Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was named in two indictments and entered a negotiated plea in each. The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that Defendant took advantage of a position of trust, then sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range for the convictions on both indictments. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had stipulated to the aggravating factor in the earlier indictment only and that the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence on the latter indictment because he had entered no stipulation in that case. The court of appeals vacated the sentence imposed on the latter indictment and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on that indictment, finding that the transcript of plea was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant unambiguously stipulated to application of the aggravating factor for both indictments and that application of the aggravating factor for both indictments was supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. View "State v. Khan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to traffic in cocaine by transportation and possession. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, alleging that the stop was an illegal seizure. Specifically, Defendant argued that the law enforcement officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was engaging in illegal activity by operating a vehicle without a properly functioning brake light. The court of appeals reversed, holding that state law requires a motor vehicle to have only one brake light, and therefore, the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the officer was mistaken about the requirements of the motor vehicle laws, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and under the totality of the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in this case. View "State v. Heien" on Justia Law

In an effort to regulate gambling, the General Assembly passed N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4, which bans the operation of electronic machines that conduct sweepstakes through the use of an "entertaining display" such as video poker or video bingo. Originally, Plaintiffs were companies that marketed and sold prepaid products. As a promotion, Plaintiffs developed electronic sweepstakes systems where participants were allowed to access a gamestation terminal that revealed the content of the sweepstakes entry using different displays that simulated various game themes. After the General Assembly enacted the current version of section 14-306.4, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment. The trial court concluded that the law was constitutional. The court of appeals majority concluded that the announcement of the sweepstakes result and the video games were protected speech and that the entire statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislation regulated conduct and not protected speech and was therefore constitutional. View "Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The State filed a notice of appeal seven days after the trial judge in open court orally granted Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress but three months before the trial judge issued his corresponding written order of suppression. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the State's appeal, finding that the State's notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' dismissal of the State's appeal, holding that, under Rule 4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1448, the window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order. View "State v. Oates" on Justia Law

Defendant reserved her right to appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and then pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in marijuana by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were either without merit or inconsequential and that law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend a detention of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual offense with a child under the age of thirteen and two counts of first-degree statutory rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted conclusory expert testimony on whether the juvenile victim had been sexually abused, as it was "highly plausible" that the jury would have reached a different result absent the expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified, holding (1) the admission of the testimony was plain error; but (2) the plain error standard requires a determination that the jury "probably would have" returned a different result. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape of a child, two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense, two counts of sexual offense with a child, and five counts of indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial for Defendant's two convictions for sexual offense with a child, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by a disjunctive jury instruction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in ordering a new trial for two of Defendant's sexual offense convictions based on fellatio, as the State satisfied the corpus delicti rule by presenting evidence of the trustworthiness of Defendant's confession to the incidents of fellatio.

After Defendant appealed his district court conviction for driving while impaired, the superior court granted Defendant's motion to suppress based upon its conclusion that there was not probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle because of the contradictory testimony of the arresting officers and the allegations contained in Defendant's affidavit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the superior court erred by applying the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard to determine the validity of Defendant's traffic stop. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the superior court did not apply the correct legal standard and failed to make findings of fact sufficient to allow a reviewing court to apply the correct legal standard. Remanded.

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while impaired, reserving her right to appeal. Defendant subsequently appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of her vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, holding that one of the trial court's findings of fact was not supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in finding that one of the trial court's findings of fact was not supported by the evidence; but (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress because there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of committing a misdemeanor sexual battery. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony referring to Defendant's post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court's determination of guilt, concluding that the admission of the statements was not plain error; but (2) vacated the trial court's order requiring that Defendant register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of the post-Miranda testimony was error; but (2) this error did not amount to plain error.