Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law

Sean Hart and Tiffany Guzman filed a lawsuit against the City of Grand Rapids and three police officers, alleging excessive force during a 2020 Black Lives Matter demonstration. Hart and Guzman claimed that the officers used excessive force and that the City ratified this conduct. The officers sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the City argued that the plaintiffs failed to establish municipal liability.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the officers, dismissing the federal claims with prejudice and declining jurisdiction over the state claims. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Officer Johnson and Sergeant Bush, finding that the plaintiffs did not show that the officers violated clearly established rights. However, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Officer Reinink, determining that a reasonable jury could find that he used excessive force when he fired a Spede-Heat canister at Hart at close range, which could be considered deadly force. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on this claim.The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to support their claim of municipal liability based on ratification of unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs' evidence, a spreadsheet of excessive force complaints, lacked qualitative specifics to show a pattern of inadequate investigations by the City. View "Hart v. City of Grand Rapids, Mich." on Justia Law

M.R., a high school student and basketball player, was sexually abused by Cody Butler, a women's basketball coach at Yakima Valley Community College (YVCC), starting when she was 17 years old. The abuse continued into her adulthood, including inappropriate touching, sexual comments, and physical advances. Butler's actions had a significant negative impact on M.R.'s life, leading to substance abuse, abusive relationships, and other personal issues. In 2018, M.R. connected her experiences of abuse to her injuries while in therapy.In 2019, M.R. sued the State of Washington, YVCC, and Butler for various claims, including negligence and assault. The trial court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, which argued that M.R.'s claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(2). The court found that the abuse was a continuous series of events that could not be segregated. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that RCW 4.16.340 only applies to claims based on acts of childhood sexual abuse occurring before the plaintiff turns 18 years old.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that RCW 4.16.340 does not preclude complainants from bringing claims of sexual abuse that originate from childhood sexual abuse and extend into the victim’s adulthood. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative intent support the inclusion of claims for continuing sexual abuse that are based on intentional acts of childhood sexual abuse. The court also noted that the statute accounts for the continuing tort doctrine, allowing for claims involving a common scheme of abuse by the same perpetrator. View "M.R. v. State" on Justia Law

Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law

David Hieber, who led Oakland County’s Equalization Department for nearly twenty years, was terminated after an employee reported him for creating a hostile work environment. Hieber sued Oakland County and his supervisor, Kyle Jen, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of pretermination and post-termination due process, political-affiliation retaliation, and age discrimination. He also brought state-law claims for defamation and age discrimination. Oakland County and Jen moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of Oakland County and Jen on all claims. Hieber appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Oakland County and Jen, in his official capacity, on Hieber’s pretermination due-process claim, finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Hieber received a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against him. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on Hieber’s post-termination due-process claim, political-affiliation retaliation claim, age discrimination claims, and defamation claim. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Jen in his individual capacity on the due-process claims.The main holding of the Sixth Circuit was that Hieber’s pretermination due-process rights may have been violated, warranting further proceedings on that claim. The court found that the investigatory interview and the pretermination hearing may not have provided Hieber with adequate notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hieber v. Oakland County, Mich." on Justia Law

Kevin Niedzialek died after being restrained by Riverside County Sheriff’s Department deputies. The deputies responded to a 911 call reporting a man having a psychotic episode. Upon arrival, they found Niedzialek bleeding from the head and acting erratically. After he advanced towards one of the deputies, they used a taser to subdue him and handcuffed him while he was prone. Niedzialek continued to struggle but eventually became unresponsive. The deputies did not move him into a recovery position or perform CPR before paramedics arrived. Niedzialek died the next day.In the United States District Court for the Central District of California, a civil jury found that the deputies did not use excessive force under the Fourth Amendment but acted negligently under California law. The jury awarded $1.5 million to Niedzialek’s successor-in-interest, Tracy Alves. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the jury’s mixed verdicts were irreconcilable because the legal standard for reasonableness was the same for both claims. The district court denied the motion, stating that California’s negligence standard is broader than the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the jury’s verdicts were reconcilable because California’s “reasonable care” standard considers the totality of circumstances more broadly than the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. The jury could have found that the deputies did not use excessive force but still breached their duty of care by failing to monitor Niedzialek’s condition or place him in a recovery position. The court concluded that it was possible to reconcile the jury’s verdicts based on the evidence and theories presented at trial. View "Alves v. Riverside County" on Justia Law

On Thanksgiving night in 2018, Officer David Alexander, a policeman with the City of Hoover, was on foot patrol at the Galleria Mall in Birmingham, Alabama. During a suspected active shooting situation, Officer Alexander saw Emantic "E.J." Fitzgerald Bradford moving towards two men with a gun in his hand. Without issuing a verbal warning, Officer Alexander shot and killed Mr. Bradford, who was legally authorized to carry his gun and was attempting to provide assistance.April Pipkins, Mr. Bradford's mother and representative of his estate, filed a lawsuit against Officer Alexander, the City of Hoover, and other defendants, asserting Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for negligence and wantonness. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the state law claims and granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, ruling that Officer Alexander's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that a verbal warning was not feasible under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Officer Alexander acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances, which included a crowded mall, the sound of gunshots, and Mr. Bradford running with a gun towards two men. The court also found that a verbal warning was not feasible due to the immediate threat perceived by Officer Alexander. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the state law claims, concluding that the Mall defendants did not owe a duty to protect Mr. Bradford from the criminal acts of a third party and that the complaint did not plausibly allege foreseeability or incompetency in hiring, training, and supervising Officer Alexander. View "Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

Dennis Christopher Howard sued Spotsylvania County Sheriff Roger L. Harris and Deputy David Setlock for injuries from a self-inflicted gunshot wound while detained in a law enforcement vehicle. Howard claimed Harris was responsible for Setlock’s actions, which he argued constituted gross negligence. The incident began when Howard, a convicted felon, was found with a suicide note and missing shotgun. After being detained and searched, Howard maneuvered his handcuffs, accessed a handgun left in the vehicle, and shot himself.The Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that Howard’s gross negligence claim failed as a matter of law and that the defense of illegality barred his claims. The court found that Setlock’s actions did not amount to gross negligence and that Howard’s injuries resulted from his illegal act of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Howard had stated a viable gross negligence claim and that his claim was not barred by the illegality defense. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Howard’s mental state and whether it negated the mens rea required for the illegal possession of a firearm.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that Howard’s claim was barred by the defense of illegality. The court held that Howard’s violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, was a proximate cause of his injuries. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the defendants, finding that Howard’s allegation of an “unsound mind” did not negate the strict liability offense of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. View "Harris v. Howard" on Justia Law

Raymond Tackett, an inmate with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), suffered from Hepatitis C (HCV) and did not receive direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), a treatment that cures HCV. He died on November 29, 2019, from complications related to HCV. His daughter, Skyler Tackett, as the personal representative of his estate, filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical malpractice claim against the medical professionals who treated him, Wexford Health Services, and Dr. Kristen Dauss, the Chief Medical Officer of the IDOC. She later dismissed all claims except the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dauss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Dauss, finding that she took reasonable steps to expand access to DAAs and was not responsible for the treatment decisions that led to Mr. Tackett’s death. Ms. Tackett appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that Ms. Tackett presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Dr. Dauss liable in her individual capacity. The court noted that Mr. Tackett was in a treatment priority group and that Nurse Myers had requested DAAs for him, but there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions or the IDOC policy prevented him from receiving the treatment. The court concluded that while Mr. Tackett’s death was tragic, there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. View "Tackett v Dauss" on Justia Law

Jeremy James Allen, while incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Faribault, filed a complaint against several officials alleging deliberate indifference and medical malpractice related to a hand injury from December 2017. He did not file any grievances with prison officials regarding his injury or medical treatment during his incarceration. Allen's complaint was initially filed in state court and later removed to federal court. After his release from custody, Allen amended his complaint, substituting Charles Brooks and Cheryl Piepho for previously unidentified defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted Allen's unopposed motion to amend his complaint after his release. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, but did not initially raise the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The district court denied the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, finding that Allen plausibly alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.Brooks and Piepho later raised the failure to exhaust defense in a summary judgment motion, arguing that Allen's original complaint, filed while he was incarcerated, was subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion requirement. The district court denied their motion, ruling that the amended complaint, filed after Allen's release, was not subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement and did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Allen's amended complaint, filed after his release, was the operative complaint and not subject to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Additionally, the court found that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint because naming John and Jane Doe defendants did not qualify as a "mistake" under Rule 15(c). View "Allen v. Brooks" on Justia Law