Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A three-judge panel convicted Lamont Hunter for the aggravated murder and rape of a three-year-old and child endangerment. The panel sentenced Hunter to death based on two death-penalty specifications: aggravated murder while committing or attempting to commit rape and aggravated murder of a child under the age of thirteen. The Supreme Court affirmed Hunter's convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) Hunter did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Hunter had previously abused the child; (3) the panel did not create a miscarriage of justice in convicting Hunter of all counts and specifications; (4) the panel did not err in denying multiple defense motions; (5) the panel did not err in sentencing Hunter to consecutive sentences for his noncapital offenses in violation of his constitutional rights; and (6) the aggravating factors clearly outweighed any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and the penalty imposed in this case was appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences approved for other rape-murders.

After Appellant Jermaine McKinney was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case, Appellant petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellee, a county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge's sentencing entry in the criminal case fully complied with Ohio. R. Crim. P. 32(C) by including the findings of the jury upon which Appellant's convictions were based, the sentence, the signature of the judge, and the clerk's time stamp; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the claim that the judge erred in his sentencing entry.

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of various crimes. The judgment entry of conviction did not set out whether the conviction was based upon a guilty or no-contest plea or upon a bench trial or jury trial. The cause was remanded for resentencing for other reasons. On remand, the judgment entry contained the same error. The trial court then sua sponte filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry supplementing the wording of the original resentencing judgment entry. The appellate court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding no new or substantial right was affected by correction of the sentencing judgment. Appellant subsequently obtained a certification of a conflict of the decision in this case with that of State v. Lampkin. At issue on appeal was whether a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that is issued solely to correct a clerical omission in a prior final judgment entry constitutes a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no new right of appeal is created by such an entry, and therefore, the entry in this case was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken.

A jury convicted Roland Davis of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. Davis was sentenced to death. The trial court dismissed Davis's petition for postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Davis then filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) a trial court has jurisdiction over a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific issue has not been decided on direct appeal; and (2) an appellate court has jurisdiction, in a case in which a death penalty has been imposed, to consider the trial court's denial a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Corey Hazel filed a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison. With his petition, Hazel filed an affidavit of indigency and sought waiver of prepayment of the court's filing fees. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was defective because Hazel failed to include in his affidavit of indigency a statement setting forth his balance in his inmate account for the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals did not err in finding the petition defective because (1) the petition was in violation of section 2969.25(C), (2) as Hazel could have raised his claims in a previous habeas corpus case, res judicata barred Hazel from filing a successive habeas corpus petition, and (3) as Hazel's petition did not state a facially valid habeas corpus claim, the appellate court's dismissal without prior notice was proper.

Edward Lang was convicted of the aggravated murder of two persons and aggravated robbery, with each count carrying gun specifications. Lang was sentenced to death for one murder and life with no possibility of parole for the other murder. The trial court also imposed a ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated-robbery conviction and a three-year term for the gun specifications, which it had merged for sentencing. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Lang's convictions and sentences of death and life without parole despite Lang's mental illness and history of abuse, but (2) remanded for the proper imposition of postrelease control pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2929.91 on Lang's sentence for aggravated robbery.

Michael Pruitt filed writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel Appellees, common pleas court judges, to vacate his convictions and sentence. Pruitt argued that the common pleas court erred in entering a sentence that incorrectly stated that Pruitt had entered pleas of guilty to having a weapon while under disability and to a firearm specification relating to an attempted-murder charge. The court of appeals dismissed Pruitt's claims, noting that all of the cases cited by Pruitt were resolved in the ordinary course of law by appeal rather than in an action for an extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed Pruitt's claims as Pruitt had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law to raise his claims.

Christopher Barker pleaded guilty to five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. On appeal, Barker argued that the entry of his no-contest plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing because the trial judge had failed to fully comply with the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C) when the judge told Barker that by entering the plea he was giving up the "right to call witnesses to speak on his behalf." The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's admonition to Barker was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate to compulsory process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the language employed by the trial court while addressing Barker was a reasonable explanation of Barker's right to compulsory process, and (2) other portions of the record may be referenced in resolving an alleged ambiguity such as the one here during the oral colloquy.

After a jury trial, Thomas Dunlap was convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under the age of thirteen, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of disseminating obscene matter to juveniles. The court sentenced Dunlap to two years in prison and found Dunlap to be a tier three sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (S.B. 10). Dunlap appealed the section 2907.05(A)(4) convictions and his sex-offender classification, arguing that (1) section 2907.05(A)(4) requires a men rea element of recklessness, and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to offenses committed before its effective date violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that section 2907.05(A)(4) requires no precise culpable state of mind. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the element of sexual contact in a section 2907.05(A)(4) violation requires a mens rea of purpose, but the indictment and jury instructions in this case sufficiently set forth the required mens rea; and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to Dunlap violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Duane Short was found guilty of the aggravated murders of his wife and another man and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Short's judgments of conviction and sentence of death, holding (1) Short's contention that his waiver of the right to present evidence in the penalty phase was not knowing and voluntary and hence was invalid was overruled; (2) the trial court did not violate Short's right to present mitigating evidence by denying Short's request to present mitigating evidence to the judge alone after the penalty phase; (3) the trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing to inquire into Short's claim that the prosecutor's office unconstitutionally interfered with defense counsel's ability to interview state witnesses before trial; (4) Short did not establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (5) Short's claims attacking the constitutionality of Ohio's death penalty statutes were overruled; and (6) upon an independent review of Short's death sentence, the evidence supported the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death sentence was proportionate to those affirmed in similar cases.