Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Paul Choy filed a complaint in district court alleging various tort claims against respondent Ameristar Casinos. According to the complaint, Choy was gambling at the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City when he was handcuffed by casino security guards and his belongings were searched. Ameristar subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was not properly named as a party because Ameristar did not own or operate the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. In his opposition to Ameristar's motion, Appellant sought a continuance under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow discovery before granting Ameristar's motion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameristar and denied Choy's request for a continuance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Choy did not comply with rule 56(f) because he did not attach an affidavit explaining why he sought a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery, and therefore, the district court properly denied Choy's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court properly granted Ameristar's motion for summary judgment because Choy failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue regarding Ameristar's ownership or operation or Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City.

Appellant Stuard Stephans and a companion stole six bottles of men's cologne from a retail department store. At trial, the State relied on the store's loss prevention officer to prove both theft and value. The officer testified, over the defense's foundation, hearsay, and best evidence objections, that the stolen goods he recovered bore price tags adding up to $477. Neither the price tags nor duplicates of them were offered or admitted. In order to establish grand larceny, the State needed to prove that the stolen goods had a value of $250 or more. A jury convicted Stephans of grand larceny and burglary, both felonies, and conspiracy to commit larceny, a gross misdemeanor. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grand larceny charge, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the officer's testimony, and the defense objections to the testimony should have been sustained; and (2) affirmed the judgment of conviction as to conspiracy and burglary.

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded.

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was named as a defendant in an action alleging civil rights violations. LVMPD had an insurance policy with respondent Coregis Insurance to protect against liability for police officer actions when the damages exceeded a certain amount. Coregis denied LVMPD coverage for the civil rights claims because LVMPD did not notify Coregis of its potential liability until ten years after the incident that led to the lawsuit. After settling the action, LVMPD filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination that Coregis was required to defend and indemnify LVMPD for damages related to the civil rights claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Coregis, concluding that LVMPD's notice was clearly late and that Coregis was prejudiced by the late notice. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding (1) when an insurer denies coverage of a claim because the insured party failed to provide timely notice of the claim, the insurer must demonstrate that notice was late and that it was prejudiced by the late notice in order to assert a late-notice defense to coverage; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of LVMPD's notice. Remanded.

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual.

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection.