Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the court of appeals that affirmed his classification as a Tier I sex offender based on his guilty plea to one count of sexual imposition. At issue was whether the trial court retained authority to classify Defendant as a Teir I sex offender more than a year after the entry of a final judgment of conviction for a sexually oriented offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked authority to reopen this case to reconsider the final judgment it had entered, and the protections against double jeopardy barred it from classifying Defendant as a Tier I sex offender more than a year after it imposed sentence. View "State v. Raber" on Justia Law

This was an original action by Relators, property owners, for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. On December 1, 2011, the court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of their taking of the property. Following failed settlement negotiations, the State filed appropriation cases for the property of two of the relators. All of the relators with the exception of the two then filed a motion for an order for Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ. The Supreme Court held that Relators established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ and ordered Respondents to file appropriation cases for Respondents' parcels. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zehringer" on Justia Law

A grand jury issued an indictment charging Appellee with two counts of trafficking in drugs. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the indictment did not sufficiently charge the two trafficking counts because neither count named the specific controlled substance involved. The trial court denied Appellee's motion, and Appellee pleaded no contest to the charges. Appellee appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the indictment was insufficient because it stated that the drug involved was a Schedule I or II drug instead of naming the specific drug involved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an indictment charging a defendant with trafficking in drugs under Ohio Rev. Code 2925.03 is sufficient if it names the schedule in which the drug appears; and (2) therefore, the indictment in this case adequately informed Defendant of the charges pending against him. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, in general, cell-phone records produced by a cell-phone company constitute testimonial evidence that implicates a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Defendant here was convicted of murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by allowing cell phone records to be admitted into evidence without being properly authenticated in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The appellate court determined that the admission of the cell-phone records did not contribute to Defendant's conviction and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because cell-phone records are generally business records that are not prepared for litigation and are thus not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause does not affect their admissibility; (2) however, the hearsay rule barred the records' admission in this case because they were not properly authenticated; but (3) the admission of the cell-phone records did not contribute to Defendant's conviction, and their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Hood" on Justia Law

In this certified conflict, the Supreme Court considered whether a trial court's failure to impose the statutorily mandated fine required by Ohio Rev. Code 2925.11(E)(1)(a) and 2929.18(B)(1) when no affidavit of indigency has been filed with the court prior to the trial court's journal entry of sentencing renders void the part of the sentence waiving the fine. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in resolving the certified conflict, holding that a trial court's failure to impose the required fine under these circumstances renders void the part of the sentence waiving the fine, and that resentencing of the offender is limited to the imposition of the mandatory fine. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

Appellant, the former mayor of the city of Vermilion, appealed from a judgment denying her request for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the city, to provide copies of certain itemized billing statements for attorney services rendered to the city. Because she thought the annual legal fees expended by the new administration would far exceed the fees incurred during her administration, Appellant made the records requests to permit public scrutiny of the city's expenditure of funds for legal services. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the city and denying Appellant's claim for a writ of mandamus, as the city did not establish that the entirety of the requested statements were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act; and (2) affirmed the portion of the judgment denying Appellant's request for an award of statutory damages and attorney fees. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Anderson v. City of Vermilion" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a certified conflict between the fifth and second district courts of appeals on whether res judicata bars a criminal defendant from arguing that his plea is void due to an earlier postrelease-control sentencing error when the defendant has entered a plea of guilty to escape. The Supreme Court held that if a trial court improperly sentences a defendant to a term of postrelease control and the defendant subsequently pleads guilty to violating the terms of that postrelease control, the defendant is not barred by principles of res judicata from collaterally attacking his conviction as void. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the fifth district court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to escape on the theory that he had never been legally placed on postrelease control. View "State v. Billiter" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with one count of domestic violence. The domestic-violence charge was enhanced to a third-degree felony under the statute applicable to third-time offenders. A jury found Appellant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's domestic-violence conviction but as a fourth-degree rather than a third-degree felony because the state had not presented evidence of at least two prior domestic-violence convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while Ohio Rev. Code 2945.75(B)(1) permits the state to prove a prior conviction by submitting a judgment entry of the conviction, the statute does not restrict the manner of proof to that method alone; (2) when the state chooses to prove a prior conviction by using a judgment entry, that entry must comply with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C); (3) the appellate court in this case was correct in holding that the state proved only one, not two, prior convictions, and therefore the offense may be elevated only to a fourth-degree felony; but (4) the court of appeals was incorrect in holding that compliance with Rule 32(C) was not a prerequisite to proving a prior offense for purposes of increasing a subsequent charge. View "State v. Gwen" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder and tampering with the evidence. The trial court, however, granted Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated-burglary count. The Supreme Court accepted Appellant's appeal to review two questions of law: (1) does a person have standing to object under the fourth Amendment to the retention of a DNA profile by the state and its use in a subsequent criminal investigation when the profile was lawfully created during a previous criminal investigation, but the person was acquitted of the crime; and (2) does the state have the authority to retain a DNA profile that was created during a criminal investigation and use that profile in a subsequent investigation, when the person was acquitted of any crime following the first investigation? The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a person does not have standing to object to the retention of his or her DNA profile or the profile's use in a subsequent criminal investigation; and (2) the state is authorized to retain the DNA profile and to use it in a subsequent investigation even though the profile was obtained from a sample taken during the investigation of the crime of which the person was acquitted. View "State v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court found juvenile appellant J.V. delinquent and guilty of felonious assault, aggravated robbery, and the attendant firearm and serious-youthful-offender specifications. The court imposed a blended sentence of at least two years of incarceration at the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a stayed adult sentence of three years. Near the end of his sentence, J.V. was involved in a fight that led the trial court to invoke the stayed adult sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the invocation of the stayed adult sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the invocation of the adult prison sentence was constitutional; but (2) a juvenile court does not have the authority to impose criminal punishment, including post-release control, after the delinquent child turns twenty-one, and because the juvenile court imposed the adult sentence and added postrelease control after J.V. turned twenty-one, the court acted outside of its jurisdiction. View "In re J.V." on Justia Law