Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant's paramour, Maria, obtained an order of protection requiring Defendant to refrain from contacting her in any manner and to stay away from her. Defendant violated the order and was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Another order of protection was issued, which Defendant violated by trying to open the door of Maria's apartment. Based on this incident, Defendant was indicted for attempted burglary in the second degree and several counts of criminal contempt in the first degree. Defendant was convicted on all counts. At issue on appeal was whether the intent to do something inside the residence that would be legal in the absence of the order of protection establishes the requisite criminal state of mind to elevate the trespass to a burglary. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even an act that would otherwise be legal but for the issuance of the order of protection can be viewed as a crime, and the intent to commit this act inside a building may be used to prove a burglary charge. View "People v. Cajigas" on Justia Law

Appellants were indicted for enterprise corruption based in essential part on their commission of numerous predicate offenses. There was proof before the grand jury that three of them repeatedly purchased stolen credit card data which they then used for fraudulent purposes, and that the remaining appellant, through the company he controlled, Western Express International, Inc., facilitated transactions by which the purloined credit card data was transferred. Supreme court granted Appellants' respective motions to dismiss the indictment's enterprise corruption count upon the ground that the proof before the grand jury did not make out the existence of a "criminal enterprise." The appellate division reversed and reinstated the enterprise corruption count, concluding that the evidence permitted the inference that Appellants knowingly played roles in the enterprise even though, for the most part, they had no personal interaction. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the orders of supreme court, holding that although there was evidence of many arms' length transactions, there was no proof of concerted activity from which a petit jury might reasonably have gathered that Appellants were knowing participants in the affairs of a "criminal enterprise" within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 460.10(3). View "People v. W. Express Int'l Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the high profile disappearance of Michele Harris, the mother of four young children and Defendant's estranged wife. After a lengthy retrial, a jury convicted Defendant of murder in the second degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for a new trial, holding, (1) the appellate division properly held that the guilty verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence; but (2) a critical error occurred during voir dire when supreme court failed to elicit from a prospective juror an unequivocal assurance of her ability to be impartial after she apprised defense counsel that she had a preexisting opinion as to Defendant's guilt or innocence. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Court of Appeals considered whether a written letter from the assistant commissioner of the fire department of the city of New York to Petitioner firefighter advising him that he violated the department's code of conduct and equal employment (EEO) policy may be made part of Petitioner's permanent EEO file without affording him an opportunity for a hearing. The supreme court annulled the department's determination that Petitioner made racially offensive remarks and expunged the letter from Petitioner's EEO file. The appellate division affirmed, concluding that the department did not comport with the requirements of due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the department denied Petitioner his right to due process by placing the letter in his file without conducting a hearing, and thus the letter was properly expunged from Petitioner's permanent EEO file. View "D'Angelo v. Scoppetta" on Justia Law

In these two cases, Defendants were convicted of violent felonies. Their sentences were required by law to include a period of post-release supervision (PRS), but in each case the court failed to impose a PRS term. In both cases, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCS) sent notices to the sentencing courts and to Defendants pursuant to New York Correct. Law 601-d, which provides a procedure for resentencing defendants in cases where the original sentence illegally omitted a term of PRS. In both cases, the resentencings were delayed, and the courts that resentenced Defendants did not meet the deadline contained in section 601-d. Defendants therefore claimed their resentencings under section 601-d were untimely and therefore invalid. Defendant Jessie Velez also complaint that his resentencing took place after his original sentence had expired and thus violated constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals held (1) the failure to meet the statutory deadline did not impair the validity of the resentencing in these cases; but (2) Velez's sentence was barred by double jeopardy under the Court's decision in People v. Williams.

After a trial, Defendant was convicted for stealing copper pipes. A few months before trial, however, the pipes were returned to their rightful owner without the notice to Defendant required by N.Y. Penal Law 450.10. Defendant appealed, arguing that the defense team was prejudiced because they were deprived of an opportunity to examine the pipes and independently assess their value and that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to impose a sanction. The appellate division modified on the basis of an unpreserved error. The People appealed, arguing that the appellate court abused its discretion, as the alleged error was unpreserved for appellate review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the People's appeal, holding that the unpreserved issue in this case was beyond its review.

After a non-jury trial, Claimant was convicted of having committed various sex offenses. The appellate division reversed and ordered a new trial. The reversal was premised upon the manner in which certain exculpatory evidence had been dealt with, both by the prosecutor and defense counsel. Later, the indictment was dismissed on the People's motion. Following his release from prison, Claimant commenced this action to recover for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to Ct. Cl. Act 8-b. The State moved to dismiss on the ground that Claimant's wrongful conviction had not been found to have been actionably eventuated. Claimant cross-moved for summary judgment as to liability. The court of claims denied both motions. The appellate division affirmed the denial of the State's motion but reversed the denial of Claimant's cross motion, finding that the reversal of conviction was premised, at least in part, upon prosecutorial misconduct amounting to fraud, and awarding Claimant summary judgment upon the issue of liability. The Court of Appeals modified to deny Claimant's motion for summary judgment as to liability and otherwise affirmed, holding that the appellate court erred in finding that Claimant clearly and convincingly proved the elements of his fraud claim.

Defendant was convicted of several charges stemming from relationships she allegedly had with two underage students who attended a school where Defendant was a teacher. Defendant moved to vacate her conviction on the grounds that the People had violated their disclosure obligation by belatedly disclosing several emails and by failing to disclose certain other information that might have been used to impeach one of the alleged victims. The appellate division modified by reversing the conviction of bribing a witness, remanded that charge for a new trial, and otherwise affirmed the judgment of Supreme Court, holding that the prosecution failed to fulfill basic disclosure obligations essential to a fair trial but that failure did not affect the remaining counts of Defendant's conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, reversal was not required on the remaining counts as there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence supporting the alleged tainted count had a spillover effect on the other convictions.

Defendant was indicted on one count of grand larceny in the second degree and four counts of forgery in the second degree for stealing money from her employer. Defendant pleaded guilty to the entire indictment, and the court advised Defendant she should come up with one-half of the restitution owed by the time of sentencing. However, the court did not state that Defendant would go to prison if she failed to make any payments. Defendant subsequently appeared at sentencing without having made any restitution payments. Appellant was sentenced to the maximum term on each count of the indictment. The appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although Defendant waived her right to appeal the conviction, she never expressly waived her right to appeal the sentence, as, during the plea colloquy in this case, the court did not explain that the appeal waiver would bar Defendant from not only challenging the sentence she hoped to receive - five years probation - but also any sentence the court would impose in the event Defendant failed to meet the court's condition of paying the restitution by the date of sentencing.

The common issue presented by these two consolidated appeals was whether an appeal lies from an oral order issued by a criminal court on a pre-trial matter. In People v. Elmer, the People appealed from an oral decision by the trial court that granted, in part, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. In People v. Cooper, Defendant sought review of an oral order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search attendant to his arrest. In both cases, the appellate division ruled adversely to the appellants, finding that the failure to obtain a written order precluded appellate review. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that an appeal does lie from an oral order of a criminal court that finally disposes of the pre-trial matter at issue.