Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a high school student, anonymously posted sexual information and photographs of fellow classmates and other adolescents on Facebook, a social networking website. Defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to cyberbullying under a local law enacted by the Albany County Legislature. Defendant appealed, arguing that the cyberbullying law violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Albany County’s cyberbullying law was overbroad and facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause because the text of the law criminalized a variety of constitutionally-protected modes of expression - a great deal more than acts of cyberbullying. View "People v. Marquan M." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed on direct appeal. Approximately a decade later, Defendant moved to vacate his judgment of conviction, asserting that the People committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose to him that a federal civil action had been brought against one of their police witnesses, a homicide detective who interrogated Defendant, based on the detective’s alleged police misconduct in an unrelated case. The Appellate Division remitted the matter for a hearing, determining that the civil allegations against the detective constituted impeachment evidence and that the People’s failure to disclose them may have deprived Defendant of a fair trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although the civil allegations were favorable to Defendant, he failed to prove that the People suppressed the information or that he was prejudiced by the undisclosed information. View "People v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Defendant, the son of a Dead Sea Scrolls scholar, launched an internet campaign to attack the integrity and harm the reputation of other Dead Sea Scrolls academics and scholars. To accomplish his goal of discrediting and harming these individuals, Defendant used pseudonyms and impersonated real academics and scholars in communicating with academics, museum administrators, and reporters. A jury convicted Defendant on thirty counts, including several counts of identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, and aggravated harassment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions for nine counts of criminal impersonation in the second degree and all the convictions for forgery and vacated the remainder of the convictions, holding (1) the mere creation of email accounts in others’ names, which accounts are not used, does not constitute criminal conduct; (2) the aggravated harassment statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) the People did not sustain their burden of proof that Defendant was guilty of unauthorized use of university computers; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions of identity theft in the second degree. View "People v. Golb" on Justia Law

In 1968, Respondent pleaded guilty to rape and robbery. A federal court later vacated Respondent’s convictions. In 1978, Respondent was convicted of rape in the first degree. After Respondent was released on parole, he pleaded guilty in 1996 to rape in the first degree. Prior to Respondent’s release from custody, the State filed a petition under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Respondent moved to preclude expert testimony relating to both the 1968 charges and an uncharged rape Respondent allegedly committed in 1978. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under article 10. Supreme Court subsequently ordered Respondent committed to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) basis hearsay related to Respondent’s 1968 indictments for rape and robbery met minimum due process requirements and was properly admitted at trial; and (2) basis hearsay about Respondent’s uncharged rape was unreliable and should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless error. View "State v. John S." on Justia Law

Petitioners and other members of the East Meadow Teachers Association displayed picketing signs from their cars parked where parents were dropping their children off at Woodland Middle School. The Board of Education of the East Meadow Union Free School District (District) charged Petitioners with misconduct related to the demonstration, claiming that Petitioners created a safety risk by parking their cars so that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at curbside. Petitioners were found guilty of misconduct. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings against them violated their right to free speech. Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Appellate Division reversed after applying the two-part balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the picketing demonstration was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment; but (2) Petitioners’ interests in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the particular manner they employed on the day in question were outweighed by the District’s interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at the middle school. View "Santer v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant struck and killed a pedestrian while driving an automobile and was subsequently transported to police headquarters. While Defendant’s attorney was pursuing telephone contact with law enforcement personnel, the police obtained Defendant’s consent to administer a breathalyzer test. After Defendant took the test, she was indicted for second-degree manslaughter, second-degree vehicular manslaughter, and two counts of driving while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test on the grounds that it had been administered in violation of her right to counsel. Supreme Court granted the motion and suppressed the chemical tests. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the police violated Defendant’s constitutional right to counsel because Defendant was not alerted to the lawyer’s communication before the breath test occurred and because the People did not demonstrate that a notification of this nature would have been unreasonable under the circumstances. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant and his codefendants were charged via a sixty-one count indictment with several crimes arising from a sophisticated scheme to steal property through the use of forged credit cards. The case proceeded to trial on twenty-six of the counts. The jury found Defendant guilty on twenty of the twenty-six counts. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court ran afoul of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 310.20(2) when it submitted to the jury a verdict sheet containing the locations of the designated offenses; and (2) law enforcement’s warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device on Defendant’s vehicle violated this Court’s holding in People v. Weaver and the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Jones. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court appropriately included the annotations on the verdict sheet so that the jury could distinguish the submitted counts; and (2) Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the warrantless installation of the GPS tracking device on his vehicle, but the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law

These four cases involved criminal appeals that were not pursued for more than a decade after the filing of a notice of appeal. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal in each case. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the dismissals in three of the cases, as the procedure followed in these cases did not deny the defendants of any constitutional right, nor did the Appellate Division abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeals; and (2) remitted the fourth case to the Appellate Division so that counsel could be appointed to represent the defendant in opposing the dismissal of his appeal, as the Appellate Division erred in denying this defendant’s appeal before assigning him counsel on that appeal and giving counsel a chance to review the record. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

Appellants retained Mary Dorman to represent them in a lawsuit. During the litigation, Dorman and Appellants entered into three separate retainer agreements pertaining to Dorman’s work on the trial, on the appeal to the Appellate Division, and on the appeal to the Court of Appeals. A jury ruled in Appellants’ favor, awarding them $986,671 in damages. Dorman was awarded $296,826 for her trial work. The verdict and trial fee awards were upheld on appeal. Dorman subsequently requested fees for her appellate work, and Supreme Court awarded Dorman $233,966. After a monetary dispute arose between Dorman and Appellants, Dorman sought a declaratory judgment to enforce the three retainer agreements. Supreme Court granted Dorman’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Dorman correctly interpreted the fee calculation. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order with regard to the trial agreement and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial agreement entitled Dorman to one third of the jury award; and (2) because the trial agreement did not address the treatment of statutory counsel fees, Dorman was entitled to the more generous alternative of either one third of the jury verdict or the statutory award for her trial work. View "Albunio v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2001, Defendant was found guilty of robbery and other crimes and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Supreme Court later ordered that Defendant be resentenced, determining that Defendant’s sentence was illegal because it did not include a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS). After Defendant was conditionally released, Supreme Court resentenced Defendant by imposing a term of PRS. In 2009, the maximum term of Defendant’s prison sentence passed. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion to set aside his second sentence, arguing that the imposition of PRS constituted double jeopardy because he was out of prison on conditional release when it was imposed. Supreme Court granted the motion and resentenced Defendant, reimposing the terms of his completed initial sentence. The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s appeal, concluding that imposing PRS in this case would constitute double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant had not acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence because the direct appeal of the sentence Defendant served was not over; and (2) therefore, the prohibition against double jeopardy was not implicated in this case. View "People v. Cintron" on Justia Law