Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Gerald Strothers requested that East Cleveland Mayor Gary Norton provide access to review, inspect, and copy at cost various public records. A week after Strothers's public-records request was received by Norton, Strothers filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Norton to provide access to the requested records. Norton subsequently made available to Strothers all of the requested records. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus but awarded Strothers $1,000 in statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment denying the writ of mandamus and reversed the portion awarding statutory damages, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Norton's evidence established that Strothers had been given access to all of the requested records, which rendered his mandamus claim moot; and (2) abused its discretion in granting statutory damages to Strothers, as Norton produced the records within a reasonable period of time.

After receiving a dispatch that a male driving a tow truck was armed and planned to kill himself, two police officers stopped the driver, Richard Dunn. Because they were dealing with an allegedly suicidal person, they handcuffed Dunn and placed him in a police cruiser. The officers subsequently found a loaded gun in the truck's glove compartment. Dunn was indicted on one count of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Dunn filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court overruled the motion, holding that the stop was a legitimate response to an emergency situation. Dunn then pleaded no contest to the charge. The court of appeals reversed and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the officers in this case were authorized to stop Dunn because the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a low-enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need for her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury to effect a community-caretaking/emergency-aid stop.

Appellant Robert Watson, who was serving a custodial sentence, filed a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, various correctional officials and employees, to provide certain public and nonpublic records directly related to Watson. The court of appeals conditionally granted the writ, stating that Watson must pay for the copies. After Appellees failed to provide the copies to Watson, Watson requested statutory damages in connection with his mandamus case. The court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson's request, as (1) the court did not conclusively determine that Watson had submitted the applicable cost for the copies; (2) the court did not specify that Appellees had breached any duty owed to Watson; and (3) Watson's mandamus claim was based in part on his request for nonpublic records, which claim was not authorized by Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, and therefore, Watson could not be awarded statutory damages for that claim.

Appellant Timothy Smith pleaded guilty to forgery. The trial court sentenced Smith to five years of community control and required him to pay court costs, the fee for his court-appointed attorney, and $4,857 in restitution. Smith appealed, asserting that the trial court erred when it did not inform him that if he failed to pay court costs, the court could require him to perform community service. The court of appeals refused to consider this assignment of error on its merits, holding that the issue was not ripe for review because Smith had not yet failed to pay court costs. Smith filed a motion in the court of appeals to certify a conflict, alleging that the court's holding conflicted with the Fourth District Court of Appeals' holding in State v. Moss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to precedent, the court's failure to provide Smith the community-service notice required by Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23(A)(1) was ripe for review regardless of whether Smith had failed to pay costs. Remanded.

Appellant Jason Carrick was charged with and convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2917.11(A)(2) after the police department received complaints about the loud music coming from Carrick's property during a Halloween party Carrick hosted in a building he owned. The court of appeals held that section 2917.11(A)(2) was not unconstitutionally vague but thereafter found its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Compher and certified the record to the Supreme Court for review. At issue was whether section 2917.11(A)(2) provides sufficient notice for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what he or she is required to do under the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the statute does provide sufficient notice and thus is not void for vagueness, and (2) therefore, Carrick's due-process rights were not violated.

Paul Palmer pleaded guilty to sexual battery in 1995 and served an eighteen-month sentence. Based on Palmer's conviction, the Adam Walsh Act of 2007 automatically imposed a sex-offender classification, requiring registration with authorities. Palmer filed a petition challenging the application of the new registration requirements to him. Meanwhile, Palmer was indicted for violating his registration requirements under the Act. The trial court (1) ruled that Ohio's sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer and granted his motion to dismiss the indictment, and (2) ordered the removal of Palmer's name from lists of sex offenders. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment in light of the Act's explicit retroactivity, and (2) because the Act did apply to Palmer, the court erred in requiring removal of Palmer's name from lists of sex offenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) State v. Bodyke did not invalidate the statutory petition process for challenging a reclassification under the Act; and (2) a trial court may dismiss an indictment alleging violations of the Act based on the retroactive application of the Act because, after State v. Williams, duties under the Act may not be imposed retroactively.

After Jose Agosto was convicted and sentenced on criminal charges, Agosto unsuccessfully sought resentencing by raising claims for writs of mandamus and procedendo. Agosto again petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellees, a judge and the county court of common pleas, to resentence him to a lawful sentence that constitutes a valid final judgment. The court of appeals denied relief, concluding that res judicata barred Agosto from instituting a successive writ action for the same relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err where (1) res judicata barred Agosto's claims, and (2) some of Agosto's claims were not cognizable in an extraordinary-writ action.

Appellant, Marquise Jones, petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellee, Sandusdy County Court of Common Pleas Judge Barbara Ansted, to issue a new sentencing entry in Jones's criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. Jones appealed, arguing that the entry issued in his case was not a final, appealable order because it failed to dispose of every firearm specification of which he was found guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing entry constituted a final, appealable order because it set forth the fact of Jones's convictions, the sentence, the judge's signature, and the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk; and (2) Jones had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error.

A jury convicted Dennis Gould of rape, gross sexual imposition, pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, all based on images located on the hard drive of Gould's computer. The court of appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court should have excluded all evidence that resulted from the warrantless search of Gould's hard drive. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court, holding (1) because Gould had abandoned the hard drive, Gould did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the hard drive; and (2) therefore, the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

A jury found Jack Carlisle guilty of kidnapping and gross sexual imposition (GSI) and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment for kidnapping and one year of imprisonment for GSI, to be served concurrently. The trial court later vacated Carlisle's sentence due to change of circumstances, namely the cost of Carlisle's dialysis, and imposed a sentence of five years of community control. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to modify Carlisle's sentence because his convictions had been affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the trial court in this case lacked the requisite authority to modify Carlisle's sentence, as absent statutory authority, a trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment. Remanded.