Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In these two cases, Defendants were convicted of violent felonies. Their sentences were required by law to include a period of post-release supervision (PRS), but in each case the court failed to impose a PRS term. In both cases, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCS) sent notices to the sentencing courts and to Defendants pursuant to New York Correct. Law 601-d, which provides a procedure for resentencing defendants in cases where the original sentence illegally omitted a term of PRS. In both cases, the resentencings were delayed, and the courts that resentenced Defendants did not meet the deadline contained in section 601-d. Defendants therefore claimed their resentencings under section 601-d were untimely and therefore invalid. Defendant Jessie Velez also complaint that his resentencing took place after his original sentence had expired and thus violated constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals held (1) the failure to meet the statutory deadline did not impair the validity of the resentencing in these cases; but (2) Velez's sentence was barred by double jeopardy under the Court's decision in People v. Williams.

After a trial, Defendant was convicted for stealing copper pipes. A few months before trial, however, the pipes were returned to their rightful owner without the notice to Defendant required by N.Y. Penal Law 450.10. Defendant appealed, arguing that the defense team was prejudiced because they were deprived of an opportunity to examine the pipes and independently assess their value and that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to impose a sanction. The appellate division modified on the basis of an unpreserved error. The People appealed, arguing that the appellate court abused its discretion, as the alleged error was unpreserved for appellate review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the People's appeal, holding that the unpreserved issue in this case was beyond its review.

After a non-jury trial, Claimant was convicted of having committed various sex offenses. The appellate division reversed and ordered a new trial. The reversal was premised upon the manner in which certain exculpatory evidence had been dealt with, both by the prosecutor and defense counsel. Later, the indictment was dismissed on the People's motion. Following his release from prison, Claimant commenced this action to recover for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to Ct. Cl. Act 8-b. The State moved to dismiss on the ground that Claimant's wrongful conviction had not been found to have been actionably eventuated. Claimant cross-moved for summary judgment as to liability. The court of claims denied both motions. The appellate division affirmed the denial of the State's motion but reversed the denial of Claimant's cross motion, finding that the reversal of conviction was premised, at least in part, upon prosecutorial misconduct amounting to fraud, and awarding Claimant summary judgment upon the issue of liability. The Court of Appeals modified to deny Claimant's motion for summary judgment as to liability and otherwise affirmed, holding that the appellate court erred in finding that Claimant clearly and convincingly proved the elements of his fraud claim.

Defendant was convicted of several charges stemming from relationships she allegedly had with two underage students who attended a school where Defendant was a teacher. Defendant moved to vacate her conviction on the grounds that the People had violated their disclosure obligation by belatedly disclosing several emails and by failing to disclose certain other information that might have been used to impeach one of the alleged victims. The appellate division modified by reversing the conviction of bribing a witness, remanded that charge for a new trial, and otherwise affirmed the judgment of Supreme Court, holding that the prosecution failed to fulfill basic disclosure obligations essential to a fair trial but that failure did not affect the remaining counts of Defendant's conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, reversal was not required on the remaining counts as there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence supporting the alleged tainted count had a spillover effect on the other convictions.

Defendant was indicted on one count of grand larceny in the second degree and four counts of forgery in the second degree for stealing money from her employer. Defendant pleaded guilty to the entire indictment, and the court advised Defendant she should come up with one-half of the restitution owed by the time of sentencing. However, the court did not state that Defendant would go to prison if she failed to make any payments. Defendant subsequently appeared at sentencing without having made any restitution payments. Appellant was sentenced to the maximum term on each count of the indictment. The appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although Defendant waived her right to appeal the conviction, she never expressly waived her right to appeal the sentence, as, during the plea colloquy in this case, the court did not explain that the appeal waiver would bar Defendant from not only challenging the sentence she hoped to receive - five years probation - but also any sentence the court would impose in the event Defendant failed to meet the court's condition of paying the restitution by the date of sentencing.

The common issue presented by these two consolidated appeals was whether an appeal lies from an oral order issued by a criminal court on a pre-trial matter. In People v. Elmer, the People appealed from an oral decision by the trial court that granted, in part, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. In People v. Cooper, Defendant sought review of an oral order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search attendant to his arrest. In both cases, the appellate division ruled adversely to the appellants, finding that the failure to obtain a written order precluded appellate review. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that an appeal does lie from an oral order of a criminal court that finally disposes of the pre-trial matter at issue.

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder upon evidence that he killed his fiancee by inflicting numerous knife wounds. Although Defendant had sought to interpose the affirmative defense that his homicidal acts had been committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, and upon that theory to afford the jury the option of returning a verdict of manslaughter in the first degree instead of murder, the trial court refused to charge the defense, deeming the charge unwarranted absent proof that Defendant suffered from an underlying "mental infirmity." The appellate division affirmed, concluding that Defendant's conduct before, during and after the offense was inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the charge should have been given, as the evidence would have permitted Defendant's jury reasonably to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the homicide, he was affected by an extreme emotional disturbance, and that the disturbance was supported by a reasonable explanation or excuse rooted in the situation as he perceived it.

In Soundview Park in the Bronx, a New York City police officer observed a knife on Defendant's person and seized it while issuing Defendant a summons for trespass and questioning him about his presence in the park after hours. The knife turned out to be a gravity knife, and Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendant moved to suppress the knife as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The Supreme Court granted the motion on the ground that, at the time the officer took the knife, he lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a crime. The appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to retrieve the knife and make an arrest when the knife turned out to be unlawful.

Plaintiffs commenced this hybrid declaratory judgment action/article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that the implementation of Local Law No. 3-2011 in relation to the November 8, 2011 general election was null and void for lack of compliance with the Nassau County Charter. At issue was whether the metes and bounds descriptions in Local Law No. 3-2011 applied to the 2011 general election or whether they were the first part of a three-step process to take effect in 2013. The court held that Supreme Court properly declared that Local Law No. 3-2011 was in accord with Nassau County Charter 112, but that its implementation was null and void in connection with the November 8, 2011 general election for lack of compliance with Nassau County Charter 113 and 114. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, without costs, and the order and judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.