, “failing to follow prison policy is not a constitutional violation in and of itself.” View "George v. Beaver County, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in this case arising from allegations of sexual harassment brought by the complainant, a judicial marshal who was employed by the Connecticut Judicial Branch, holding that remand was required.A human rights referee with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities concluded that the the allegations were substantiated and awarded the complainant back pay, emotional distress damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The trial court reversed in part, concluding that the award of emotional distress damages must be vacated due to the complainant's failure to comply with discovery requests and that the injunction reinstating the complainant to her former workplace must be vacated as overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) properly concluded that emotional distress damages and attorney's fees were available remedies; but (2) erred in upholding the referee's determination that the state waived its sovereign immunity with respect to prejudgment and post judgment interest awards for civil rights violations. View "Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that law enforcement officers used excessive force in apprehending him after he escaped from a County Jail highway work crew and lived on the lam for three weeks.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of law enforcement officials. The court held that the bodycam footage and audio did not blatantly contradict all of Plaintiff’s testimony. The court viewed the facts blatantly contradicted by the bodycam footage in the light depicted by the videotape and its audio to conclude that Plaintiff did not attempt to surrender to the officers. However, the court viewed all other facts, including Plaintiff’s allegation of the post-handcuff beating, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff on summary judgment.   The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged post-handcuff beating and dog-biting were proportional to the threat the officer reasonably perceived by Plaintiff while handcuffed. The court also found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity under Sec. 1983 as to the claimed post-handcuff beating and dog-biting because it was clearly established law that beating a handcuffed convict violates the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court found that the excessive force claims based on failure to intervene and failure to intercede against the other defendants failed. View "COREY HUGHES V. MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed 1983 against two nurses alleging that he was provided inadequate medical care during a health crisis he experienced while incarcerated. He was eventually sent a series of hospitals, where doctors told him a flesh-eating organism was damaging his internal organs.The first nurse was successfully served by the Marshals Service within Rule 4(m)’s 90-day period. The second nurse was not served because service was returned as “refused unable to forward.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit on timeliness grounds after finding that Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to his initial and timely complaint.At issue is whether the amended complaint adding Defendants is timely because it relates back to the date of the original complaint. The court found that the district court erred and the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) makes clear that the required “notice” and knowledge must come “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service.Next, the court addressed whether Defendants were provided the necessary notice within the Rule 4(m) notice period. The court ruled that Rule 15(c)’s requirements have been satisfied as to the first nurse. In regards to the second nurse, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of Plaintiff’s extension request, reasoning that the district court incorrectly believed that Plaintiff lost his chance to take advantage of Rule 15(c)’s relation-back rule. The court vacated the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. View "Patrick McGraw v. Theresa Gore" on Justia Law

In the course of responding to a dispute between neighbors, a Deputy fatally shot a man while he was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The personal representative of the deceased's estate (“the Estate”), subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the Deputy used excessive force in violation of the deceased’s Fourth Amendment rights, along with various related state law claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the following claims and remand the case for further proceedings: (1) the 1983 claim against the Deputy in his individual capacity; (2) the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against the Deputy in his individual capacity; and (3) the claims under the Macon County Sheriff’s Office’s surety bond against the Deputy and Sheriff in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages.Notably, the court found that parties’ factual disputes are quintessentially “genuine” and “material.” Assuming that a jury would credit the Estate’s expert evidence over the Deputy’s competing testimony and expert evidence, leads to the conclusion that the Deputy’s use of force was objectively unreasonable.The court affirmed the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the Estate’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; (2) Macon County’s liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office’s governmental immunity from suit; and (3) the Estate’s claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. View "Melissa Knibbs v. Anthony Momphard, Jr." on Justia Law

Following Susanne Burgaz’s suicide in a County Detention Facility, her children and estate sued two individual Sheriff’s deputies on duty the night she died, and various other County officials. They argued the deputies were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs and the County and sheriff negligently operated the jail. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that both individual deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because the Estate failed to allege either deputy violated Ms. Burgaz’s constitutional rights. The "Monell" claim against the sheriff was also properly dismissed. And because all the claims arising under federal law were properly dismissed, the district court correctly dismissed the remaining state-law claims. View "Estate of Susanne Burgaz, et al. v. Board of County Commissioners, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' son was killed when he attempted to drive through a low water crossing in Camp Bullis, a military training base outside San Antonio, Texas. As Plaintiff's son navigated the crossing, water swept across the road, ultimately resulting in his death.Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, claiming the government failed to inspect the low water crossing, failed to warn approaching motorists about the dangers of flooding, and failed to install guard rails that may have prevented water from accumulating on the road. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") applied.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under the FTCA, the federal government waives sovereign immunity for actions based on the negligence of federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. However, immunity is not waived if the federal employee is carrying out a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. To be discretionary, an action must involve some element of judgment or choice.Here, the relevant regulation states that "[a]ll Range/Control Area/Impact Area gates will either be locked or guarded by the unit using the area." A natural reading of the regulation imposed an obligation on the officers who were on-site to lock the gate. Thus, the discretionary exception to the FTCA did not apply. View "Barron v. USA" on Justia Law