Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Relator submitted to the attorney general's office a written request for copies of records concerning any communication to that office relating to Danny Bubp's simultaneously holding and exercising the public offices of state representative and mayor's court magistrate. The attorney general's office mailed several pages of responsive documents, but many of the documents were withheld and parts of other documents were redacted based on the claim that they were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Relator subsequently filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the attorney general's office to provide access to those portions of the requested public records that were withheld. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator did not establish his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief. The Court also denied Relator's request for statutory damages and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder and multiple counts of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. Defendant was allegedly one of four men involved in the crimes. As part of the proof to establish Defendant's involvement, the State introduced cell-phone records in an effort to show Defendant's communication with the other co-conspirators and his whereabouts during the morning in question. The appellate court affirmed, holding that even if the admission of the cell-phone records was in violation of Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him, any error was harmless. Defendant appealed, arguing that the cell-phone records were inadmissible as business records without proper authentication. In this motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the admission of the cell-phone records was unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause because the records were not authenticated as business records; but (2) the admission of the records was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Hood" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, gross sexual imposition, kidnapping, and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Curry, other acts evidence offered to show a scheme, plan, or system is inadmissible unless it shows the background of the alleged crime or proves the identity of the accused; and (2) under Curry, the admission of evidence of a prior sexual relationship Defendant had with a different minor was precluded because the sexual acts of that relationship had been "chronologically and factually separate occurrences" and the identity of the accused was not an issue at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Ohio R. Evid. 404(B), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused may be admissible to prove intent or plan, even if the identity of an accused or the immediate background of a crime is not at issue; and (2) consequently, evidence that Defendant had engaged in sexual relations with a teenage boy could be admissible to prove Defendant had a plan to groom boys for sexual activity with the intent of sexual gratification. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of forcible rape of a child, gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to life in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's judgment not to merge the kidnapping and rape offenses, holding that the convictions for rape and kidnapping were allied offenses of similar import that should have merged at sentencing. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court erred in applying a de novo review of the trial court's determination that Defendant's offense should merge, or whether the court should have applied an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an appellate court should apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial court's Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 merger determination. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who violated former Ohio Rev. Code 2950.99 by failing to give proper notice of an address change. At issue in this case was whether current section 2950.99 or former section 2950.99 governed the penalty for Appellant. The appellate court (1) reversed the sentence imposed by the trial court, and (2) applied the penalty provision in place when Defendant was classified rather than the penalty provision in place immediately before Megan's Law was replaced by the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), holding that current section 2950.99 does not apply to sex offenders originally classified under Megan's Law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a defendant whose sex-offender classification was determined under Megan's Law, the penalty for a violation of the reporting requirements of former section 2950.05 that occurs after Megan's Law was supplanted by the AWA is the penalty set forth in the version of section 2950.99 in place just before the effective date of the AWA. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated murder, one count of murder, and two counts of rape. Defendant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder and to twenty years in prison for the two rape convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court properly excused two prospective jurors for cause who were not unequivocally opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in the majority of its evidentiary rulings; (3) the erroneous admission of testimony relaying out-of-court statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the remaining evidence establishing Defendant's guilt; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the penalty phase; (5) Ohio's death-penalty was constitutional; and (6) Defendant's death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a judgment of a court purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a "final verdict" as that term is defined in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.67(A), which authorizes the state to appeal certain trial court decisions either as a matter of right or by leave of court. In accordance with well-established caselaw, the court of appeals concluded in this case that the order purporting to acquit Defendant for failure to establish venue was a final verdict and could not be appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to establish venue in a criminal felony trial is a basis for acquittal, and therefore, an acquittal order based on the failure to establish venue is a final verdict, and the state may not appeal from the order. View "State v. Hampton" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an individual who is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant forfeits all expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Defendant in this case moved the trial court to suppress the cocaine found in his possession. The trial judge denied the motion base solely on the notion that an arrest warrant "cleanses" any error by police in seizing an individual later found to be subject to the warrant. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of crack cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unlawfulness of an improper arrest or seizure cannot be purged by the fortuitous subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant. Remanded for a finding of whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the arresting officer's patdown of Defendant and whether the contraband seized could be justified. View "State v. Gardner" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice claim filed well after the statute of repose set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C). Timothy and Tracy Ruther sued a doctor and medical facility, claiming that the doctor had failed to properly assess, evaluate and respond to abnormal laboratory results including very high liver enzymes. The court of appeals held that section 2305.113(C), as applied to the facts of this case, violated the right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio Constitution, relying in part upon Hardy v. VerMeulen. The Supreme Court overruled Hardy and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs, whose cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until after the statute of repose had expired, were not deprived of a vested right; (2) Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to their claim; and (3) therefore, the medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 2305.113(C) does not extinguish a vested right and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution. View "Ruther v. Kaiser" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. The court of appeals vacated both convictions, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence showing Appellee knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired. Upon his release, Appellee filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellee was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by Appellee, or both. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) one who claims to be a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in section 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment; and (2) a trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to section 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellee court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial. Remanded. View "Doss v. State" on Justia Law