Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. In a statement given shortly after the homicide, and at trial, Defendant admitted fatally stabbing her estranged boyfriend but claimed she had done so while attempting to defend herself. The trial evidence showed that Defendant had been a frequent victim of sexual and other physical abuse since her early childhood. After a social worker testified that Defendant had stabbed another man in the thigh and that Defendant was "very angry toward men" for all the abuse she had suffered, the prosecutor argued that the fatal stabbing had been motivated by anger and not by a reasonably perceived need to resort to deadly force for self-protection. Defendant's principal appellate contention was that the social worker's testimony should not have been received. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence was not demonstrably relevant to the specific state of mind at issue in this case and was more prejudicial than probative. View "People v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child. During the court of Defendant's bench trial, the trial court restrained Defendant without articulating a specific justification for doing so. Defendant was convicted of the charge. The Appellate Court upheld the conviction, rejecting Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in ordering that he remain handcuffed during the proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the rule governing visible restraints in jury trials applies with equal force to non-jury trials, and the district court erred in failing to state a basis on the record for keeping Defendant handcuffed throughout these proceedings; but (2) based upon the Court's recent holding in People v. Clyde, the constitutional error committed here was harmless. View "People v. Best" on Justia Law

Having decided to arrest Defendant for driving with a revoked license, a police officer also decided to impound the car he was driving. The officer did not inquire whether Defendant's passenger, who was not the registered owner of the car, was licensed and authorized to drive it. Defendant pled guilty for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officer acted unreasonably when he decided to impound and search the car without inquiring whether the passenger was licensed and authorized to drive it. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) no such inquiry was constitutionally required; and (2) the officer's search of the car after he decided to impound it was a valid inventory search. View "People v. Walker" on Justia Law

The lawyer who represented Defendant at a pre-trial hearing and at trial was simultaneously representing, in an unrelated matter, a police officer who testified for the People that Defendant had confessed to one of the charged crimes. Defendant appealed, contending that his lawyer's conflict denied him the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate division affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of any conflict of interest was invalid, but (2) Defendant failed to establish that any conflict affected the conduct of the defense. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that, because there was no valid waiver of the lawyer's conflict of interest, Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "People v. Solomon" on Justia Law

The question presented by these consolidated appeals was whether a defendant must preserve the argument that he was deprived of the right to a public trial when his family members were excluded from the courtroom during a portion of voir dire. In People v. Alvarez, the appellate division rejected Alvarez's argument that he had been deprived of a public trial as unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. In People v. George, the appellate division found George's argument that his right to a public trial had been violated was unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed in George, as preservation is required; and (2) reversed in Alvarez and remitted for a new trial, as the issue was adequately preserved. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Defendant contested his second violent felony offender adjudication, predicated upon a prior conviction in Pennsylvania that occurred when he was eighteen years old, contending (1) because he could have been accorded youthful offender status had he committed that crime in New York, he was entitled to such status for the purpose of enhanced sentencing, and (2) N.Y. Penal Law 70.04(1)(b)(v)'s tolling provision violated the equal protection clause of the State Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not receive youthful offender treatment for the underlying offense at issue, he was not now entitled to a retroactive application of youthful offender status to a foreign felony conviction; and (2) section 70.04(1)(b)(v)'s tolling provision, as applied to persons with differing years of incarceration may result in disparate punishment, does not violate the equal protection clause. View "People v. Meckwood" on Justia Law

At Defendant's trial for second-degree murder, the trial judge agreed with the defense attorney that a reasonable view of the evidence supported his request to submit the lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter to the jury. But contrary to defense counsel's request and repeated statements that, in his professional judgment, the lesser-included offenses should be given to the jury, the judge did not do so because Defendant objected. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge denied Defendant the expert judgment of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as the decision regarding whether to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses is for the defense attorney, not the accused, to make; and (2) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Colville" on Justia Law

Defendant's paramour, Maria, obtained an order of protection requiring Defendant to refrain from contacting her in any manner and to stay away from her. Defendant violated the order and was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Another order of protection was issued, which Defendant violated by trying to open the door of Maria's apartment. Based on this incident, Defendant was indicted for attempted burglary in the second degree and several counts of criminal contempt in the first degree. Defendant was convicted on all counts. At issue on appeal was whether the intent to do something inside the residence that would be legal in the absence of the order of protection establishes the requisite criminal state of mind to elevate the trespass to a burglary. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even an act that would otherwise be legal but for the issuance of the order of protection can be viewed as a crime, and the intent to commit this act inside a building may be used to prove a burglary charge. View "People v. Cajigas" on Justia Law

Appellants were indicted for enterprise corruption based in essential part on their commission of numerous predicate offenses. There was proof before the grand jury that three of them repeatedly purchased stolen credit card data which they then used for fraudulent purposes, and that the remaining appellant, through the company he controlled, Western Express International, Inc., facilitated transactions by which the purloined credit card data was transferred. Supreme court granted Appellants' respective motions to dismiss the indictment's enterprise corruption count upon the ground that the proof before the grand jury did not make out the existence of a "criminal enterprise." The appellate division reversed and reinstated the enterprise corruption count, concluding that the evidence permitted the inference that Appellants knowingly played roles in the enterprise even though, for the most part, they had no personal interaction. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the orders of supreme court, holding that although there was evidence of many arms' length transactions, there was no proof of concerted activity from which a petit jury might reasonably have gathered that Appellants were knowing participants in the affairs of a "criminal enterprise" within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 460.10(3). View "People v. W. Express Int'l Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the high profile disappearance of Michele Harris, the mother of four young children and Defendant's estranged wife. After a lengthy retrial, a jury convicted Defendant of murder in the second degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for a new trial, holding, (1) the appellate division properly held that the guilty verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence; but (2) a critical error occurred during voir dire when supreme court failed to elicit from a prospective juror an unequivocal assurance of her ability to be impartial after she apprised defense counsel that she had a preexisting opinion as to Defendant's guilt or innocence. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law