Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for first degree rape. Four years later, he was indicted for additional charges of felony child abuse by committing a sexual act on a child, incest, and indecent liberties with a child. The victim in this case was Defendant's daughter, who experienced a "flashback" to the alleged events and reported the allegedly repressed memory to her therapist. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress expert testimony regarding the repressed memory, concluding that even though evidence of repressed memory was relevant, the evidence must be excluded because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' determination that the trial court properly granted Defendant's motion; but (2) disavowed the portion of the opinion that, relying on an earlier opinion of that court, required expert testimony always to accompany the testimony of a lay witness in cases involving allegedly recovered memories. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and trafficking in cocaine by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. Defendant contended that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the charges and therefore the charges should not have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to reach a reasonable inference that Defendant constructively possessed the cocaine and rifle at issue, and therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child and first-degree sexual offense. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of prior acts was properly admitted against Defendant under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b). The court of appeals reversed the convictions, determining that the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the alleged crimes to be admitted under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concluding that the trial court, after carefully evaluating the evidence, correctly ruled that the prior acts had sufficient similarity and temporal proximity to those alleged in the charged crimes. Remanded.

Defendant Paul Lewis was convicted of first-degree sexual offense, felonious breaking or entering, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Defendant discovered information previously unknown to him relating to his trial. Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), alleging that his trial had been tainted because of improper communication between the investigating detective and a juror. The trial court denied Defendant's MAR, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. On retrial, Defendant was once more convicted of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the charges against Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the retrial court erred in limiting Defendant's ability to examine before a jury the State's lead investigator about the investigator's possible bias and about instances of purported misconduct by the investigator during Defendant's first trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with resisting a public officer, felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the resisting charge and a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the search incident to arrest. At a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the motions, the trial court granted both of Defendant's motions. Immediately thereafter, the State announced to the court that it would be unable to proceed with the case in chief on the remaining charges. As a result, the other charges were dismissed. The State appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the prosecutor's statements to the trial court amounted to a dismissal in open court under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-931. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals to the extent it could be read as affirming to the trial court's dismissal of charges on its own motion, holding (1) the prosecutor's statements did not amount to a dismissal in open court, and (2) the trial court had no authority to enter an order dismissing the case on its own motion. Remanded for consideration of the State's argument pertaining to the motion to suppress.

On July 29, 1994, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The date of the offense was August 25, 1993. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). The General Assembly enacted the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) to supercede the FSA for offenses committed on or after the SSA's effective date, October 1, 1994. In contrast to the FSA, the SSA imposed shorter terms of imprisonment for second-degree murder. On March 28, 2011, Defendant filed an amended motion for appropriate relief requesting modification of his sentence under the SSA. The superior court ordered that Defendant's life sentence be modified to a term of 157 to 198 months under the SSA. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant's offense was controlled exclusively by the FSA; and (2) the superior court violated a clear and unambiguous statute by modifying Defendant's sentence in accordance with the SSA. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature based on the victim's age and inability to consent due to a mental disability. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish whether the victim had the requisite mental capacity to consent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the State was not required to use expert testimony pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 702 to establish the extent of the victim's mental capacity to consent to sexual acts under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to withstand Defendant's motions to dismiss.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for trafficking in cocaine by possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, and carrying a concealed gun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a search that was conducted only after officers had arrested him for carrying a concealed gun and placed him in a police car. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was not reasonable for the arresting officers to believe Defendant's vehicle contained evidence of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals with instructions to reinstate the trial court's decision, holding that the search of Defendant's vehicle was constitutionally permissible under Arizona v. Gant, and the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion for relief.

After a jury trial, Defendant Thomas Starr was convicted of four counts of assaulting a firefighter with a firearm. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to follow the procedures of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1233 when it denied the jury's request to review the testimony of one of the firefighters involved in the incident. The court of appeals held that because the trial court instructed the jurors to rely on their recollection of the evidence, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the jury's request. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court in this instance violated section 15A-1233 by failing to exercise its discretion, and the error was preserved by operation of law for appellate review; but (2) Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that the error was prejudicial.

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and sale of cocaine and pled guilty to habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and vacated Defendant's convictions, concluding that in the absence of expert testimony as to the chemical analysis of the substance, the evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of the crime, namely, that the substance was a controlled substance. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the testimony of Defendant's witness, which identified the substance as cocaine, provided evidence of a controlled substance sufficient to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss.