Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Complainant, a sitting Rochester City Court Judge, accused Defendant of sending her three offensive text messages. Defendant was charged with two misdemeanor counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree. A visiting judge from a neighboring county was assigned to preside over pretrial hearings. Despite repeated plea negotiations, the District Attorney's office did not offer Defendant a reduced charge or agree to a plea that included a favorable sentence. Defendant filed a motion and a renewed motion to disqualify the District Attorney due to the existence of a conflict of interest and requested that a special prosecutor be appointed. The District failed to rebut the allegations of disparate treatment with a single example of a comparable case it had similarly refused to resolve with a plea that included a favorable sentence. Both motions and requests were denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of aggravated harassment in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the District Attorney's office failed to take steps to dispel the appearance of inappropriate disparate treatment in this case, this was one of those rare cases in which a significant appearance of impropriety was created, requiring disqualification. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Amazon.com and Overstock.com. Both companies were formed in states other than New York, were located in states other than New York, and sold their merchandise solely through the Internet. At issue was N.Y. Tax Law 1101(b)(8)(vi) (the Internet tax), which was amended in 2008 to provide that vendors who paid New York residents to actively solicit business in the State would be required to pay New York taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the Internet tax, alleging that it was unconstitutional on its face as a violation the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Internet tax did not subject online retailers without a physical presence in the State to New York sales and compensating use taxes; and (2) the tax did not create an irrational, irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the State. View "Overstock.com, Inc. v State Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with various sex crimes pertaining to separate incidents involving two twelve-year-old girls. During the trial, the People presented the testimony of an expert witness on the subject of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the expert's testimony exceeded permissible bounds when the prosecutor tailored hypothetical questions to include facts concerning the abuse that occurred in this case, which improperly bolstered the People's proof that Defendant was the perpetrator; but (2) the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The appellate division reversed and remitted the matter for a new trial, concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in (1) precluding the testimony of a witness who had previously been accused by complainant of sexual abuse, and (2) permitting the prosecutor to adduce testimony from the People's child abuse expert, improperly bolstering the complainant's credibility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit expert testimony regarding the behavior of sexual abusers; but (2) the proffered testimony of the witness should have been permitted at trial, as the proposed testimony went to a material issue of Defendant's defense, and the trial court's error in excluding the testimony was not harmless. View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant executed in May 2009, law enforcement found a single pornographic image of a child on Defendant's computer. In September 2009, Defendant pled guilty to possessing a sexual performance of a child. In January 2010, the forensic examination of a memory card and other media devices seized pursuant to the warrant was performed and resulted in the discovery of hundreds of still-frame digital images depicting Defendant engaged in a sexual act with a child. Defendant subsequently entered a plea to predatory sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, concluding that by the time of the forensic examination yielding the inculpatory still-frame images took place, the authority provided by the warrant had lapsed, and therefore the search was illegal and the evidence obtained from it inadmissible. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant had no relevant expectation of privacy in the seized items to ground a Fourth Amendment-based suppression claim; and (2) even so, the claim would not be viable in light of the warrant's continued validity. View "People v. DeProspero" on Justia Law

After a joint trial with his co-defendant, Defendant was convicted on an accomplice theory of reckless endangerment in the first degree and attempted murder in the first degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as (i) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the sufficiency arguments identified on appeal because they were not fairly characterized as dispositive in Defendant's favor, and (ii) Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel contentions were similarly unavailing. View "People v. McGee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery, menacing, and possession of a weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People violated N.Y. Crim. Proc. 710.30, which Defendant argued entitled him to the suppression of testimony about the victim's post-arrest identification. Defendant also argued that trial counsel's failure to raise that issue deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, assuming there was a section 710.30, if defense counsel did make a mistake in failing to object to the evidence, the mistake was not so egregious and prejudicial as to deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Defendant and three codefendants - Eric Young, Marvin Howard and Nathaniel Williams - were jointly indicted on a theory of accomplice liability for second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession. Young and Howard waived their right to a jury, and Defendant and Williams were tried jointly. Howard testified during the trial. Defendant and Williams were convicted of both crimes, and the judge acquitted Howard. Defendant appealed on the ground that the judge's refusal to direct Howard to testify outside the jury's presence deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The appellate division agreed and reversed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the judge's decision to allow the jury to hear Howard's defense. View "People v. Warren" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts. At the time of the guilty plea, Defendant had a prior undischarged state sentence stemming from a felony drug conviction and also faced a federal violation of supervised release in connection with two prior federal felonies. Defendant was later sentenced to a determinate prison term of twelve years. The sentencing court stated that the sentence would be concurrent to the federal sentence. In addition, as a second felony drug offender, N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2-a) required Defendant's twelve-year prison term to run consecutively to his prior undischarged state sentence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court did not advise him of the consequence of his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the failure of the trial court to address the impact of section 70.25(2-a) during the plea colloquy did not require vacatur of the plea. View "People v. Belliard" on Justia Law

Following a verbal exchange between Defendant and a police officer in which Defendant swore at the officer and accused the officer of harassing him, Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct. In a search incident to arrest, the police discovered Defendant was in possession of twenty-five bags of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs found on his person, contending that the arrest for disorderly conduct was illegal, rendering the contraband fruit of the poisonous tree. After the motion was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance third degree and assault second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacated Defendant's guilty plea, and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant's arrest for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause due to insufficient proof on the public harm element; and (2) because the arrest was unlawful, the cocaine seized during the search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. View "People v. Baker" on Justia Law