Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested after striking a marked New York City police vehicle. After he was arrested, Defendant consented to a breathalyzer test, which resulted in a reading below the 0.08 minimum required for a per se violation. Defendant was not given a physical coordination test on the basis of a language barrier. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. Criminal Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the New York Police Department (NYPD) violated Defendant’s constitutional rights by failing to offer a physical coordination test on the basis of a language barrier. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the NYPD policy withstands rational basis review, Defendant’s equal protection claim must be rejected; and (2) given the substantial State interests involved, Defendant’s due process claim must be rejected. View "People v. Aviles" on Justia Law

Respondent was riding his bicycle against the flow of traffic on a one-way street when officers stopped him. Respondent told the officers he was sixteen years old. The police arrested Respondent and transported him to the precinct, where Respondent told law enforcement that he was only fifteen years old. Thereafter, the officers placed Respondent in a juvenile room and instructed him to remove his belt, shoelaces, and shoes as a protective measure. A revolver was recovered from one of the shoes. The presentment agency filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Respondent with various weapon possession counts. Respondent filed a motion to suppress. Family Court denied the motion, concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest Respondent for disorderly conduct and that the seizure of the gun was legal because the officers were justified in having Respondent remove his shoes as part of protocol to ensure a detainee’s safety. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the search that uncovered the weapon from Respondent’s shoe was unreasonable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the officers’ initial arrest of Respondent was lawful where the officers believed he was sixteen years old at the time; and (2) the subsequent search of Respondent’s shoes was reasonable. View "In re Jamal S." on Justia Law

A hearing officer found Petitioner, a prison inmate, guilty of violating two prison disciplinary rules and imposed penalty of twelve months’ punitive confinement in a special housing unit. The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision affirmed. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding challenging the determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in dismissing Petitioner’s article 78 petition because a violation of Petitioner’s right to call witnesses occurred at the administrative hearing where the hearing officer failed to undertake a meaningful inquiry into a requested witness’s allegation that the witness had been coerced into refusing to testify. View "Cortorreal v. Annucci" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The county court sentenced Defendant, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of eight years’ imprisonment and three years of postrelease supervision. On appeal, Defendant argued that the county court erred in failing to hold a Darden hearing, as the information provided by a confidential informant (CI) was insufficient to establish probable cause to support a search warrant for his apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a Darden hearing was unnecessary because reasonable cause for the search existed independently of the statements by the CI to the police. View "People v. Crooks" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of identity theft in the first degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and theft of services. At several court appearances, the People requested adjournments. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights. Supreme Court denied the motion. More than sixteen months after commencement of the criminal action, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by dismissing the identity theft count but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds, as (1) Defendant did not consent to additional delay attributable to court congestion, and (2) the People failed to announce readiness within the statutory time period. View "People v. Barden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery and sentenced to a twenty-year term of imprisonment. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, finding a majority of Defendant’s challenges on appeal unpreserved. Defendant appealed, arguing that errors made by the prosecution before the Grand Jury required dismissal of the indictment and that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to preserve these claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s challenges were not preserved; (2) defense counsel was not ineffective; and (3) Defendant’s remaining contentions were partially unpreserved and otherwise meritless. View "People v. Griggs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and two counts of assault in the first degree. Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time of the crime, challenged the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by withholding information from an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant received meaningful and effective representation; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and menacing in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by permitting the People to introduce DNA reports into evidence providing that Defendant’s DNA profile was found on the gun that was the subject of the charged possessory weapon offense without producing a single witness who conducted, witnessed, or supervised the laboratory’s generation of the DNA profile from the gun or Defendant’s exemplar. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of Defendant’s DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data, must be available to testify. View "People v. John" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and related crimes. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding him from presenting third-party culpability evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the standard set forth in People v. Primo that third-party culpability evidence should be evaluated in accordance with ordinary evidentiary principles does not infringe upon a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense; and (2) applying the Primo standard in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant’s “ill-defined and speculative” third-party culpability evidence. View "People v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his initial statement made to a police detective, as well as a statement he made after a forty-five-minute break, on the grounds that the detective failed to issue a complete set of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview. The hearing court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division reversed and denied the suppression motion, concluding that Defendant’s second statement had been attenuated from the first. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of murder in the second degree. Defendant moved to vacate the judgment, alleging that defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to reopen the suppression hearing based on the detective’s trial account of the statement made by Defendant prior to the issuance of the Miranda warnings. Supreme Court denied Defendant’s post-judgment motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance claim. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law