Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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In June 2020, a local newspaper in Polk County published an article criticizing a local assistant district attorney, Tommy Coleman. The article claimed that Coleman had "assisted with the prosecution of Michael Morton" while he was a prosecutor in Williamson County. Michael Morton was wrongfully convicted in 1987 due to prosecutorial misconduct, a conviction that occurred before Coleman began practicing law. Morton was exonerated in 2011 after spending nearly 25 years in prison. The article specifically highlighted an instance during a post-conviction hearing where Coleman mocked requests for DNA testing of evidence that would eventually exonerate Morton. Coleman sued the newspaper and its author for defamation, arguing that the claim that he assisted in Morton's prosecution was false and defamatory.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the article's statement that Coleman "assisted with the prosecution of Michael Morton" was substantially true given Coleman’s public involvement in his office’s efforts to resist DNA testing of the evidence that exonerated Morton. The Court ruled that even if the article was not precise in its characterization of Coleman's role, the "gist" of the article - that Coleman supported the efforts to keep Morton behind bars by resisting DNA testing - was substantially true and therefore not actionably defamatory. As such, Coleman's claims were dismissed. View "POLK COUNTY PUBLISHING COMPANY v. COLEMAN" on Justia Law

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A plaintiff, Robert Trebelhorn, suffered a serious knee injury at his apartment complex when a section of an elevated walkway collapsed due to deterioration. The defendants, Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, and Prime Administration, LLC, who owned and managed the apartment complex, were aware of the deteriorated condition of the walkway but chose not to repair it. Trebelhorn sued the defendants for negligence and violation of Oregon's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and won. The jury awarded him just under $300,000 in damages and also imposed punitive damages of $10 million against each defendant. On post-verdict review, the trial court concluded that although the evidence supported some amount of punitive damages, the amount of $10 million would violate the defendants' due process rights. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to just under $2.7 million against each defendant. On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon also agreed with the trial court that $10 million in punitive damages would violate the defendants' due process rights and affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case is about a dispute between Richard Roe and St. John’s University (SJU) and Jane Doe. Roe, a male student at SJU, was accused of sexually assaulting two female students, Doe and Mary Smith, on separate occasions. SJU's disciplinary board found Roe guilty of non-consensual sexual contact with both Doe and Smith and imposed sanctions, including a suspension and eventual expulsion. Roe then sued SJU, alleging that his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and state contract law had been violated. He also sued Doe for allegedly defaming him in an anonymous tweet accusing him of sexual assault. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Roe's Title IX and state law claims, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over his defamation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Roe's complaint failed to state a plausible claim of sex discrimination under Title IX. The court found that, while Roe had identified some procedural irregularities in SJU's disciplinary proceedings, these were not sufficient to support a minimal plausible inference of sex discrimination. Furthermore, the court ruled that Roe's hostile environment claim was fatally deficient, as the single anonymous tweet at the center of his claim was not, standing alone, sufficiently severe to support a claim of a hostile educational environment under Title IX. View "Roe v. St. John's University" on Justia Law

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Edward Zaragoza, an inmate suffering from hypothyroidism, filed a lawsuit against three prison physicians and their employer. Zaragoza claimed that the doctors' treatment decisions, specifically their refusal to provide alternative medication despite the severe side effects he experienced from the prescribed medication, amounted to medical malpractice and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Indiana Supreme Court found that Zaragoza's expert's affidavit, which challenged the doctors' treatment decisions, was both admissible and substantively sufficient to create an issue of fact in the malpractice case. The court also found that there were disputes over whether the doctors knowingly failed to offer Zaragoza a potentially safer alternative medication. Thus, the court ruled that summary judgment was not warranted and reversed the trial court's decision, allowing Zaragoza's claims to proceed to trial. The court emphasized that summary judgment is not a summary trial and that genuine issues of material fact remained to be determined by a factfinder after a trial. View "Zaragoza v. Wexford of Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law

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In the early morning hours of August 1, 2018, Gwendolyn Adams and Glenn Tyler Bolden were pursued in a high-speed chase by Michael William Becker, a peace officer employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Becker suspected Adams and Bolden of wrongdoing, although his suspicions were unfounded. The pursuit resulted in a catastrophic accident that caused severe injuries and, ultimately, the death of Adams's son, D'son Woods.Adams and Bolden filed a lawsuit against the CDCR, alleging negligence causing wrongful death, assault and battery, and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The CDCR sought summary judgment, arguing that Becker was not acting within the scope of his employment during the pursuit. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in favor of CDCR.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that whether Becker was acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued Adams and Bolden was a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. The court noted that Becker’s actions may have been influenced by his role as a peace officer, and it was not clear whether he was acting as a private citizen or a law enforcement officer during the pursuit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDCR. View "Adams v. Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that the underlying suit was time barred as to all defendants in this action brought by Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of her late son's estate on the six-year anniversary of his death, holding that the lawsuit was time barred.Plaintiff sued jail staff and a medical contractor (collectively, Defendants), alleging that while her son was detained in the Somerset County Jail, Defendants failed to recognize his serious mental illness, thus leading to his death following a suicide attempt. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit as time barred. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error. View "Martin v. Somerset County" on Justia Law

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Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer David McNamee, Officer Cory Budaj, and Sergeant Patricio Serrant. Between May 28 and June 2, 2020, several large protests occurred on Denver streets in reaction to the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis. On May 30, then-Denver Mayor Michael Hancock declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew; he also requested assistance from mutual aid police departments, including the Aurora Police Department. At about 9 p.m. on May 31, Plaintiff Zachary Packard was protesting near downtown Denver when a police officer threw a tear gas canister near Packard. Packard kicked the cannister“away from himself and other protesters, in the direction of a line of officers.” Packard kicked the canister about five to ten feet away from himself and other protesters. Critically, this action “did not pose an immediate threat,” the district court concluded, “because officers were equipped with gas masks that protected them from any gas from that container.” Immediately after kicking the canister, Packard was hit in the head with a beanbag round fired from a shotgun; the round knocked him unconscious and caused major injuries. One of the officers on Sergeant Serrant’s line was Defendant Officer McNamee. He fired several beanbag rounds at the time Packard was shot, but the parties disputed whether Officer McNamee was the officer who shot Packard. The district court concluded Plaintiffs raised genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Sergeant Serrant and Officer McNamee were “personally involved in the alleged violation of Mr. Packard’s rights.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Duran, et al. v. Budaj, et al." on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs in this case, which included the estate and surviving family members of Allan Thomas George, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Rifle, Colorado (the City), Tommy Klein, the chief of the Rifle Police Department (RPD), and Dewey Ryan, a corporal with RPD, alleging that the defendants violated George’s Fourth Amendment rights by employing excessive and deadly force against him in the course of attempting to arrest him on a felony warrant. Plaintiffs also raised a Colorado state law claim of battery causing wrongful death against Ryan. Defendants moved for summary judgment with respect to all of the claims asserted against them. Defendants Ryan and Klein asserted, in particular, that they were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 excessive force claim. The district court denied defendants’ motion in its entirety. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s ruling. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that where, as here, a police officer’s employment of deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer’s use of force cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed to be in “conscious disregard of the danger.” The Court therefore concluded the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the defendant officers, and reversed with respect to all defendants. View "Estate of Allan George, et al. v. Ryan, et al." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law