Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant, an accountant, was convicted of one count of second-degree larceny and several counts second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument (CPFI), forty of which related to checks Defendant endorsed in a client's (Client) name. Defendant appealed, arguing that because the power of attorney Client executed granting Defendant powers to act in her stead with respect to a long list of subjects vested Defendant with the legal right to sign Client's name on the checks, his act in doing so was not forgery. The appellate division reversed Defendant's forty check-related CPFI convictions and dismissed those counts of the indictment, concluding that the evidence was not legally sufficient to convict Defendant of those crimes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Defendant was empowered to sign Client's name at the times when he drew or endorsed the forty checks at issue, there was legally insufficient evidence to convict him of CPFI. View "People v. Ippolito" on Justia Law

Upon Defendant's arraignment on charges of attempted robbery and robbery, the Legal Aid Society was assigned as Defendant's counsel. The Legal Aid Society later requested an adjournment date that would allow for a new Legal Aid attorney to prepare for trial, which the trial court rejected. The court then relieved the Legal Aid Society and assigned new counsel. Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the second degree. The appellate division reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court's discharge of Defendant's counsel without consulting Defendant was an abuse of discretion and interfered with Defendant's right to counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment claim by pleading guilty; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it removed the Legal Aid Society. View "People v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for second-degree kidnapping, two counts of second-degree weapon possession, and first-degree reckless endangerment. Defendant pled guilty to the charges. On appeal, Defendant sought reversal of the kidnapping conviction, arguing that his restraint of the victim was incidental to the conduct constituting reckless endangerment, and therefore, the kidnapping count merged with the reckless endangerment offense. The Appellate Division declined to address the merger theory since Defendant's guilty plea forfeited this claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preservation rule, which states that any claims of error not preserved by appropriate objection in the court of first instance will not be considered by the Court of Appeals, applies to a merger claim in a kidnapping prosecution, and therefore, Defendant's failure to assert the claim in Supreme Court precluded the Court's review. View "People v. Hanley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assaulting three deputy sheriffs while he was an inmate in county jail. At trial, Defendant testified that one deputy, Saeva, had started the physical fight. Defendant also denied kicking at or trying to hurt another deputy, Schliff. The jury acquitted Defendant of assaulting two of the deputies, including Saeva, but convicted him of assaulting Schliff. At issue was a video camera located in the cell block where Defendant and Saeva had their altercation. The video images were destroyed by the State before trial. At trial, the court refused to give an adverse inference charge as to the count on which Defendant was convicted with respect to any video of the incident because Defendant had asked for the preservation of that video before it was destroyed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that Defendant was entitled to have an adverse inference charge given as to all counts. View "People v. Handy" on Justia Law

Complainant, a sitting Rochester City Court Judge, accused Defendant of sending her three offensive text messages. Defendant was charged with two misdemeanor counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree. A visiting judge from a neighboring county was assigned to preside over pretrial hearings. Despite repeated plea negotiations, the District Attorney's office did not offer Defendant a reduced charge or agree to a plea that included a favorable sentence. Defendant filed a motion and a renewed motion to disqualify the District Attorney due to the existence of a conflict of interest and requested that a special prosecutor be appointed. The District failed to rebut the allegations of disparate treatment with a single example of a comparable case it had similarly refused to resolve with a plea that included a favorable sentence. Both motions and requests were denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of aggravated harassment in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the District Attorney's office failed to take steps to dispel the appearance of inappropriate disparate treatment in this case, this was one of those rare cases in which a significant appearance of impropriety was created, requiring disqualification. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Amazon.com and Overstock.com. Both companies were formed in states other than New York, were located in states other than New York, and sold their merchandise solely through the Internet. At issue was N.Y. Tax Law 1101(b)(8)(vi) (the Internet tax), which was amended in 2008 to provide that vendors who paid New York residents to actively solicit business in the State would be required to pay New York taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the Internet tax, alleging that it was unconstitutional on its face as a violation the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Internet tax did not subject online retailers without a physical presence in the State to New York sales and compensating use taxes; and (2) the tax did not create an irrational, irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the State. View "Overstock.com, Inc. v State Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with various sex crimes pertaining to separate incidents involving two twelve-year-old girls. During the trial, the People presented the testimony of an expert witness on the subject of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the expert's testimony exceeded permissible bounds when the prosecutor tailored hypothetical questions to include facts concerning the abuse that occurred in this case, which improperly bolstered the People's proof that Defendant was the perpetrator; but (2) the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The appellate division reversed and remitted the matter for a new trial, concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in (1) precluding the testimony of a witness who had previously been accused by complainant of sexual abuse, and (2) permitting the prosecutor to adduce testimony from the People's child abuse expert, improperly bolstering the complainant's credibility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit expert testimony regarding the behavior of sexual abusers; but (2) the proffered testimony of the witness should have been permitted at trial, as the proposed testimony went to a material issue of Defendant's defense, and the trial court's error in excluding the testimony was not harmless. View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant executed in May 2009, law enforcement found a single pornographic image of a child on Defendant's computer. In September 2009, Defendant pled guilty to possessing a sexual performance of a child. In January 2010, the forensic examination of a memory card and other media devices seized pursuant to the warrant was performed and resulted in the discovery of hundreds of still-frame digital images depicting Defendant engaged in a sexual act with a child. Defendant subsequently entered a plea to predatory sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, concluding that by the time of the forensic examination yielding the inculpatory still-frame images took place, the authority provided by the warrant had lapsed, and therefore the search was illegal and the evidence obtained from it inadmissible. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant had no relevant expectation of privacy in the seized items to ground a Fourth Amendment-based suppression claim; and (2) even so, the claim would not be viable in light of the warrant's continued validity. View "People v. DeProspero" on Justia Law

After a joint trial with his co-defendant, Defendant was convicted on an accomplice theory of reckless endangerment in the first degree and attempted murder in the first degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as (i) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the sufficiency arguments identified on appeal because they were not fairly characterized as dispositive in Defendant's favor, and (ii) Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel contentions were similarly unavailing. View "People v. McGee" on Justia Law